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1 Introduction
1.1 The economic problem of organizational risk appetite
In our current era of major global challenges and worldwide crises the human race is contin-
uously searching for solutions to the fundamental economic problem of how to determine 
which aims should be pursued and how limited resources ought to be allocated. Economics 
as the science that studies “human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means” 
(Robbins 1932 p.16) is poised to prescribe normative antidotes to the calamities and acts of 
man that plague today’s financial and economic markets. Aiming to minimize the adverse 
effects of risk at minimum cost, organizations are engaged in a balancing act between the ex 
ante allocation of resources for risk reduction and the ex post adequacy of resources to absorb 
losses. The outcome of this trade-off is an expression of the organization’s willingness to 
accept risk, also known as its risk appetite. Scarcity of resources implies that the probability 
of occurrence and the potential impact of events identified as risks cannot always be reduced 
beforehand, and thus requires these risks to be ranked in priority by a decision maker in the 
organization. Risk attitude, a concept from decision theory, allows one to specify the rank 
order of a set of identified risks. In addition, the concept of risk appetite specifies the subset 
of this rank ordered set of risky events that requires control measures and its complement 
that, in contrast, is accepted. Given that organizational risk appetite is not unlimited, this 
thesis explores how measurements of risk attitude can be applied meaningfully in risk man-
agement to the economic problem of scarcity of resources. 
In order to survive, human kind has always been engaged actively in the management 
of risk. As a formal field of study and practice, however, risk management only established 
itself in the second half of the 20th century. In the 1990s the idea that organizations should 
manage their risks holistically led to what is now commonly referred to as enterprise risk 
management (ERM). The COSO (2004a p.4) framework for enterprise risk management 
provides the following definition for this enterprise-wide view of risk management: 
“Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, manage-
ment and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed 
to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.”
The risk management process is typically composed of the following steps: setting organiza-
tional objectives, identifying events that threaten the objectives (risk identification), assessing 
the probability that these events will occur and their impact on the objectives (risk assessment), 
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determining the acceptability of the events identified (risk evaluation), formulating a suitable 
response to the events in terms of control measures (risk treatment) and finally monitoring 
whether the controls are effective. The risk evaluation step requires the organization to for-
mulate its risk appetite. Through its definition of enterprise risk management, the COSO 
framework formalized a requirement for organizations to become more explicit about their risk 
appetite and thereby created “a new managerial and regulatory object of attention” (Power 2007 
p.78). In the COSO framework, organizational risk appetite is defined as “the broad-based 
amount of risk a company or entity is willing to accept in pursuit of its mission” (p.110). The 
large number of internet pages on risk appetite and an abundance of references in professional 
literature indeed demonstrate that the topic has not been wanting in attention. Despite this 
large stock of guidelines, advice and good practice examples, practitioners still characterize the 
topic as “challenging”, “tough”, and “one of the hardest things to define” (www.LinkedIn.com 
ERM discussion group).
The communis opinio in risk management is that risk appetite should be formally ex-
pressed and that it should reflect the risk attitude of the senior management of the organiza-
tion, which acts in the interests of its stakeholders. In line with the “rituals of verification” 
that today’s “Audit Society” (Power 1997) requires organizations to perform, these Board 
approved statements of risk appetite act as traces of evidence of good governance. A formal 
and approved expression of risk appetite is presumed to attest to the active involvement of 
senior management in the setting of risk appetite so that it supposedly reflects a deliberate 
and well thought-out attitude towards organizational risk taking. Recent publications by 
risk management practitioners explicitly call for the need to embed the senior management’s 
risk attitude in the organizational risk appetite.
These demands for the validation of organizational risk appetite could be addressed by 
models and methods from behavioral economics that facilitate the analysis and the elicita-
tion of a decision maker’s risk attitude. Behavioral economics is a branch of economics that 
incorporates findings from psychology into economic models with a view to understand-
ing human decision making in economic settings. Since the 1990s, behavioral economics 
has been a mainstream branch in economics and, rather recently, received a lot of media 
attention due to the publication of popular monographs such as Thinking Fast and Slow 
(Kahneman 2011), Predictably Irrational (Ariely 2008), and Nudge (Thaler & Sunstein 
2008). The discipline in which behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists cooperate 
in the study of individual decision making under risk and uncertainty is referred to as deci-
sion theory. An accessible academic treatment of decision theory recently became available 
in the form of the textbook Prospect Theory for Risk and Ambiguity (Wakker 2010). The 
application of decision theory to decision problems in practice is referred to as decision 
analysis. Despite the high regard in which decision theory is held in academic circles, it is 
not yet commonplace for its concepts to be applied in practice, not even in very important 
decisions. In relation to risk appetite, decision theory holds the promise that its descriptive 
models can uncover the professional risk attitudes of key decision makers and that its nor-
mative models may offer to improve strategic decisions on organizational risk appetite.
17
1.2 Decision theory and decision analysis
One of the models in decision theory that is commonly applied in enterprise risk manage-
ment is expected value (EV, Huygens 1657). This decision model assumes a risk neutral 
decision maker who determines the priority of risks on the basis of their mathematical 
expectation. For example, under expected value theory a decision maker is indifferent be-
tween accepting a 50/50-gamble with monetary outcomes -100 and 0 and losing the cer-
tain amount -50. The shorthand for this indifference between the standard gamble and its 
certainty equivalent is
 -50 ~ (.5 : -100, .5 : 0), (1.1)
where the symbol ~ represents equivalence. Another model for decision making under risk is 
expected utility (EU, Bernoulli 1738/1954). Expected utility theory is famous in economics but 
has found little application in enterprise risk management. In this model the decision maker is 
assumed to be risk averse. Examples of aversion to risk can be found in the indifferences
 -60 ~ (.5 : -100, .5 : 0), and  (1.2a)
 -50 ~ (.4 : -100, .6 : 0).  (1.2b)
In both cases the decision maker is willing to lose a sure amount that is more negative than 
the expected value of the gamble, and is thus said to be risk averse. Indifferences similar to 
those in equations 1.2a and 1.2b can be found by requesting a decision maker to express 
her preference for either the sure amount or the gamble in equation 1.1. Let us assume 
that the indifference in this equation does not hold for a particular decision maker. We can 
then either let this decision maker adjust the sure amount until she is indifferent (certainty 
equivalent method ) or we let her adjust the probability of losing until indifference is reached 
( probability equivalent method ). Let us assume that as a result of these two choice processes 
the indifferences in equation 1.2a and 1.2b result. Expected utility theory models these in-
differences using a concave utility function. It assigns priority to risks on the basis of a math-
ematical expectation over outcomes that have been transformed to utility. The expected 
utility model then represents the two indifferences by the following equations
 u(-60) = .5 × u(-100) + .5 × u(0), and  (1.3a)
 u(-50) = .4 × u(-100) + .6 × u(0). (1.3b)
One of the major achievements of expected utility theory is that it enables the measurement 
of utility by inferring utility from revealed preferences (Samuelson 1938) using representa-
tions such as equations 1.3a and 1.3b. For example, when we assign utilities to outcomes 
and let u(-100) = -1 and u(0) = 0 then we infer from equation 1.3a that u(-60) = -.5 
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and from equation 1.3b that u(-50) = -.4. By plotting these data points in a graph with 
outcomes on the horizontal axis and utility on the vertical axis we derive a concave utility 
function. 
Both expected value and expected utility have a normative status as rational models 
for decision making under risk. The rationality of expected value hinges on the law of 
large numbers. The rationality of the expected utility model was firmly established by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) who formulated four axioms for rational choice and 
proved that these axiomata and the expected utility representation were equivalent. How-
ever, despite their attractiveness from a normative standpoint empirical evidence indicates 
that expected value and expected utility theory do not accurately describe actual choice 
behavior under risk. 
Expected value was already disregarded as a descriptive theory of choice under risk since 
Bernoulli published the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli 1738/1954). Expected utility’s 
descriptive validity was rejected when the outcomes of several choice experiments, one of the 
famous being the Allais paradox (Allais 1953), did not correspond with the predictions of 
the theory. To provide a descriptively accurate theory of choice under risk that is capable of 
teasing out the rational from the irrational components of choice behavior, Kahneman and 
Tversky invented prospect theory (PT, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 
1992). This theory accommodated several biases from expected utility that had already been 
reported previously in the literature. 
One of these biases was the phenomenon of risk seeking in the domain of losses. Con-
trary to the indifferences presented in equations 1.2a and 1.2b responses in the domain 
of losses typically do not express a risk averse but instead risk seeking tendency. Given the 
choice to adjust either the sure amount or the probability of losing, a risk seeking decision 
maker could for instance end up with the following indifferences
 -40 ~ (.5 : -100, .5 : 0), and  (1.3c)
 -50 ~ (.6 : -100, .4 : 0).  (1.3d)
Decision makers rather consistently prefer the gamble in equation 1.1 over losing the sure 
amount with same expected value. The inference drawn from equations 1.3c and 1.3d by 
the decision analyst under expected utility would then be that utility in the domain of losses 
is convex, with u(-40) = -.5 and u(-50) = -.6. 
Empirical evidence additionally suggests that decision makers not only transform out-
comes but also transform probabilities. While the utility function u(.) in equation 1.3a and 
1.3b is already used to transform outcomes, an additional transformation can be applied to 
probabilities using a probability weighting function w(.). Under prospect theory the indif-
ferences in equations 1.3c and 1.3d would then be represented by
 u(-60) = w(.5) × u(-100) + (1 - w(.5)) × u(0), and  (1.4a)
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 u(-50) = w(.4) × u(-100) + (1 - w(.4)) × u(0). (1.4b)
Under prospect theory the decision analyst would now infer u(-40) = -w(.5) and u(-50) = 
-w(.4), which leaves both u(.) and w(.) initially undefined. By assuming functional speci-
fications for u(.) and w(.) and employing a statistical optimization technique, such as non-
linear regression analysis, the decision analyst would, however, still be able to infer a shape 
for both functions.
Another deviation from the expected utility model is loss aversion, the phenomenon 
that “losses loom larger than corresponding gains” (Tversky & Kahneman 1991 p.1039). 
A loss averse decision maker is not indifferent between maintaining her status quo and 
accepting a 50/50 “fair” gamble with monetary outcomes +100 and -100. To break even 
with zero a loss averse decision maker typically requires the magnitude of gains to be much 
higher than the absolute value of losses such as, for example, in the indifference
 0 ~ (.5 : 100, .5 : -50). (1.5)
Under prospect theory, loss aversion is represented by the loss aversion coefficient λ, with 
λ > 1, which is multiplied with utility u(.) in the domain of losses. As a result, graphical 
plots indicate the slope of the loss utility function to be much steeper than that of the gain 
utility function and show a distinct kink at zero, the point at which both functions connect. 
Under prospect theory, the indifference in equation 1.5 is represented by
 u(0) = w+(.5) × u(100) + w-(.5) × λ × u(-50). (1.6)
This equation illustrates that prospect theory requires the decision analyst to estimate u(.) 
for gains as well as losses, probability weighting functions for gains and losses w+(.) and 
w-(.), and, in addition, the loss aversion parameter λ. In comparison with the expected util-
ity model, prospect theory offers more descriptive accuracy at the expense of an increase in 
model complexity.
While evidence of discrepancies with expected utility theory offers more descriptive 
insight into the domain of decision making under risk, the knowledge of these deviations 
reduce the freedom of the decision analyst to employ her traditional range of instruments 
prescriptively. Only by dismissing an abundance of empirical evidence on nonlinear prob-
ability weighting, can the analyst freely elicit utility by means of the certainty equivalent and 
probability equivalent methods and continue to believe that the resulting utility function is 
unbiased. The assumption of concave utility over the entire outcome domain, which is in-
herent in economic models, can only be maintained by discharging evidence of risk seeking 
in the domain of losses. By forfeiting empirical findings on loss aversion and its distinctive 
kink in utility at zero, the decision analyst is able to safeguard the analysis from “sources 
of embarrassment”, given that “few people or companies would want a utility curve with 
kinks and bumps” (Howard 1988 p.689). However, the mainstream application of decision 
analysis to corporate decision-making (e.g. Spetzler 1968, Walls & Dyer 1996, Stanford 
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University Strategic Decisions Group 2010) continues to adhere to utility elicitation under 
the assumptions of expected utility. An alternative to this “classical elicitation assumption” 
is to elicit utility under the assumptions of prospect theory, while maintaining the “norma-
tive assumption” in decision analysis of expected utility’s superiority as a rational model 
(Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker 2001 p.1499). Several utility elicitation methods enable the 
elicitation of such an unbiased utility function under prospect theory (Wakker & Deneffe 
1996, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv 2007). 
These utility elicitation methods offer the decision analyst the tools to measure the 
unbiased utility function of senior managers under prospect theory. These utility functions 
are assumed to represent the true preferences of the organizational decision makers and can 
be applied in the rational expected utility model to formulate organizational risk appetite. 
The application of these unbiased utility functions to the traditional expected utility model 
can then be referred to as “unbiased expected utility” and its application to the formula-
tion of organizational risk appetite opens a window of opportunity for decision theorists 
who, despite their impressive academic track record, have not yet been able to “conquer 
the world” (Kahneman 2007, session six). There are, however, several unresolved issues that 
need consideration in order to tighten the gap between the “practice and promise” (Howard 
1988 p.679) of decision analysis for enterprise risk management.
1.3 Questions
One of the greatest stumbling blocks for the adoption of decision theory in the field of en-
terprise risk management is its empirical finding of risk seeking in the domain of losses. Risk 
seeking in the domain of losses implies that a decision maker who faces two risky choices 
with the same expected value, of which neither promises any prospect of a gain, will prefer 
the risky alternative, i.e. the option with a lower probability of occurrence at the expense 
of a larger loss. Risk seeking for losses applies to pure risk, a decision context in which 
losses are the only possible outcome and no gains can be made. Historically the mainstream 
convention in risk management has been to adopt a neutral attitude to pure risk, whereas 
several authors, partly in response to the 2007–2009 financial crisis, favor an averse attitude 
to this risk category. In economics risk aversion is normatively advocated under the law of 
diminishing marginal utility. Here risk aversion implies that the utility function for losses 
is concave under expected utility theory. Under expected utility theory, risk seeking for 
losses is modeled through a convex utility function. If organizational risk appetite is based 
on a utility function elicited from the ranks of its senior management which, despite being 
unbiased, is a convex function of losses, then the normative application of the expected util-
ity framework will stimulate the organization to engage in low probability – high impact 
gambles with negative consequences only. 
The measurement of organizational risk appetite requires the organization to define ap-
propriate risk measures. Such risk measures may be based on the utility function of its senior 
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management. Measure theory stipulates whether a suitable risk measure can be obtained 
from such a function. The question remains how utility functions are used to obtain suitable 
measures for risk. 
In operational risk management it is very popular to prioritize risks using the risk ma-
trix, a grid with on its two axes a scale for the probability of the occurrence of a risk and a 
scale for its negative impact respectively. The risk matrix expresses risk appetite by indicating 
which risks are acceptable to the organization and which risks are unacceptable and thus 
should be controlled. Practitioners find it hard to decide where to draw the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable risks. While an unbiased utility function of senior management 
can be used to draw this boundary within the risk matrix, it remains unclear how exactly 
this should be done.
Relatively few studies in decision theory have empirically elicited utility and prob-
ability weighting functions within the context of organizational decision making. Organi-
zational life is full of examples that resemble mixed gambles, i.e. gambles that incorporate 
both gains and losses. In the context of organizational risk appetite, mixed gambles that 
involve large monetary amounts are particularly relevant. In decision theory, the use of 
mixed gambles is restricted mainly to the elicitation of the loss aversion parameter. The 
technicalities of eliciting this parameter require furthermore that the decision analyst use 
very small monetary amounts in the elicitation process. This line of questioning, which is 
completely accepted in decision theory, is not compatible with the real conditions of enter-
prise risk management to which a senior management is exposed in practice. 
Organizations usually do not publish their formalized expressions of risk appetite. It is 
therefore as yet unknown what risk attitude is expressed in organizational policies that formu-
late organizational risk appetite. A priori it is unclear whether to expect a risk seeking tendency, 
such as predicted under prospect theory in the domain of losses, a risk averse attitude, as 
assumed in economic models, or a risk neutral, expected value type of reasoning. 
While decision theory is very quantitative, enterprise risk management is often very 
qualitative in nature. Quantification of risk is prominently present in financial risk manage-
ment. In operational risk management, however, it is common to use verbal expressions of 
probability and outcome in risk assessments. As a result, risk appetite is often considered as 
something vague and qualitative. The question is then what the relevance is for operational 
risk management of a quantitative approach, such as proclaimed in decision theory. The 
value added of decision theory could lie in its ability to connect qualitative and quantita-
tive risk analysis by determining the utility of verbal outcome expressions and the weight of 
verbal probability expressions.
The cornerstone of the theory of incentives, or principal-agent theory (Laffont & 
Martimort 2002), is that economic agents are risk averse. To align the objectives of the 
agent with those of the principal, incentives can be used. The empirical finding of risk 
seeking in the domain of losses challenges one of the theory’s major assumptions, namely 
the risk aversion of the agent. While the problem in principal-agent theory is to induce the 
agent to take risk, in response to the 2007–2009 financial crisis there is an increased call 
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for performance-based incentives to promote prudent behavior by economic agents. What 
kind of incentives can be designed to induce organizations to adopt an averse appetite to 
risk remains an unresolved issue. 
Based on these issues, five central questions have been formulated:
Which models from decision theory and which methods from measure theory ensure 1. 
that organizational risk appetite both complies with the risk attitude of senior manage-
ment and a rational model of decision making? What effect does risk attitude have on 
organizational risk appetite in the risk matrix?
Which utility elicitation method is compatible with the elicitation of utility in the con-2. 
text of organizational risk appetite?
If the objective is to describe the organizational risk appetite of practitioners, which 3. 
decision theory (expected value, unbiased expected utility or prospect theory) 
performs best?
If verbal probability and outcome expressions are used in risk evaluation, do the intro-4. 
spective judgments of their value differ from those that can be inferred from the choices 
of participants under prospect theory? 
What is the influence of performance-based incentives on expressions of risk appetite 5. 
in the risk matrix? 
1.4 Structure
To answer these five central questions this dissertation reviews relevant literature in risk 
management, decision theory, measure theory, linguistics and principal-agent theory. To 
answer the first central question, a literature review of risk management, decision theory 
and measure theory was undertaken. An attempt was made to integrate the findings 
from these fields in order to apply measurements of a senior management’s risk attitude 
to organizational risk appetite. Given the lack of archival data on the subject of orga-
nizational risk appetite, the remaining four central questions could not be answered by 
archival-based methodologies. The exploratory nature of these questions, however, did 
lend itself to the use of individual case-studies as a data-collection method. To answer the 
third and fourth central questions, research was therefore carried out at two anonymous 
case companies. Given our aim to unravel organizational risk appetite from the perspec-
tive of decision theory, survey and experimental methods from decision theory were ap-
plied to these two companies. Surveys were used to assess the correspondence between 
organizational risk appetite and several decision theories in response to the third central 
question. To answer the fourth central question, an experimental design was used to 
compare introspective and choice-based values of verbal expressions under a small versus 
a large project condition. The survey method was also applied in trial sessions in which 
the elicitation method was tested that has been designed in response to the second cen-
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tral question. To test the existence of a causal relationship between performance-based 
incentives and risk appetite, an experimental design was used to answer the fifth central 
question. 
This thesis is structured as follows. 
Decision theory, measure theory, and organizational risk appetite (Chapters 2 & 3)
Chapters 2 and 3 are theoretical chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the topic of this thesis, 
namely organizational risk appetite. Furthermore three decision theories are discussed, 
in particular expected value, expected utility and prospect theory. The chapter estab-
lishes the consistency of valuation methods from decision theory with the definition of 
a risk measure, in the sense in which this concept is used in measure theory. The chapter 
provides new definitions for organizational risk appetite, unbiased utility, and unbiased 
risk attitude. It also introduces a risk measure that is derived from the willingness-to-
accept and willingness-to-pay concepts in decision theory: the zero equivalent risk mea-
sure. Several decision rules for organizational risk appetite are defined and illustrated by 
examples.
In chapter 3, the zero equivalent risk measure and these decision rules are applied to the 
risk matrix. The chapter contains three observations and one proposition that are derived 
from isocontours in the risk matrix. The chapter concludes with examples that illustrate the 
different expressions of organizational risk appetite that result in the risk matrix under ex-
pected value, exponential expected utility, and expected utility based on the unbiased utility 
function from prospect theory.
Utility elicitation and organizational risk appetite (Chapter 4)
Chapter 4 identifies several utility elicitation conventions in decision theory that are not 
compatible with risk as it is experienced by organizations. It defines a new four-step non-
parametric elicitation method that extends the trade-off method (Wakker & Deneffe 1996) 
to the whole domain of outcomes and is more compatible with real-life business conditions. 
Initial results of trial sessions in which the practical applicability of this method was tested 
are reported. 
Describing organizational risk appetite using decision theory (Chapter 5)
Based on a field study in which the senior management of a large Dutch company was in-
volved, chapter 5 assesses which decision theory performs best in describing organizational 
risk appetite. In this study utility and probability weighting functions of senior managers 
were elicited under prospect theory using the elicitation method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt 
and Paraschiv (2007). The introspective judgments of organizational risk appetite of these 
senior managers were compared with predictions from expected value theory, unbiased ex-
pected utility theory, and prospect theory. 
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The utility and probability weight of verbal probability and outcome expressions (Chapter 6)
Chapter 6 presents a field experiment in which consultants of a Dutch subsidiary of an inter-
national consultancy company were engaged. It presents an extensive overview of vagueness 
studies, in particular with respect to verbal expressions. On the basis of this, two hypotheses 
are defined regarding the utility and probability weight of verbal probability and outcome 
expressions. Prospect theory values in this study were derived using the elicitation method 
of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L’Haridon (2008). 
Performance-based incentives and organizational risk appetite (Chapter 7)
Chapter 7 reports the results of a laboratory experiment on the effect of performance-
based incentives on risk appetite. It reviews the role of incentives in risk management 
and principal-agent theory and, based on this theory, suggests an effective performance-
based incentive. Three hypotheses are posited about the effect of incentives on risk ap-
petite and the efficiency and effectiveness of risk management. The experimental design 
is based on the risk matrix. Monte Carlo simulation is used to define optimum choice 
strategies for risk appetite. 
Chapter 8 contains a discussion of the conclusions derived in this thesis and the direction 
future research in this area may take.
The chapters in this thesis have been written as separate articles for journals and for the pur-
pose of this thesis have been rewritten so as to contain a minimum of overlap between the 
chapters. The ordering of the chapters follows the five research questions in this introduc-
tion and not the chronological order in which they were written. At the time each chapter 
was written, the findings in preceding chapters may therefore not have been known to the 
author. While the chapters in this thesis are written by a single author, occasionally the first-
person plural form is used for stylistical reasons. When referring to a decision maker in the 
third-person singular form, the feminine form is adopted.
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2 On the Measurement of Risk Appetite and Risk Attitude
Summary
This chapter proposes to measure organizational risk appetite on the basis of an expected 
utility model in which the utility function is elicited under the assumptions of prospect 
theory. This utility function is free from the bias of probability distortion and is assumed to 
reflect the true preferences of the decision maker. The unbiased risk attitude of the decision 
maker, which is embedded in this function, can subsequently be used to calculate the utility 
based shortfall risk (UBSR) measure. Three examples illustrate how the zero equivalent risk 
measure, a member of the UBSR-family that resembles the willingness-to-accept valuation 
method, can be used to measure organizational risk appetite. 
2.1 Introduction
Just as humans who in their pursuit of pleasure need to accept the risk of suffering pain, or-
ganizations in their pursuit of gain risk incurring losses. To what degree organizations should 
be willing to accept risk is currently a lively debate in regulatory and management circles. 
The common theme in these discussions is that organizational willingness to accept risk, or 
risk appetite, is an important topic but no one seems to agree or even know how it should 
or could be measured. While the measurement of risk appetite is one challenge, another 
challenge for organizations is to incorporate the risk attitude of its senior management into 
its formal statements of risk appetite. Practitioner literature and enterprise risk management 
frameworks voice a clear need for the measurement of organizational risk appetite as well 
as the consolidation of the Board’s attitude to risk therein. It is evident that the ambiguity 
surrounding organizational willingness to accept risk is frustrating attempts by practitioners 
to determine the acceptable level of risk for their organization.
Both needs, the measurement of risk as well as the incorporation of risk attitudes, can 
simultaneously be addressed by expected utility theory (Cramer 1728/1954, Bernoulli 
1738/1954). In this theory the sensitivity of a decision maker to monetary outcomes is ex-
pressed by a utility function. This function can subsequently be used to measure risk, by 
calculating the minimum amount of capital that the organization requires to accept risk 
(Föllmer & Schied 2004, utility based shortfall risk). From these risk measures decision rules 
can be derived that define organizational risk appetite. The utility function specifies, at the 
same time, the risk attitude of the decision maker. For example, under expected utility theory 
a risk averse attitude – the decision maker prefers each probability distribution less than its 
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expectation – is expressed by a concave utility function. Under expected utility theory elicita-
tion of the utility function can be biased by phenomena that are considered deviations from 
this rational theory of choice, such as nonlinear probability weighting. Under prospect the-
ory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992) utility elicitation produces a 
function that is free from these biases. These unbiased utility functions from decision theory, 
in combination with the risk measures from measure theory and decision rules derived from 
these, address the current need in enterprise risk management to define the amount of accept-
able risk on the basis of senior management’s attitude to risk. 
This chapter aims to clarify which models in decision theory and which methods from 
measure theory ensure that organizational risk appetite complies with the risk attitude of senior 
management as well as a rational model of decision making. Its primary contribution is to 
respond to the practitioners’ call for a clear measurement of organizational risk appetite and the 
incorporation of the risk attitude of senior management therein. It applies the concept of risk 
attitude to organizational risk appetite in the vernacular of the risk manager, the decision theo-
rist, and the actuary, which should facilitate communication between these fields.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes risk appetite and reports 
how organizational risk appetite is measured in risk management and how risk attitudes 
have traditionally been incorporated in these measurements. The third section discusses 
how risk attitude is modeled under three theories for decision making under risk: expected 
value, expected utility, and prospect theory. It also illustrates that under prospect theory the 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) valuation methods for valuing 
lotteries are not only different in magnitude, but are dissimilar in terms of risk attitudes as 
well. The fourth section assesses whether these two valuation methods are risk measures and 
provides definitions for organizational risk appetite, unbiased utility, and unbiased risk at-
titude. It furthermore introduces the zero equivalent risk measure, which is based on both 
the WTA and WTP valuation methods from decision theory and which is congruent with 
measure theory. The fifth section defines decision rules for organizational risk appetite and 
provides several illustrative examples. Section six draws conclusions. Appendices are in the 
final section. 
2.2 The measurement of risk appetite in risk management
This section draws upon several risk management frameworks to define risk appetite and 
discusses the practical measurement of risk appetite in risk management and how this in-
volves risk attitude.
2.2.1 The formal definition and relevance of risk appetite
Risk appetite is a key element in the COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated 
Framework (2004a). In this 125-page long document the term is mentioned 105 times, 
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is instrumental in defining Enterprise Risk Management itself, 1 and the term is associated 
with five of the eight components of the framework. In this framework the term applies 
to appetite for downside risk only because in COSO risk is defined as the possibility that 
an event will occur and adversely affect the achievement of objectives. COSO defines risk 
appetite as “the broad-based amount of risk an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of its 
mission/vision.” (p.110). This definition clearly states that any appetite for downside risk is 
contingent on the value that is being pursued. Another, closely related term, risk tolerance, 
is reserved for describing the acceptable variation relative to the achievement of an objective 
(COSO 2004a p.124). Where risk appetite pertains at a high level to the entity as a whole, 
risk tolerance relates to specific objectives (COSO 2004a p.116). By requiring organizations 
to become more explicit about defining and monitoring their risk appetite, COSO creates 
a new object of attention for management and regulatory bodies and signifies a new “or-
ganizational consciousness” of risk appetite (Power 2007 pp.77–78). The COSO (2004a) 
framework specifically refers to risk appetite as an acceptable “amount of risk” which sug-
gests a purely quantitative interpretation of the term. While this suits many financial service 
providers that express risk appetite as the maximum allowable probability of ruin before 
their risk capacity (financial buffer) is depleted, this interpretation does not sit well with 
organizations with a different “quantitative culture” (Mikes 2009). It appears that organiza-
tions tend to interpret risk appetite both qualitatively as a component of a “boundary sys-
tem” or quantitatively as part of a “diagnostic control system” (Simons 1995). 
The FERMA risk management standard briefly stipulates four methods to describe risk 
appetite and risk tolerance but it does neither define nor clearly distinguish the two terms 
from each other (2003 table 4.2.1). The standard prescribes that an organization’s risk man-
agement policy should set out its appetite for risk (p.12). An important premise underlying 
the standard is that a subset of all downside risks is acceptable to bear and that its unaccept-
able complement should be treated.
ISO 31000 : 2009 principles and guidelines on risk applies risk appetite both to upside 
and downside risk. The term risk appetite is defined as the “amount and type of risk (..) 
that an organization is prepared to pursue, retain or take.” Even though the principles and 
guidelines do not make any other explicit reference to risk appetite, its concept is implicitly 
embedded in the process of risk evaluation in order to determine whether risk is acceptable 
or not.
Risk appetite plays a crucial role in modern risk management practice and has re-
cently become the object of academic research (Ashby & Diacon 2010, AIRMIC 2009, 
Power 2009). Textbooks and standards for risk management invariably put risk appetite at 
1  Enterprise Risk Management is “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risk to be within risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives.” (COSO 2004a p.1)
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the heart of good practice (AIRMIC 2009 p.9).2 The importance of formally stating risk 
appetite is emphasized by enterprise risk management standards, guidelines (HM Treasury 
2004), best practice studies (Collier, Berry, & Burke 2006) and practitioners (EY 2009, 
Mercer Oliver Wyman 2006). The ability to set risk appetite and manage risks in line with 
this policy has been cited as one of the least mature competencies of organizations (RIMS 
2008) and the lack of competency in this field as one of the causes of the 2008 financial 
breakdown (McDonald 2009, RIMS 2009). An incentive to articulate risk appetite comes 
from rating agencies that give positive weight to the articulation of risk appetite (Standard & 
Poor’s 2006). Regulators demand more transparency on risk appetite in financial reporting 
(Mertens & Blij 2008, Van Beurden & Bos 2007, Monitoring Commissie 2007) and con-
tinuously demand that organizations are “in control”, which can be rephrased as demand-
ing them to act within risk appetite (Paape 2008 p.23). Practitioner literature suggests that 
formal statements of risk appetite should articulate the risk attitude of senior management 
(Semple 2007, Van den Brink 2007, PwC 2006, Barfield 2005, Zurich 2004), that risk 
preferences should be elicited and integrated in risk acceptability statements (CAS 2005), 
and mentions the need for independent validation of risk appetite (Pool & Kuijck 2009, EY 
2008). The need for measurement of organizational risk appetite is implied by its definition 
as the acceptable “amount” of risk as well as proclamations by the risk management com-
munity that “risk appetite needs to be a measurable concept” (Anderson 2011 p.7).
2.2.2 The practical measurement of risk appetite 
In financial risk management risk appetite is expressed using quantile-based risk measures, 
such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (Tail-VaR), which focus on the tail of 
the predicted loss distribution and implicitly assume risk neutrality (Ai & Brockett 2008, 
Dowd & Blake 2006). Less commonly applied are risk measures that incorporate a weight-
ing function to describe different degrees of risk aversion over quantiles, such as spectral 
measures (Acerbi 2002, see also Wang 2000, 2002). In economic capital calculations risk 
appetite is typically expressed by a threshold for the acceptable frequency of ruin and oc-
casionally other “material events”, such as dividend cuts and profit warnings (Thomson & 
Chan 2008). Such an ex ante formulation of the desired distribution of payoffs expresses 
the decision maker’s risk attitude, in particular her aversion to variance and negative skew-
ness (Filbeck, Hatfield, & Horvath 2005). In finance measures for expressing risk appe-
tite with an “on-going concern”, rather than the aforementioned “solvency concern”, focus 
on the standard deviation or variance of the distribution function and imply risk aversion 
(Ai & Brockett 2008, Wakker 2010 p.75 aversion to mean-preserving spreads). For example, 
in the risk-return diagram of modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1952a, COSO 2004b 
p.18 exhibit 3.7) risk aversion is expressed by the increase of financial returns with variance 
(see Ashby & Diacon 2010 for a theoretical framework for risk appetite using a risk-return 
2 Opinion expressed by AIRMIC’s Technical Director, Paul Hopkin.
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diagram). In capital budgeting expected utility has been incorporated in a risk adjusted 
discounted cash flow analysis approach, which employs a hurdle rate as well as a measure 
for risk aversion (Cozzolino 1977, Spetzler 1968). This approach has been adopted in the 
oil and gas exploration industry (Walls 1995, Walls & Dyer 1996) and was recently rein-
troduced to a mainstream public under the heading of “quantified risk appetite” (Stanford 
University Strategic Decisions Group 2010).3 
In operational risk management one of the most widespread tools to express organiza-
tional risk appetite is the risk matrix (AIRMIC 2009 p.10). A risk matrix is composed of a 
grid with two axes, one for the probability of occurrence of an event and one for the nega-
tive impact of that event on an objective of an organization (Goldberg, Everhart, Stevens, 
Babbitt, Clemens, & Stout 1994, Clemens, Pfitzer, Simmons, Dwyer, Frost, & Olson 2005, 
Kwak & LaPlace 2005 p.692). Once risky events have been identified by the organization, 
they are then plotted within this probability-impact grid. Risk appetite is expressed in the 
risk matrix by a boundary line that separates the unacceptable risk events from the accept-
able ones. Risk matrices originate from military standards for systems safety where both 
probability and impact are expressed in quantitative terms and where the boundary line 
for risk appetite is based on expected value calculations (Pfitzer, Hardwick, & Dwyer 
2001, MIL-STD-882B 1984). This implies that these standards adopt a neutral attitude to 
risk to express risk appetite. Apart from the observation that the concept of utility can be 
applied to the risk matrix (Kwak & LaPlace 2005) and the notion that subjective risk 
attitudes play an essential “but seldom articulated” role in risk matrices (Cox 2008), risk 
neutrality has remained the mainstream interpretation of risk attitude in risk matrices. In 
the absence of precise information on probability and impact these risk characteristics can 
be assessed subjectively using verbal descriptors and imprecision intervals. Inspired by the 
introspective, “professional judgment” of decision makers a numerical rating can be assigned 
to each verbal descriptor and interval. These precise rating scales over the imprecise descrip-
tors and intervals facilitate the use of mathematical operations in the evaluation of risk, not 
unlike the calculation of expected values (Fine 1971, Kinney & Wiruth 1976). Commonly 
referred to as Kinney-values these numerical indicators of risk have found widespread adop-
tion by the risk management community. These rating scales assign weights to outcomes 
and probabilities and resemble utility and probability weighting functions from decision 
theory (see appendix A). The underlying risk attitude that these scales imply is, however, 
not explicitly stated. 
Despite evidence of scale aversion in responses to large-scale incidents, and the use of 
societal risk aversion indices by Denmark and The Netherlands to determine what level of 
risk to lives is tolerable, the general stance to risk appetite in public policy making is that risk 
neutrality should be adopted (Marszal 2001 p.397, Bennett & Murray 2009, Ball & Floyd 
3  Quantified risk appetite is synonymous to the concept of risk tolerance in decision theory, which is discussed 
in §2.5.5. An Excel-based tool for calculating risk-adjusted values is made available by Stanford at www.sdg.
com/sdg-toolbox/risk-adjusted-value-tool.
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1998, Fisschoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney 1981 pp.113–114). Risk appetite is 
typically expressed in risk matrices that are referred to as FN diagrams with F representing 
the frequency of N casualties or more. The difficulty in assigning monetary value to such 
intangible benefits as saved lives is suggested as one of the reasons why expected utility maxi-
mization is rarely used in social safety issues (Marszal 2001 p.393).
In summary, measurements of risk appetite by organizations and society typically assume 
a risk neutral decision maker. This holds in particular for the most popular expressions of risk 
appetite, such as quantile-based risk measures in financial risk management and risk matrices 
in operational risk management. A notable exception is the widespread adoption of mean-
variance analysis, which implies aversion to risk. While enterprise risk management has for 
quite some time been exposed to the methods that decision theory has available to measure 
organizational risk appetite and define the risk attitude of senior management, this has barely 
resulted in their practical application (e.g. Borge 2001 pp.20–24, COSO 2004b pp.51–52, 
Vaughan 1997 pp.54–62).4
2.3 The measurement of risk attitude in decision theory
This section introduces risk attitude as it is defined in decision theory and explains the 
importance of the use of lotteries to determine risk attitude. It furthermore discusses three 
theories that allow us to model decision making behavior under risk: expected value, 
expected utility, and prospect theory (for an overview of decision theories see Starmer 2000 
and Schoemaker 1982).
2.3.1 The definition of risk attitude
In decision theory risk is operationalized by probability distributions over monetary or non-
monetary outcomes and these distributions are referred to as lotteries, gambles or prospects. 
Lotteries are the primary tools of decision theory to express risk and application of these 
tools to risk management by no means implies that organizational decision making resem-
bles sweep staking or gambling. The lottery-concept, which has so much been ingrained in 
the decision theory literature, is adopted in this chapter because thinking about risk in terms 
of lotteries brings out the essence of decision making under risk in a tractable way. The com-
4  In his risk management textbook Vaughan (1997 p.56) explains expected utility theory in the following way: 
“The initial step in the expected utility model approach is to derive the individual’s utility function. Several 
approaches have been suggested for this task, but in general they involve asking a subject a series of questions 
concerning the amount he or she would pay to eliminate the possibility of loss of a given magnitude.” He then 
voices his opinion about expected utility theory in footnote 6: “We will not discuss the process by which the 
utility function is derived primarily because we believe that it is an essentially useless tool for risk management 
decisions.”
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plexity that characterizes probability distributions in practice often obscures a plain view on 
decision making under risk. For this reason lotteries with only two outcomes (binary lotter-
ies) are commonly used in decision theory.
A lottery L that returns outcome x with probability p and outcome y with probability 
(1 - p) is expressed as L = ( p : x, (1 - p) : y) with x  > y, 0 < p ≤ 1. The preference rela-
tionships of a decision maker between two lotteries, L and M, are expressed as L  M 
when L is weakly preferred to M and as L ~ M when the decision maker is indifferent 
between L and M. Decision makers express their risk preferences by choosing between 
lotteries. Because risk appetite relates to the acceptance of losses in the pursuit of gains, 
the class of mixed lotteries that combines both a positive outcome (x > 0) and a negative 
outcome ( y < 0) are in this context of particular interest. In this chapter we assume that 
all outcomes are monetary. 
The term “risk attitude” refers to the attitude of a decision maker towards a particular 
lottery (Keeney & Raiffa 1976 p.149). This attitude is characterized by the preference of the 
decision maker either for the certain amount z or for a risky lottery L with expected value z.5 
A person is risk averse if she prefers the amount z to any risky lottery L with expected 
value z, i.e. z  L. Risk seeking holds if every lottery is preferred to its expected value, i.e. 
L  z, and risk neutrality holds if the decision maker is indifferent between every lottery and 
its expected value, i.e. L ~ z (Kahneman & Tversky 1979 p.264, see Wakker 2010 p.52 for 
an alternative definition). This typology of risk attitudes can also be applied to characterize 
different kinds of risk appetite or to facilitate the comparison of statements of risk appetite 
of different decision makers.
Studies on the temporal stability of risk preferences find that some individuals whose 
risk attitude is elicited at two separate moments in time change their preferences. Tempo-
ral instability of risk preferences is in some studies reported to be quite high (Baucells & 
Villasís 2010 p.193, Zeisberger, Lang, & Vrecko 2012 p.359), with low correlation coef-
ficients (Wehrung, MacCrimmon, & Brothers 1984, Smidts 1997), while other studies 
report it to be quite stable (Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, & Rutström 2005, Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau, & Rutström 2008).
2.3.2 Decision theories under risk: EV, EU and PT
Decision theory has produced many theoretical models that either describe how humans 
choose between lotteries or prescribe what choices they should make under risk. The 
rational choices that normatively oriented theories prescribe are frequently at odds with 
actual human choices that are, on the contrary, “predictably irrational” (Ariely 2008). 
The finding that the rational predictions of the prescriptive expected value and expected 
utility models failed to deliver, acted as a call to assembly for the academic community 
5 For lottery L its expected value (EV) is calculated as the sure amount EV(L) = p × x + (1 – p) × y.
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to “hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk” (Starmer 2000). A theory that cap-
tures many irrational biases of choice behavior while separately maintaining the rational 
elements of choice that emanate from prescriptive theories of choice is prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992). This section describes how 
risk preferences from paragraph 2.3.1 are modeled on the basis of the aforementioned 
three theories of decision making under risk.
2.3.2.1 Expected value theory
The origin of expected value (EV), the oldest known theory for decision making under 
risk, is attributed to a letter correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat. 
Its foundations were first published by Christiaan Huygens (1657). Under expected value 
theory a preference for lottery L over M (L  M) is represented by the inequality EV(L) ≥ 
EV(M). Important features of expected value are the multiplication of probabilities and 
outcomes (thus p × x) and the additivity of these products, which implies that the outcomes 
are statistically independent of each other. When the same lottery is played over and over 
again then, subject to the law of large numbers, the sum of all the outcomes in these trials is 
approximated by the sum of their mathematical expectations. When this law does not hold, 
such as in one-shot decisions, maximization of expected value is generally still considered a 
reasonable decision criterion for lotteries when these involve small stakes (see various anno-
tations in Wakker 2011, Wakker 2010 §8.2, Kahneman & Lovallo 1993 p.21). The theory 
assumes one single attitude to risk taking, which is risk neutrality, and is ignorant of any 
preferences for degrees of risk and levels of outcome that may want to reveal themselves in 
choice behavior. 
2.3.2.2 Expected utility theory
A theory that allows for the accommodation of all kinds and degrees of individual risk at-
titude was proposed by Cramer (1728/1954) and Bernoulli (1738/1954) and has become 
known as expected utility (EU). Similar to expected value, a decision maker’s preference 
between lotteries is under expected utility represented by a mathematical expectation 
that, unlike expected value, is defined over a utility transformation of lottery outcomes. 
Given the transformation of outcomes by a utility function U(.) the EU of lottery L is 
calculated as 
 EU(L) = p × U(x) + (1 - p) × U( y). (2.1)
Under expected utility theory the inequality EU(L) ≥ EU(M) represents a preference for lottery 
L over M (L  M).
The utility curve U is monotonically increasing and its shape can be either concave, 
convex, linear or any combination hereof. Concavity implies that when any two points on 
a curve are connected by a straight line then the curve will be positioned just at or above 
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that line.6 Comparison of the coordinates of this straight line and the utility curve at any 
outcome in the domain of the utility curve indicates that the property of concavity can be 
summarized by the inequality 
 U(θx + (1 - θ)y) ≥ θU(x) + (1 - θ)U( y), (2.2)
for all 0 < θ < 1 and x,y (Wakker 2010 p.72, Chiang 1984 p.342). Replacement of θ by p, 
allowed under the condition 0 < θ < 1, produces the inequality U( px + (1 - p)y) ≥ pU(x) + 
(1 - p)U ( y), or in short EU(EV(L)) ≥ EU(L), and implies the preference EV(L)  L, which 
is the definition of risk aversion presented in paragraph 2.3.1.7 Under expected utility concav-
ity of the utility curve is thus equivalent to risk aversion.8 Similarly it can be shown that under 
expected utility convex utility implies risk seeking and linear utility implies risk neutrality. Ex-
pected value thus remains nested in the expected utility model. In most economic applications 
a concave utility function that expresses marginal decreasing utility is assumed, which under 
expected utility implies risk aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979 p.264). For this reason con-
cavity is commonly considered to be an integral assumption of expected utility theory as well.
Expected utility is considered a reasonable theory of choice under risk for one-shot 
decisions with large stakes (Wakker 2010 p.44). The rationality of expected utility was un-
derpinned by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, reformulated by Marschak 1950 and 
Nash 1950) who defined a set of necessary and intuitively appealing conditions for rational 
decision making under risk and demonstrated that a decision maker who agrees with this 
set should behave according to expected utility.9 In expected utility theory outcomes are 
defined as final wealth states (asset integration). Following Markowitz (1952b), most experi-
mental measurements of utility, however, define utility over gains and losses rather than on 
final asset positions (Kahneman & Tversky 1979 p.271), and initial wealth, which is often 
unknown, is usually not expressed in the outcomes (Wakker 2010 p.234). Because initial 
wealth is the same in all choice options, it follows that outcomes defined to this fixed refer-
ence point are uniquely related to a final wealth position, even when the latter remains un-
specified (Wakker 2010 p.238). Over the years expected utility has retained its prescriptive 
status and, just as expected value, can have descriptive validity for subsets of individuals in a 
6   In more precise terms, concavity of the utility curve implies that when any two coordinates {x, U(x)} and 
{ y, U( y)} with x < y are connected by a straight line that consists of the coordinates {θx + (1 - θ)y, θU(x) + 
(1 - θ)U( y)} with 0 < θ < 1, then at any θ the coordinate {θx + (1 - θ)y, U(θx + (1 - θ)y)} on the utility curve 
will be positioned just at or above the corresponding coordinate on the straight line. Under EU strict concav-
ity of the utility function (the second derivative of U(x) is negative, U″(x) < 0), explains an unwillingness to 
accept any mixed lottery with EV(L) = 0 (Pratt 1964).
 7  The first part in these inequalities represents the utility of the expected value of lottery L and the second part the 
expected utility of lottery L.
 8  That this equivalence also holds for lotteries with more than two outcomes was demonstrated by Wakker 
(2010, Exercise 3.2.1b).
 9 The axioms of decision theory are completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence.
34
heterogeneous population. For example, elicitation of the utility functions in organizations 
under the assumptions of expected utility (Wehrung 1989, Swalm 1966) and interviews 
with corporate executives (March & Shapira 1987, Spetzler 1968) displayed a significant 
degree of risk aversion. Numerous falsifications of expected utility in experiments, however, 
produced evidence of various irrational biases in choice behavior that eventually led to the 
development of other, nonexpected theories of choice.
2.3.2.3 Prospect theory
An extension to expected utility that sprung from the minds of Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky and accommodates various empirical choice anomalies is prospect theory (1979, 
1992), “the first rational theory of irrational behavior” (Wakker 2010 p.2). Prospect theory 
(PT) assumes a fixed reference point, usually 0 or the status quo, and gains and losses rela-
tive to this point are evaluated by an overall utility function U. The utility function U takes 
the form U(x) = u(x) for gains and U(x) = λu(x) for losses, with u(.) measuring basic util-
ity in the gain and loss domains separately, u(0) = 0, and the loss aversion parameter λ > 0, 
measuring sensitivity to losses relative to gains (Wakker 2010 pp.239, 252). Loss aversion 
refers to the empirical finding that gains bear less weight in evaluations than losses. Under 
prospect theory loss aversion is modeled by a much steeper slope of the utility function 
for losses than for gains (λ > 1) which results in a kink in the utility function at reference 
point zero (see Tversky & Kahneman 1991 for an application to riskless choice).10 There 
is strong empirical evidence that λ exceeds 1 considerably (Novemsky & Kahneman 2005 
p.119). Evidence of concave utility in the gain domain is much stronger than the evidence 
for convexity in the domain of losses where the prevalence of convexity over concavity is 
“a close call” (Wakker 2010 p.264).11 Comparable to the transformation of outcomes un-
der expected utility, prospect theory transforms probabilities using a probability weighting 
function for gains w+(.) and losses w-(.).12 Its typical shape resembles an inverse-S that over-
weights small probabilities and underweights large probabilities. Overweighting means that 
in evaluating a decision under risk an objective probability p receives additional weight so 
that w( p) > p and underweighting implies the reverse. In the domain of gains (losses) prob-
ability overweighting encourages risk seeking (risk aversion) and underweighting encourages 
risk aversion (risk seeking). The prospect theory value of a lottery L that is either loss-free or 
gain-free is calculated by 
 PT(L) = ws( p) × U(x) + (1 – ws( p)) × U( y), (2.3)
10 The opposite of loss aversion is referred to as gain seeking (0 < λ < 1) which is a rare empirical finding.
11  In their (1992) study Tversky and Kahneman empirically find a reflection effect for the utility for gains and 
losses, i.e. u(x) = -u(-x) for all x ∈ . This is, however, not a structural element of prospect theory. 
12  Original prospect theory (1979) contained only one probability weighting functions that applied to both 
gains and losses. Cumulative prospect theory (1992) incorporated sign-dependent probability weighting 
functions.
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with s = +,-, x > y > 0 or x < y < 0, and 0 < ws( p) ≤ 1. For a mixed lottery L with x > 0 > y this 
value is calculated by 
 PT(L) = w+( p) × U(x) + w-(1 - p)) × U( y).13 (2.4)
If ws(p) = p for all probabilities then prospect theory reduces to expected utility. Under 
prospect theory the inequality PT(L) ≥ PT(M) represents a preference for lottery L over M 
(L  M). 
One of the strengths of prospect theory is that the flexibility of its model specifications 
accommodates empirical findings that were already known before prospect theory was even de-
veloped such as concavity for gains and convexity for losses (Fishburn & Kochenberger 1979), 
overweighting of losses relative to gains (Robertson 1954), and overweighting of small prob-
abilities and underweighting of large probabilities (Preston & Barrata 1948). Another major 
strength of the model is that it accommodates anomalies to expected utility, such as the Allais 
paradox (1953) and many phenomena that can be explained by a “fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes”, such as the coexistence of gambling and insurance (Tversky & Kahneman 1992 
p.297).14 By accommodating deviations from expected utility into the novel parameters of prob-
ability weighting and loss aversion while retaining expected utility’s utility function, the model 
allows us to make “descriptive use of prospect theory to improve the prescriptive use of expected 
utility” (Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker 2001). Where the utility function under expected utility 
carried the heavy load of representing both the rational and irrational elements of risk attitude, 
prospect theory allows it to share this burden with parameters that specifically are designed to 
deal with irrationality and trusts on utility to be able to bear the weight of rationality. Prospect 
theory can thus be used to elicit utility functions that represent the decision maker’s attitude 
to outcomes only. This unbiased utility can subsequently be applied to determine risk appetite 
under the assumptions of expected utility. Interestingly the popular COSO (2004a pp.51–52) 
framework for enterprise risk management does mention prospect theory but fails to show how 
its concepts can be applied to express risk appetite. To this end we discuss in the next section two 
measurement methods from decision theory for the valuation of lotteries: willingness-to-accept 
and willingness-to-pay.
2.3.3 Willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP)
Willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay are two methods for the valuation of lotteries 
that are commonly applied in decision theory. Willingness-to-accept and risk appetite, be-
ing the amount of risk that an organization is willing to accept, appear to be related seman-
13  For binary lotteries original prospect theory (1979) and cumulative prospect theory (1992) PT-values are calculat-
ed in the same way, apart from the absence of sign-dependent probability weighting in original prospect theory.
14  The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk 
seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability.
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tically. This section investigates whether the two terms are also related in terms of the risk 
attitudes that they portray. 
Several studies have demonstrated that the ask-price for a lottery largely exceeds its bid-
price, often by a factor two to one.15 This spread between willingness-to-accept (the ask) and 
willingness to pay (the bid ) is much larger than economic theory predicts (Willig 1976). 
Many studies have investigated the causes of this WTA/WTP-disparity and have tested 
methods that aim to diminish it (for overviews of these studies see Sayman & Öncüler 2005, 
Horowitz & McConnell 2002, Brown & Gregory 1999, Hoffman & Spitzer 1993). The 
marked disparity between both valuation methods emphasizes the need to investigate which 
measurement method is most appropriate in a particular context (Knetsch & Sinden 1984 
p.520). Given the need for proper measurements of organizational risk appetite it is impor-
tant to assess whether these should be based on willingness-to-accept or willingness-to-pay. 
Let c represent the set of all lotteries that an entity faces that are real-valued functions 
on a finite set of states of nature Ω. A lottery X ∈ c is thus a mapping X : Ω →  (Wakker 
2010 p.13). We assume that explicit probabilities Q are given on Ω and restrict our discus-
sion to binary lotteries of the type X = ( p : x, (1 - p) : y) with x, y ∈ , 0 < p ≤ 1 and refer 
to N = (1 : 0) as the neutral lottery. Favorable lotteries are denoted by X + and unfavorable 
lotteries by X -. For favorable lotteries the preference X +  N holds and for unfavorable lot-
teries the preference X -  N. Table 2.1 provides definitions of willingness-to-accept (WTA) 
and willingness-to-pay (WTP) both for X + and X -. 
Table 2.1 Willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay for both X + and X -.16
Notation Definition
WTP(X + ) maximum sure amount b ≥ 0 that a decision maker is willing to pay to acquire X +
WTA(X - ) minimum sure amount a ≥ 0 that a decision maker is willing to accept to acquire X -
WTP(X - ) maximum sure amount b ≥ 0 that a decision maker is willing to pay to avoid X -
WTA(X + ) minimum sure amount a ≥ 0 that a decision maker is willing to accept to abandon X +
The indifference relationships that can be used to elicit WTA and WTP values directly are present-
ed in table 2.2. These four relationships are generated by either the zero equivalent or the certainty 
equivalent method. In the zero equivalent method a decision maker is required to state a sure 
amount to be added to or subtracted from a lottery in order to equate this lottery with zero (Merk-
hofer 2009 p.95, Walls 1995 figure 2). In the certainty equivalent method the decision maker is 
required to state equivalence between a lottery and a positive or nonpositive sure amount.
15 This is according to Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1990) true for goods in general.
16 Following Eisenberger & Weber (1995 p.224) the following interpretations can be used as well:
 WTP(X +) : maximum willingness-to-pay to participate in a favorable lottery.
 WTA(X -) : minimum willingness-to-accept to organize a favorable lottery once / sell the lottery short.
 WTP(X -) : maximum willingness-to-pay not to organize a favorable lottery once / buy the lottery short.
 WTA(X +) : minimum willingness-to-accept not to participate in a favorable lottery.
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Table 2.2  Zero equivalence and certainty equivalence relationships for direct elicitation of WTA 
and WTP for X + and X -.
Elicitation method Favorable lottery X + (i.e. N  X +) Unfavorable lottery X - (i.e. N  X -)
zero equivalent (ZE) 
method
N ~ X + – WTP(X +)
(1 : 0) ~ (p : x - b, (1 - p) : y - b)
N ~ X - + WTA(X - )
(1 : 0) ~ (p : x + a, (1 - p) : y + a)
certainty equivalent (CE) 
method
X + ~ WTA(X +)
(p : x, (1 - p) : y) ~ a
X - ~ -WTP(X -)
(p : x, (1 - p) : y) ~ -b
WTP(X +) is the largest, positive sure monetary amount b that must be subtracted from X + 
to enable equivalence with zero. WTA(X - ) is the smallest, positive sure monetary amount a 
that must be added to X - to result in zero equivalence. 
Using the indifference relationships for unfavorable lotteries from table 2.2, equations 2.5 
and 2.6 illustrate how prospect theory predicts a disparity between WTA(X - ) and WTP(X - ) 
for a gain-free lottery with x < y < 0.
 N ~ X - + WTA(X -) ⇔ u(0) = w-( p)λu(x + a) + w+(1 - p)u( y + a) (2.5)
 X - ~ –WTP(X -) ⇔ w-( p)λu(x) + (1 - w-( p))λu( y) = λu(-b) (2.6)
Comparison of equations 2.5 and 2.6 suggests that under any specification of prospect 
theory other than expected value, a need not be identical to b. Under prospect theory dif-
ferences between a and b can occur due to the presence of loss aversion (λ > 1), differences 
in gain and loss curvature (u(x) ≠ -u(-x) for all x ∈ ), differences in probability weighting 
(w+(1 - p) ≠ (1 - w-( p)), and absence of additivity in the utility function (u(x + a) ≠ u(x) + 
u(a) for all x, a ∈ ).17
While the focus in the WTA/WTP–disparity literature has been on explaining the dif-
ference in magnitude between a and b, the literature is much less voluble on the difference 
in risk attitudes which both valuation methods portray. Equation 2.5 illustrates that applica-
tion of WTA(X -) under prospect theory invokes an averse attitude to risk, mainly generated 
by the loss aversion coefficient λ.18 In decision theory direct elicitations of WTA(X -) are 
rare. The certainty equivalent method, however, is a very popular method to elicit utility 
in the domain of losses. The certainty equivalent method that in equation 2.6 is applied to 
elicit WTP(X -) typically results a risk seeking attitude. 
17  Schmidt, Starmer and Sugden (2008 p.204) claim that their Third-generation specification of prospect theory 
explains the WTA/WTP-disparity while the prior versions of prospect theory are not able to this. Equations 2.5 
and 2.6 were, however, solely based on the 1992-model of prospect theory.
18  On the empirical relevance of loss aversion in relation to risk aversion Wakker (2010 p.234) states: “I think 
that more than half of the risk aversion empirically observed has nothing to do with utility curvature or with 
probability weighting. Instead, it is generated by loss aversion, the main empirical phenomenon regarding 
reference dependence.”
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Given the tradition in risk management to assume a risk neutral attitude to risk combined 
with the catastrophic events that have recently plagued the global economy as well as in-
dividual organizations, an attitude of “risk seeking for losses” is bound to raise eyebrows 
among prudent practitioners of risk management. For unfavorable lotteries the willingness-
to-accept valuation method is therefore both in wording and in terms of risk attitude con-
gruent with organizational risk appetite. The aversion to unfavorable lotteries that is in-
herent in the willingness-to-accept measure translates into a higher monetary valuation of 
risk for these lotteries. The disparity in both magnitude and risk attitude between the two 
valuation methods emphasizes the need to assess which method is most appropriate as a risk 
measure in the context of organizational risk appetite. 
2.4 Risk measures for organizational risk appetite 
This section derives a risk measure for organizational risk appetite drawing on economic 
valuation methods, actuarial methods for measuring risk, and decision theory. This risk 
measure is conceptually compatible with organizational risk appetite and existing concepts 
in decision theory and belongs to the family of convex risk measures, in particular the util-
ity based shortfall risk measure. Its adoption by a decision maker requires the elicitation of 
an unbiased utility function that can be accomplished by utility elicitation under prospect 
theory. This unbiased utility function is assumed to reflect the true risk attitude of the orga-
nization. For a concave exponential functional it results the entropic risk measure. 
2.4.1 Risk measures and acceptance sets
A measure of risk ρ is a functional that assigns a real number to lottery X and describes how 
close or how far a lottery X is from acceptance (Goovaerts, Kaas, & Laeven 2010, Artzner, 
Delbaen, Eber, & Heath 1999 p.207). Famous examples of risk measures are value at risk 
and average value at risk (also known as expected shortfall or tail conditional expectation). 
The acceptance set associated with risk measure ρ is the subset of lotteries denoted by A for 
which the risk measure is nonpositive and defined by
 A = {X ∈ c : ρ(X ) ≤ 0}. (2.7)
From this follows the definition of risk measures for positive and nonpositive values of 
ρ(X ). 
Definition 2.1a: For ρ(X ) > 0, ρ(X ) specifies the smallest risk-free monetary amount m 
that must be added to X to enable it join the acceptance set A. 
Definition 2.1b: For ρ(X ) ≤ 0, -ρ(X ) specifies the largest risk-free monetary amount m 
that can be subtracted from X without forcing the lottery to leave the acceptance set A. 
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The mathematical definition of risk measure ρ(X ) is 
 ρ(X ) = inf {m ∈  : X + m ∈ A} (2.8)
(Giesecke, Schmidt, & Weber 2008 p.5, Föllmer & Schied 2004 pp.155–156).
On the basis of the definition of risk measures in equation 2.8 and the definition of 
organizational risk appetite in ISO Guide 73:2009 we define organizational risk appetite 
quantitatively as follows:
Definition 2.2: Organizational risk appetite is the sum of a risk measure ρ(X ) for X ∈ B 
where B is a subset of c that the organization is willing to bear, i.e. S
B
 ρ(X ∈ B : B ⊆ c).
Where subset A specifies the lotteries for which the risk measure is nonpositive, subset B 
specifies the set of lotteries which an organization accepts to bear. 
It is important to realize that the additivity of risk measures in definition 2.2 demands 
that lotteries are independent.
Assumption 2.3: Lotteries X ∈ B are independent.
While the assumption of independence is certainly implausible for c it is considered a plausi-
ble assumption for the risks that are selected by the organization to be part of subset B. In risk 
management objective historical data on risks is often absent or considered useless for fore-
casting the future (Vaughan 1997 p.61). The probability of occurrence, the impact of risks 
and their correlation are in risk management frequently derived from subjective estimates. 
This limited information is usually not sufficient to make elaborate calculations involving 
correlation. It is often possible, however, to identify groups of risks that have a common 
cause. These groups of correlated risks can then subsequently be treated as single independent 
risks. The practical relevance of assumption 2.3 is corroborated by the fact that the risk ma-
trix, one of the most popular tools for risk evaluation in enterprise risk management, requires 
risks to be uncorrelated as well (Stanford strategic decisions group 2010b p.19). 
The next section assesses whether WTA and WTP are risk measures.
2.4.2 The WTA(  -) and WTP(  +) risk measure continuum
The definitions of WTA(X -) and WTP(X +) in table 2.1 are consistent with risk measure defi-
nition 2.1. WTA(-) is thus for the subset of unfavorable lotteries a risk measure in the sense 
of ρ. It can be interpreted as a contingent claim on the entity’s assets that is retained to absorb 
losses when these materialize. WTP(+) is a risk measure for favorable lotteries and suggests to 
what degree the assets of an entity can be safely reduced. Together they define a continuum 
of measures of risk on the whole of c. Definition 2.1 clearly precludes WTA(+) and WTP(-), 
assessed by the certainty equivalent method, to join the rank of risk measures.
The definition in COSO of risk appetite as “the amount of risk (..) an entity is willing to 
accept”, with risks defined as “events with a negative impact”, calls for the application of a risk 
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measure for unfavorable lotteries (COSO 2004 pp.4, 19). In such a context the WTA(-) risk 
measure can be applied on its own.19 The risk appetite definition of ISO as the “amount (..) 
of risk that an organization is willing to pursue or retain”, in which case the impact of risk 
can be negative as well as positive, calls for the application of a risk measure for unfavorable 
as well as favorable lotteries (ISO Guide 73 : 2009 pp.1, 9). In this context the continuum 
of WTA(-) and WTP(+) risk measures can be applied. These two risk measures have in com-
mon that they can be directly assessed on the basis of the zero equivalent method. For this 
reason we will refer to them in combination as the zero equivalent risk measure.20
Table 2.2 indicates that zero equivalent risk measures can be assessed by direct judg-
ment on the part of a decision maker. To directly assess the value of each individual lottery 
is, however, highly impractical. Instead the functionals of prospect theory can be elicited 
from the decision maker and used to estimate the value of the zero equivalent risk measure 
for each lottery. Both a decision maker’s direct judgments as well the estimations based on 
prospect theory can, however, contain inconsistencies with a rational model of choice, such 
as expected utility. The next section proposes how to unbias zero equivalent risk measures 
from these deviations. 
2.4.3 Unbiased utility 
On the basis of its rational foundations set forth by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) 
we accept expected utility as the normative model for decision making under risk (norma-
tive assumption). However, we do not accept the classical elicitation assumption (Wakker, 
Bleichrodt, & Pinto 2001 p.1499) that proposes that expected utility is a suitable model 
to be used in the elicitation of utility functions. Section 2.3.3 discusses several deviations 
from the rational model of expected utility that potentially penetrate the utility function 
when expected utility is assumed throughout the elicitation process. When such a biased 
utility function, which contradicts the assumptions of expected utility, is used as input for 
this rational model of choice, it is hard to argue in favor of the normativity of its output. 
We propose therefore to elicit the utility function under the assumptions of a descriptively 
valid nonexpected theory of choice, such as prospect theory. When applying prospect theory 
this allows one to distinguish between basic utility u(.) and probability transformation w(.), 
in both the gain and loss domain, as well as loss aversion λ.21 This leads to the follow-
19  Artzner et al. (1999 p.207 remark 2.2) specifically allow for the application of measures of risk over the whole 
domain of c. Risk measures can therefore also be applied in situations which only involve unfavorable lotteries. 
20  Zero equivalent risk measures should not be confused with the zero utility premium principle for deciding 
on the value of premium H. The zero utility premium principle is defined as E[u(H - X )] = 0, with u(0) = 0 
(Pfeifer & Heidergott 1997).
21  The use of the λ-coefficient is so widespread in decision theory that it appears to obscure the fact that the 
phenomenon of loss aversion can be defined independently from λ (see, however, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & 
Paraschiv 2007 for a nonparametric elicitation of loss aversion).
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ing definition of unbiased utility and an assumption related to the true preferences of the 
decision maker.
Definition 2.4: An unbiased utility function u* is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function that is not biased by deviations from the rational expected utility decision model. 
Assumption 2.5: The true preferences of a decision maker are represented by an unbiased 
utility function u*.
The application of u* within the framework of expected utility is referred to as unbiased expected 
utility EU* or E[u*]. Because function u* is assumed to reflect the true or unbiased risk attitude 
of the decision maker it can then be implemented in equation 2.1 to calculate EU*(X ).
Definition 2.6: Given an unbiased utility function u* the unbiased risk attitude is under 
EU* defined as
(a) [Unbiased risk aversion ⇔ u* is concave];
(b) [Unbiased risk neutrality ⇔ u* is linear];
(c) [Unbiased risk seeking ⇔ u* is convex]. 
When assumption 2.5 is accepted it still needs to be decided which deviations from ex-
pected utility are considered biases. For the purpose of this chapter we consider nonlinear 
probability weighting, but not loss aversion, to be a bias. We oppose the normative status of 
probability transformation because overweighting or underweighting of objective probabili-
ties generates possibilities for arbitrage (or a Dutch book) against the decision maker, which 
makes her worse off on the long-run (Wakker 2010 §1.5).22 While loss aversion is a deviation 
from the expected utility model we, contrary to most studies in decision theory (Köbberling 
& Wakker 2005 p.124), do not oppose its normative status in the context or organiza-
tional risk appetite. We argue that the fact that losses erode the earnings base of a business23 
22  Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker (2001 p.1500) contains a list of proponents of the normative status of prob-
ability transformation. 
23  In business decisions monetary gains and losses are frequently expressed as returns on investments (ROI). ROI 
is the monetary gain or loss that is returned by the invested principal amount and is expressed as a percentage 
relative to this invested amount. A gain of amount r is relative to an invested principal amount i expressed as 
r / i and the loss amount –r is expressed as –r / i. Once the principal i has because of loss –r been reduced to i – r 
then a return on investment of  r / (i – r) = r∕ i  ∕ (1 – r∕ i) is required to compensate the initial loss and recapture 
the original principal again. Thus an initial loss of –10% in terms of ROI can be recouped by subsequent gain of 
.1 / .9 ≈ +11.1% in terms of ROI. A negative ROI of –50% is recouped by a subsequent gain of .5 / .5 = +100%, 
thus requiring twice the effort in terms earning ROI percentage points to break even again. A ROI of –90% 
requires a massive positive response of a ROI of .9 / .1 = +900%. ROI exposes an important feature of losses 
in business being that losses erode the earnings base of a business. This feature is often lost in translating real-
ity to the laboratory where commonly utility elicitations do not require investment of a principal amount 
and financially incentivized lottery choices are played out once and immediately. The empirical implication 
that losses erode the earning potential of a business (while gains ever more increase this potential) justifies a 
preference intensity for gains relative to losses in a business context.
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and damage its capacity to act as a going concern24 constitute genuine empirical reasons for 
the adoption of loss aversion relative to a reference point around zero. We therefore consider 
loss aversion to be part of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.25
A risk measure is appropriate if and only if its characterizing axioms are. To this end the 
next section assesses how measurements of unbiased utility can be used to connect the zero 
equivalent risk measure with the axiomatizations of the utility based shortfall risk (UBSR) 
measure.
2.4.4 Utility based shortfall risk (UBSR) 
In their seminal article on risk measures Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999) argue 
that four axioms, in particular monotonicity, translation invariance, subadditivity, and posi-
tive homogeneity, should hold for any risk measure. They call measures satisfying these 
properties coherent. In combination, their last two axioms discourage diversification. In con-
vex risk measures they are for this reason replaced by the less restrictive axiom of convexity 
(Deprez & Gerber 1985, Heath 2010, Föllmer and Schied 2002). Within the family of con-
vex risk measures utility based shortfall risk (UBSR) has in particular useful properties such 
as distribution invariance and invariance under randomization (Föllmer & Schied 2004, 
Giesecke, Schmidt & Weber 2008, Gundel & Weber 2008, Föllmer & Schied 2010). As a 
result UBSR measures are the only distribution-invariant convex risk measures that should 
be used for the dynamic measurement of risk over time (Weber 2007).26 
Under UBSR acceptance sets are determined by the valuation of lottery X in terms of 
expected utility E[u(X )] for a strictly increasing and typically concave function u :  → .27 
A requirement is that for lotteries X ∈ c the expectation E[u(X )] is well-defined and finite. A 
lottery belongs to the acceptance set if E[u(X)] is bounded from below by a given threshold 
z within the range of u, i.e. 
 A = {X ∈ c : E[u(X )] ≥ z} (2.9)
24  In business life monetary losses may result in severe second-order effects such as damaged reputation, liquidity 
squeeze, and eventually insolvency. Losses act as a negative signal to the suppliers, capital providers and other 
stakeholders in the business. All these effects disable businesses to act as going concerns and eventually threaten 
their survival. For these reasons the dispreference for losses is amplified in general and for large losses in particular. 
Further amplification of the aversion to accept potential losses results from budget-constraints for making expen-
ditures on measures to control risk and from capital-constraints for absorbing the potential impact of losses.
25  For cases where relevance of the reference point is plausible Bleichrodt, Pinto & Wakker (2001 p.1500) state 
that: “If there are intrinsic reasons why losses with respect to a status quo are more serious than correspond-
ing gains, then we consider this effect as part of the genuine von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. It 
belongs to the expected utility model and does not depend on irrelevant reframings.”
26  The axiomatic foundations in this section trace back to studies in decision theory such as Gilboa & 
Schmeidler (1989). 
27  By letting (x) ≡ - u(-x) we can alternatively use a convex loss function  :  →  with z being a point in the 
interior of the range of , so that A = {X ∈ c : E[(-X)] ≤ z }.
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(Giesecke, Schmidt, & Weber 2008). 
In the context of organizational risk appetite UBSR measures are in particular relevant 
because a utility function that is concave is sensitive to large losses. As a result this risk mea-
sure is in particular useful to measure risks of a catastrophic nature. It should be noted that 
the UBSR does not require the utility function to be strictly concave even though several 
authors adopt the assumption of diminishing marginal utility from economics (Gundel & 
Weber 2008 p.1128, Föllmer & Schied 2010). UBSR measures are thus capable of accom-
modating convex utility function and risk seeking attitudes. 
In the next section UBSR measure is used to define the zero equivalent risk measure.
2.4.5 The definition of the zero equivalent risk measure
When the utility function u(.) is invertible to u-1(.) equation 2.9 for the UBSR measure can 
alternatively be expressed as 
 A = {X ∈ c : u-1(E[u(X )]) ≥ u-1(z) } (2.10)
in which utility values are transformed back to monetary amounts. When the inverse utility 
of the expected utility of X, u-1(E[u(X )]),28 in equation 2.10 exceeds u-1(z) = 0 then equation 
2.10 returns the acceptance set for the zero equivalent risk measure.29
Definition 2.7: The zero equivalent risk measure ρze(X ) is defined by the acceptance set 
 A = {X ∈ c : u-1(E[u(X )]) ≥ 0 }. (2.11)
When utility elicitation is performed parametrically with the exponential utility function or 
when nonparametric utilities can be approximated by an exponential utility function then 
the entropic risk measure can be used. The entropic risk measure is discussed in the next 
section.
2.4.6 Entropic risk
The entropic risk measure is a member of the family of UBSR measures that is based on 
the assumption of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) of the decision maker (Pratt 
1964).30 Under CARA utility depends on the risk tolerance R of the decision maker and is 
for concave utility described by the exponential utility function 
28  The term u-1(E[u(X )]) is also known as the certainty equivalent of X, CE(X ). While Definition 2.1 excludes 
WTA and WTP values which have been directly elicited by means of the certainty equivalent method, it does 
not preclude the use of certainty equivalents in general. 
29  Restriction to zero is allowed given that 0 lies in the interior of u.
30  Relative entropy is a non-symmetric measure in probability theory of the difference between two probability 
distributions. It can be shown that minimization of relative entropy is equivalent to the maximization of 
expected utility.
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 u(x) = 1 - e-x/R. (2.12)
Risk tolerance is the amount an individual is willing to stake in a 50/50 bet that either returns 
twice the stake or makes one lose half of it (Merkhofer 2009 p.83, Walls 1995 p.308).31 This 
definition clearly differs from the interpretation of risk tolerance as the “acceptable level of 
variation relative to achievement of a specific objective” (COSO 2004a p.20) or its inter-
pretation as the probability α in confidence level (1 - α) in Economic Capital calculations 
(RMTF 2004 p.5, Solvency II 2009 article 45 p.34, Basel II 2006 article 730 p.206). Just as 
linear utility the exponential utility function is additive. Additivity in the utility function is 
defined by u(x + y) = u(x) + u( y) for all x, y ∈ . 
On the basis of equation 2.9 the entropic risk measure is defined as
 ρent(X ) = inf {m ∈  : E[1 - e-(m+X)/R] ≥ z}.32 (2.13)
The solution of equation 2.13 returns
 m = R (ln E[e-X / R] - ln (1 - z)). (2.14, proof in appendix)
(Föllmer & Schied 2004 3.2, p.174 example 4.33, p.213 example 4.105). This result is 
consistent with equation 2.10 (see proof in appendix).
In the next section we define several decision rules for organizational risk appetite that 
are derived from the aforementioned risk measures and provide several examples in which 
we apply these principles using the zero equivalent risk measure and exponential utility.
2.5 Decision rules for organizational risk appetite 
While definition 2.2 provides a precise definition for measuring the “amount” of organi-
zational risk appetite by means of a risk measure, it does not specify the principles on the 
basis of which an organization decides which subset of risks it is willing to bear. This section 
specifies two decision rules that can be applied in the context of organizational risk appetite. 
Subsequently it provides several examples. 
2.5.1 Derivation of decision rules for organizational risk appetite
This section derives several decision rules that are are defined over risk measures and that, 
by a restriction or optimization procedure, aid in the decision making on organizational 
31  In other words: “What amount would you be willing to invest if you can double your investment or lose half 
of it given 50/50 odds?” See also Wakker 2010 p.82 Observation 3.5.3 and Exercise 3.5.5.
32  Using the loss function (x) = e -bx Föllmer and Schied (2004 p.213) define the entropic risk measure as 
ρ(X ) = inf {m ∈  : E[e -b(m+X )] ≤ x
0
 }. Because the utility function u(x) = 1 - e -bx is used the sign in this for-
mula reverses.
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risk appetite.33 A rudimentary set of decision rules can be found in the first textbook on the 
subject of risk management by Mehr and Hedges (1963 chapter 1, see also Vaughan 1997 
pp.62–67). It stipulates that risk management decisions are guided by three rules of risk 
management: 
Rule #1: Don’t risk more than you can afford to lose.
  On the basis of the maximum possible loss this rule identifies risks that cannot 
be retained and require treatment. The decision to treat or retain risk is made on 
the basis of the minimax cost rule, i.e. choose the treatment or retention strategy 
with the smallest maximum cost.
Rule #2: Consider the odds.
  For the set of unacceptable risks identified by the first rule the second rule states 
that only low probability risks are suitable candidates for insurance coverage.
Rule #3: Don’t risk a lot for a little.
  Below the maximum retention level some risks require risk treatment as well. 
The decision to treat or retain risk is made on the basis of the marginal benefit-
marginal cost rule.
We use rule #1 and #3 to derive two decision rules. In deriving these decision principles 
we make four simplifying assumptions. Adoption of these assumptions allows us to negate 
many complexities related to the timing of risk, such as risk incubation time, risk lifecycles, 
differences in risk management planning horizons, and the timing of risk reduction ex-
penses. They also ensure that the cost of risk reduction efforts are expressed in the same unit 
as their benefits in terms of lower damages.
Assumption 2.8: All risks are resolved at the end of a single period.
Assumption 2.9: All probabilities p ∈ Q relate to a single period.
Assumption 2.10: All costs for risk reduction are expensed at the start of the period.
Assumption 2.11: All outcomes are discounted to present values.
The first decision rule is inspired by rule #1 but not equivalent. It stipulates that the 
amount of risk should not exceed a risk bearing constraint (Spinard, Faris, Culp, & 
Nunes 2010).
Decision rule 1: The membership of the subset B ⊆ c that the organization is willing to 
bear is constrained by the risk bearing capacity d which should not be exceeded by the sum 
∑ of the amount of risk ρ(X ) embodied in B, i.e. 
33  Decision rules should not be confused with decision principles (see Goovaerts, Kaas and Laeven 2010 
p.294–295).
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 B = {X ∈ c : ∑
B
 ρ(X ) ≤ d }. (2.15)
While rule #1 considers single risks only, decision rule 1 considers in addition sets of risks 
that together should not exceed the risk bearing capacity.
The second decision rule is derived from rule #2 and states a risk reduction optimiza-
tion rule. It is based on the aforementioned marginal benefit-marginal cost rule (Vaughan 
1997 p.67). Traditionally this rule defines the marginal benefits of risk reduction efforts in 
terms of decreases in expected loss. Instead we define benefits in terms of the opportunity 
gains that result from reductions in the sum ∑ of risk measure ρ(X). The principle basically 
states that additional risk reduction efforts should be made only when these increase orga-
nizational value. 
Decision rule 2: Replace lottery X by Y if and only if the resulting change in risk measure, 
ρ(X ) - ρ( y), does equal or exceed the cost c of this change, i.e. 
 ρ(X ) - ρ( y ) ≥ c, with c ≥ 0.34 (2.16)
Derivation of these decision rules from the zero equivalence risk measure (Definition 
2.7) ensures their compatibility with the concept of organizational risk appetite. Cal-
culation of the zero equivalence risk measure on the basis of an unbiased utility func-
tion (Definition 2.4) elicited from the organization’s senior management ensures that 
this risk appetite is a reflection of their true attitude to risk (Definition 2.6) under 
assumption 2.5.
2.5.2 Examples of the application of the organizational risk appetite rules
On the basis of the definition of risk appetite in the BS 31100: 2008 in which organizational 
risk appetite is defined as the amount of risk that an organization is prepared to seek, ac-
cept or tolerate we consider three examples in which subsequently speculative risk is sought, 
inherent risk is accepted, and residual risk is tolerated.35
34  If ρ(X) > ρ( y ) then risk reduction implies that the capital requirements of the organization are reduced. This capi-
tal is freed for investment purposes and given rate of return k the opportunity gains are k × (ρ(X ) - ρ( y )). Because 
we restrict ourselves to a single period (Assumption 2.8) and assume present values only (Assumption 2.11) the 
reduction in capital (ρ(X ) - ρ( y)) is directly compared with the increased expenditure of capital c. When we relax 
the single period assumption equation 2.16 still holds if we define k × c as the periodic risk expense and c as an 
infinite expense for risk reduction. 
35  Loosemore Raftery Reilly Higgon (2006 1.4.5 p.12) define speculative risks as risks that offer a chance of 
loss and gain and pure risks as those that offer only the prospect of loss. In risk management inherent risk is 
defined as risk before risk reduction and residual risk as risk after risk reduction.
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Example 2.1: Risk pursuit 
In Fooled by randomness (2004 p.99 table 6.1) Nassim Nicholas Taleb introduces the specula-
tive lottery X
1
 = (.999 : 1, .001 : -10,000) that offers the prospect of a high probability of 
generating small profits and a small probability of a catastrophic result (a Black Swan, Taleb 
2007). He uses this example to illustrate the combined effect of asymmetric odds and asym-
metric outcomes, a feature that is common to stock markets (Taleb 2008 figures 1 and 2, the 
classical problem of the turkey). 
We adopt this example to illustrate the difference between linear and exponential 
utility. We interpret lottery X
1
 as the pay-off structure of a department of a firm with 
the outcomes of X
1
 representing after tax net operating profits. We additionally assume 
a departmental risk bearing capacity of 10, a total shareholder value of 100, a weighted 
average cost of capital k of .05, a return on investment r of .1, and an initial capital in-
vestment i of 10. To assess whether the pursuit of value warrants the acceptance of the 
risk inherent in lottery X
1
, we calculate the department’s contribution in Economic Value 
Added to the firm (EVA, Bennett Stewart III 1991). EVA is an estimate of the firm’s eco-
nomic profit and is based on net operating profits (r × i ), weighted average cost of capital 
(k), and capital employed. Capital employed includes both capital invested (i) and the 
economic capital that the firm is required to set aside for pursuing risk (m). Its formula 
is: EVA = (r × i ) - k × (i + m).
Linear utility. We first apply the zero equivalent risk measure ρze to X
1
 for a firm who 
is risk neutral with u(x) = x. Risk neutrality of the firm is in the finance literature as well 
as in decision theory (e.g. Smith 2004) frequently assumed to be in the best interests of 
the shareholder. Under linear utility the minimum additional capital requirement that 
would be sufficient to include X
1
 in the acceptance set is m = 9 (i.e. -EV).36 EVA = .05, 
which is a factor 20 lower than profits but still positive.37 Given the availability of suf-
ficient risk capacity (decision rule 1) the department may still be granted a license to 
operate. 
Exponential utility. We next apply the zero equivalent risk measure ρze to X
1
 for a firm 
who is risk averse with exponential utility u(x) = 1 - e-x/R. Empirical surveys indicate that 
risk tolerances of investors, boards, and CEOs rate R between 10%–25% of the shareholder 
value of the firm (Stanford University Strategic Decisions Group 2010). Based on this rule 
of thumb, R is assumed to be 25. We apply these numbers to the formula for the entropic 
risk measure in the appendix and find that the minimum additional capital requirement that 
36  After addition of the additional capital requirement m = 9.001 ≈ 9 prospect X
2
 = (.999 : 10.001, .001 : 
-9,991) results which EV equals 0.
37 EVA = 1 - .05 (10 + 9.001) ≈ .05.
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would be sufficient to include X
1
 in the acceptance set is m = 9,827.38 This amount differs 
from the additional capital requirement under linear utility by more than a factor 1,000. 
EVA = -491, which demonstrates that the department is not adding value to the firm but 
instead is destroying value.39 On the basis of the immense amount of additional economic 
capital that needs to be maintained and the negative EVA, the department is unlikely to 
receive approval for continuing its operations.
In this example the department is under the popular assumption of risk neutrality 
still considered to contribute value to the firm while under plausible assumptions of risk 
aversion, the department is destroying value. This is true even though it is expected to be 
profitable in 999 out of a 1000 periods. Our augmentation of Taleb’s original example with 
corporate risk attitudes adds to the strength of his exclamation that: “The frequency or prob-
ability of the loss, in and by itself, is totally irrelevant; it needs to be judged in connection 
to the magnitude of the outcome.” ( 2004 pp.98–99). When risk managers do indeed “place 
a greater emphasis on earning profits than they do on avoiding losses” (Taleb, Goldstein, 
& Spitznagel 2009 p.80), then adopting the zero equivalent risk measure, which is based 
on a risk tolerance which is accepted by the firm’s stakeholders, will aid in the pursuit of 
real value. 
Example 2.2: Risk retention
In their management of operational risk banks retain those risks that are considered too 
small to be material. In his contribution to Mastering operational risk Pezier (2003) illus-
trates this by means of a log-frequency / log-severity diagram (see figure 2.1). The figure 
displays a boundary between a zone where risks deserve attention and a zone where they 
are considered negligible. The axes define decimal logarithm scales for annual frequency 
(vertically) and relative severity (horizontally). Relative severity is defined as monetary 
impact as a fraction of a bank’s capital.40 In Pezier (2003) risks of which the expected 
loss and the standard deviation of losses is less than ten thousandth of capital are con-
sidered immaterial. This boundary is in figure 2.1 displayed by the kinked boundary 
line. This method assumes that all risks within the boundary line fulfill decision rule 1 
even though their aggregated amount of risk is not compared directly with risk bearing 
capacity (Clemens & Swallom 2005).
38  Using the formula for m which is derived in the appendix we find  
m = 25(ln(.999 e -1/25 + .001 e10,000/25)) ≈ 9,827.
39 EVA = 1 - .05 (10 + 9,827) ≈ -491.
40  Pezier (2003) divides the impact of operational losses reported in Basel’s Second Quantitative Impact Study 
by € 3 billion, the average capital of the sample of banks in the study.
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Figure 2.1 Log-frequency / log-severity diagram specifying the boundary of immaterial losses and 
exponential and linear utility isocontours.41
The kinked boundary line can be approximated by an exponential utility function with risk 
tolerance R = 1 million (see figure 2.1).42 The rather low tolerance for risk of this exponential 
function suggests a high aversion to risk. The risk averse nature of the exponential utility iso-
contour is illustrated by the large difference between exponential and linear utility isocontours 
41  The observant reader acquainted with Pezier’s original ISMA (2002) discussion paper which was made in 
preparation for his chapter in Mastering operational risk will notice that the lines in his figure 1 are incorrectly 
positioned. By elongating in his figure 1 the line section above the kink to the coordinate (-4, 0) and shift-
ing the line section below the kink 0.25 points to the right, his figure becomes consistent with the text in his 
paper and with our figure 2.1.
42  The exponential utility isocontour in figure 2.1 was derived using the following steps. In figure 2.1 the coor-
dinate (-6, 2) represents an event with a loss with a magnitude of 10-6 of a bank’s average capital and a fre-
quency of 102 per year. This annual frequency translates to a daily probability of occurrence of approximately 
.27 (= 100/365). Multiplication of 10-6 with average bank capital results in loss amount of 3.000 (=10-6 × 3 
× 109). The equation for the expected utility of the lottery X = (.27 : -3000, .73 : 0) which corresponds with 
coordinate (-6, 2) is then EU(X ) = .27 × (1 - e 3.000/R). Along the isocontours in figure 2.1 the value of EU(X ) 
is held constant. For each ordinate y of coordinates in the exponential isocontour in the range [-3, 2] its cor-
responding abscissa x is derived by the equation x = log((R ln(1 - (EU(X ) / (10y / 365))) / (3 × 109)). Applying 
ordinary least squares to this equation results in the optimum R = 1.173.777,073 which for ease of exposure 
was rounded to 1 million in example 2.2.
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in figure 2.1 at an annual frequency of .001. When we adopt the 25% of firm value benchmark 
for risk tolerance that was used in example 2.1 and consider the average capital of 3 billion to 
be a conservative estimate of firm value then risk tolerance would be estimated at 750 million. 
This rather conservative estimate differs by a factor 750 from the exponential approximation 
of the boundary in figure 2.1.
This example illustrates how utility functions can be used to benchmark the boundaries 
of risk appetite in risk management tools, such as the log-frequency / log-severity diagram in 
figure 2.1. If an unbiased utility function of senior management is available then this func-
tion can be directly used to express the degree of risk appetite in these tools.
While the previous examples considered risk pursuit and risk retention, the focus in 
the next two examples will be on risk treatment. Risk treatment stands for the effort the 
organization takes to reduce the probability of occurrence and/or the impact of a risk. By 
risk treatment the original, inherent risk is transformed to a tolerable, residual risk. In the 
first example we consider risk transfer to an insurer. In the subsequent example we focus on 
control activities that the organization carries out itself to reduce the probability of occur-
rence or the impact of risk. 
Example 2.3.1: Risk treatment by transfer
We adopt the example in Vaughan (1997 p.61) of the insurable risk X
1
 = (.01 : -100,000, 
.99 : 0) and a premium of X
2
 = (1 : -1,500) for full insurance coverage. We assume no other 
risks beside X
1
. On the basis of this example decision rules 1 and 2 are applied for organiza-
tions with either low or high risk bearing capacity. 
Low risk bearing capacity. We first consider a decision maker with a risk bearing capacity 
d of 70,000 and assume a risk tolerance of 15,000.43 Because we assume no other risks we 
can directly assess whether the zero equivalent risk measure ρze applied to X
1
 does not exceed 
d (decision rule 1). On the basis of ρze the minimum additional capital that this decision 
maker would require to include X
1
 in the acceptance set is m = 32,703, which falls below 
the risk bearing capacity.44 X
1
 is thus acceptable under decision rule 1 even though by choos-
ing to retain X
1
 the decision maker clearly risks more than she can afford to lose (rule #1). 
Because the additional capital requirement for retaining X
1
 is much higher than the insur-
ance premium of 1,500 the decision maker still prefers risk transfer by insurance (decision 
rule 2). This example illustrates rule #3 “don’t risk a lot for a little” where the risk averse 
decision maker considers the amount of additionally required capital to be “a lot” and the 
insurance premium “a little”. 
43  Delquié (2008) in table 1 demonstrates the relationship that under exponential utility exists between maxi-
mum acceptable loss at a particular probability level and risk tolerance. According to this table the maximum 
acceptable loss at p = .01 is 4.61 times risk tolerance. Starting with a maximum acceptable loss of 70,000 we 
estimate risk tolerance at 15,184 (= 70,000 / 4.61) and round this to 15,000.
44 m = 32,702 = 15,000(ln(.01 e100,000 /15,000 + (1 - .01))).
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High risk bearing capacity. Next we consider a decision maker with a risk bearing capacity of 
700,000 for which we assume a risk tolerance of 150,000.45 The minimum additional capital 
that this decision maker would require to include X
1
 in the acceptance set on the basis of ρze is 
m = 1,415.46 This amount clearly falls below risk bearing capacity and retention of X
1
 would 
thus be acceptable on the basis of decision rule 1. The additional capital requirement for reten-
tion of X
1
 can be waived by accepting the insurance policy at a cost of 1,500. However, based on 
the marginal benefit-marginal cost rule (decision rule 2) such a risk treatment is not advisable. 
Even when insurance is not advisable for X
1
 on the basis of decision rules 1 and 2, X
1
 
can still be a suitable candidate for risk treatment by probability or impact reduction. This 
is illustrated in the next example.
Example 2.3.2: Risk treatment by probability or impact reduction
We consider a decision maker with a risk tolerance of 150,000 who requires an additional 
capital amount of m = 1,415 in order to retain risk X
1
 = (.01 : -100,000, .99 : 0). Now assume 
that at the expense of 750 this decision maker has either the option to halve the probability of 
occurrence of X
1
, which obtains X
2
 = (.005 : -100,000, .995 : 0) or halve the consequent impact 
of X
1
, which results X
3
 = (.01 : -50,000, .99 : 0). Notice that both treatments halve the expected 
value of X
1
 at half the cost of full insurance. While the mean values of X
2
 and X
3
 are identical 
the variance of X
2
 is more than twice as large than the variance of X
3
.47 Variance is a measure of 
variability. When it is interpreted as an indicator of risk this suggests that the residual risk after 
probability reduction, X
2
, is more riskier than residual risk after impact reduction, X
3
.
This difference in riskiness is corroborated by the minimum capital requirement for 
holding risk X
2
 and X
3
. For risk X
2
 an amount of m = 709 is required while risk X
3
 requires 
a lower amount of m = 592.48 Compared with the capital requirement that needs to be 
maintained to retain X
1
 the reduction in capital requirement is larger for impact reduction 
(1,415 - 592 = 823) than for probability reduction (1,415 - 709 = 706). The marginal 
benefit-marginal cost rule (decision rule 2) suggests that only the benefits of impact reduc-
tion warrant the use of the 750 additional expense. 
This is an illustration of the how the risk-free monetary amount m, typically the 
amount of additional capital that makes retention of a risky event acceptable, can alter-
natively be used to determine whether it is advisable to treat the risk of the event itself. 
This application of risk measures to risk treatment was already alluded to in Artzner, 
Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999 p.205). It also illustrates that when impact and prob-
ability reduction accommodate the same reduction in expected losses, impact reduction 
45  A risk tolerance of 129,000 would still induce decision makers to insure at a premium of 1,500. At a maxi-
mum acceptable loss of 700,000 at probability p = .01 the risk tolerance is in line with Delquié (2008) 
estimated at 152,003, which for convenience is rounded to 150,000. 
46 m = 1,415 = 150,000(ln(.01 e100,000 /150,000 + (1 - .01))).
47 Var(X
2
) = 49,750,000, Var(X
3
) = 24,750,000.
48 m = 709 = 700,000(ln(.005 e100,000 /700,000 + (1 - .005))).
 m = 592 = 700,000(ln(.01 e50,000 /700,000 + (1 - .01))).
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is preferred over probability reduction under risk aversion (Wakker 2010 p.75, aversion to 
mean-preserving spreads).
2.6 Discussion
This chapter combines models and methods from decision theory and measure theory to en-
able the measurement of organizational risk appetite by means of the risk attitude of its senior 
management. It demonstrates how the rational, normative choice model of expected utility 
combined with the convex, utility based shortfall risk measure is capable of measuring the 
organizational willingness to accept risk in the pursuit, retention, and treatment of risk. Con-
trary to the mainstream tradition in decision analysis it proposes to elicit the utility function 
under prospect theory. Under prospect theory utility elicitation produces an unbiased utility 
function representing the unbiased risk attitude of senior management, which under the as-
sumptions of expected utility theory can be used to measure organizational risk appetite.
The unbiased utility function of senior management need not be concave, as assumed in 
economics, but can be convex, resulting in an unbiased risk seeking attitude to risk. While risk 
seeking in the domain of losses is a rather robust descriptive finding in decision theory it is not 
used normatively in risk management and is considered normatively undesirable in economics. 
While decision theory offers no normative arguments against such a convex utility function – 
it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and fulfills the axioms of rational decision 
making – the law of marginal diminishing utility in economics does offer such an argument by 
requiring risk measures need to be derived from concave utility functions. This emphasizes the 
mere fact that descriptive findings under decision theory need not correspond with normative 
theory (Howard 1988 p.683). The finding of convex utility requires the decision analyst, in the 
context of organizational risk appetite, to request the decision maker to reconsider her natural 
preferences in the light of their undesirable tendency to promote risk seeking behavior.
The robust empirical finding of a disparity in both magnitude and risk attitude between the 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) valuation methods, emphasized 
the need to assess which method is most appropriate as a risk measure in the context of organi-
zational risk appetite. Based on measure theory this chapter therefore introduced a continuum 
of risk measures comprising WTA(-), the minimum amount that a decision maker demands for 
accepting an unfavorable lottery, and WTP(+), the maximum amount that a decision maker is 
willing to pay for acquiring a favorable lottery. It is interesting to note that a similar conclusion 
was formulated in environmental economics, where WTA was proposed as the most appropri-
ate measure for compensating citizens for damage to environmental resources and WTP for 
measuring the value of extension of environmental resources (Knetsch 2005 p.94, Brown & 
Gregory 1999). This suggests that WTA and WTP are conceptually symmetrical and that WTA 
should be used to evaluate losses and WTP to evaluate gains (Knetsch 2000).
The risk measure concept is compatible with a utility elicitation method in which a sure 
amount is added to or subtracted from a lottery to attain zero-equivalence. In decision the-
ory utility elicitations based on zero equivalence are rare. In contrast, elicitations based on 
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certainty equivalents, which are incongruent with the risk measure concept, are very com-
mon. On the premise that utility functions should be applied in the context in which they 
were elicited (Hey, Morone, & Schmidt 2009), the lack of congruence between certainty 
equivalents and risk measures suggests that in the context of organizational risk appetite, it 
is preferable to avoid the use of certainty equivalents. 
The illustrative examples in this chapter illustrate that it is rather easy to apply the 
exponential utility function, on the premise that this represents the unbiased risk attitude 
of senior management, in combination with a selection of decision rules to facilitate deci-
sion making about organizational risk appetite. Practical measurements of risk appetite by 
organizations and society most of the times assume a risk neutral attitude and only rarely 
employ expected utility theory. A risk neutral decision does not differentiate between low 
probability-high impact and high probability-low impact risks, given that expected values 
are identical. While the means of these two risks are identical, their variances are very differ-
ent, which suggests that the two risks are characteristically dissimilar in terms of riskiness. 
Under risk neutrality, whether the risk bearing capacity of the organization is sufficient to 
recover from the high impact loss is not a consideration. Organizations who deal with one-
shot opportunities and threats will in case of default find little consolation in the fact that 
given more time they would on average have succeeded based on the law of large numbers 
in statistics. The severe organizational “pain” caused by high impact risks can be expressed by 
assigning more weight to outcomes that have serious organizational repercussions by means 
of utility functions. Contrary to risk neutrality, which assumes a linear utility function, this 
requires outcomes to be weighed nonlinearly by means of a concave utility function. 
The lack of adoption of the models and methods of decision theory in risk management 
may be attributed to the fact that most practitioners in risk management have not received 
a formal training in decision analysis. Well known tools in risk management do, however, 
implicitly assume nonlinear weighting of outcomes and probabilities, which is only evident 
to those who have been exposed to decision modeling (see for example appendix A). It is 
our hope that this chapter will inspire risk practitioners to consciously apply the concepts of 
decision theory in their measurement of organizational risk appetite and attract researchers 
from decision theory to explore this new applied field of research.
2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Appendix A: Rating scales for financial damages and frequency in Fine (1971)
In Fine’s method the priority assigned to a hazard49 is determined by a risk score (R), which 
is calculated on the basis of numerical ratings of a hazard’s consequences (C), exposure (E), 
and probability (P) using the formula
49  Fine (1971 p.2) defines a hazard as “any unsafe condition or potential source of an accident” and hazard-event 
as “an undesirable occurrence; the combination of a hazard with some activity or person which could start a 
sequence of events to end in an accident.”
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 R = C × E × P. (2.17)
The consequences of a hazard are defined as the most probable results of a potential accident, 
exposure as the frequency of occurrence of the hazard-event that could lead to the accident, 
and probability as the likelihood that the hazard-event will result in a chain of events leading 
to the accident and its consequences. Probability P is thus a conditional probability, which 
demonstrates that accidents depend on exposure to a hazard. Considering that the operation 
E × P in the formula represents the likelihood of an accident, equation 2.17 thus as a whole 
directly translates to the traditional mantra in risk management that risk is an accident’s 
“probability times impact” (Goodpasture 2004 p.229, P * I analysis), which merely is a re-
statement of the expected value concept. 
For each of the three hazard characteristics in equation 2.17 the method defines six 
degrees of seriousness described mainly in qualitative terms and mapped to numerical rat-
ings in classification tables. By setting the highest score of consequences to 100 and those of 
exposure and probability to 10 each, the method assigns equal importance to the accident’s 
impact and likelihood. Figure 2.2 presents the relationship between numerical ratings and a 
selection of (a) consequences, expressed in financial damages per accident, and (b) exposure, 
expressed in frequency of occurrence per year. 
 (a) (b)
 
Figure 2.2 Midpoint rating of a selection of (a) financial damages and (b) frequency of occurrence 
based on Fine (1971 appendix B p.28).50
The curves in figure 2.2 display a convex relationship between financial damages and its rat-
ing and a concave relationship between frequency of occurrence and its rating. 
50  For four out of the six degrees the classification tables suggest upper and lower limits for both consequences 
and exposure. Figure 2.2 presents the midpoint rating between these two limits.
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2.7.2 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of deriving Equation 2.14 from Equation 2.13
ρent(X ) = inf {m ∈  : E[1 - e-(m+X)/R] ≥ z} (2.13)
E[1 - e-(m+X)/R] = z (assess the infimum i.e. the greatest lower bound)
E[1 - e-X/R · e-m/R] = z
1 - E[e-X/R] e-m/R = z (the expectation of a constant is a constant)
E[e-X/R] e-m/R = 1 - z
ln (E[e-X/R] e-m/R) = ln (1 - z)
ln E[e-X/R] - m/R = ln (1 - z)
- m/R = - ln E[e-X/R] + ln (1 - z)
m = R (ln E[e-X/R] - ln (1 - z)).  (2.14)
Proof of equality between Equation 2.14 and Equation 2.10 
A = {X ∈ c : u-1(E[u(X )]) ≥ u-1(z)} (2.10)
u-1(E[u\(X )]) = u-1(z)
Assume exponential utility and apply this to X + m.
Step 1: find the inverse utility u-1(.)
u(x) = 1 - e-x/R
1 - u(x) = e-x/R
ln(1 - u(x)) = -x/R
u-1(u(x)) = x = -Rln(1 - u(x))
Step 2: calculate the expected utility E[u(X + m)]
E[u(X + m)] = pu(x + m) + (1 - p)u( y + m)
E[u(X + m)] = p(1 - e -(x + m)/R) + (1 - p) (1 - e-( y + m)/R)
E[u(X + m)] = p(1 - e -x/R e -m/R) + (1 - p) (1 - e-y /R e-m/R)
E[u(X + m)] = p - p e -x/R e -m/R + (1 - p) - (1 - p) e-y /R e-m/R
E[u(X + m)] = 1 - p e -x/R e -m/R - (1 - p) e-y /R e-m/R
E[u(X + m)] = 1 - e -m/R ( p e -x/R + (1 - p) e-y /R)
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Step 3: insert E[u(X + m)] into u-1(.)
u-1(E[u(X + m)]) = -R ln(1 - (1 - e-m/R ( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e-y/R)))
u-1(E[u(X + m)]) = -Rln(e-m/R ( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e-y/R))
Step 4: equate the result with u-1(z)
Let u-1(E[u(X + m)]) = u-1(z)
u-1(z) = -Rln(1 - z)
u-1(E[u(X + m)]) = -Rln(e -m/R ( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e-y/R))
-Rln(e-m/R ( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e-y/R)) = -R ln(1 - z)
ln(e-m/R ( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e -y/R)) = ln(1 - z)
-m + R ln( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e-y/R) = R ln(1 - z)
m = R (ln( p e-x/R + (1 - p) e-y/R) - ln(1 - z)) 
m = R (ln E[e-X/R] - ln (1 - z)).  (2.14)
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3  Articulating Risk Attitude in the Risk Matrix using  
Decision Theory
Summary
This chapter examines how the unbiased risk attitude of a decision maker can be articulated 
in the risk matrix on the basis of the zero equivalent risk measure. Using isocontours the 
shape and location of the unacceptable risk zone in the risk matrix is derived on the basis of 
marginal benefit – marginal cost analysis. The implication of this analysis is that a concave 
utility function, which under expected utility theory reflects an averse attitude to risk, is 
consistent with a preference for an outcome reduction over a probability reduction strategy. 
Examples illustrate how three different functional specifications under unbiased expected 
utility theory articulate organizational risk appetite in the risk matrix. 
3.1 Introduction
Since its instigation as a formal discipline, risk management has advocated prudence in the 
face of risk, articulated in statements such as “don’t risk more than you can afford to lose” and 
“don’t risk a lot for a little” (Mehr & Hedges 1963 chapter 1). The widespread neglect of the 
small probability – large impact events that initiated the 2007–2009 financial crisis is indica-
tive for the relevance of these basic principles for organizations and society in the present day. 
The lack of competency of organizations in managing their risk appetite during this crisis 
(McDonald 2009, RIMS 2009) pushed their risks into a portion of their loss distribution 
which is usually associated with unlikely, catastrophic events, resulting in an “unfortunate 
tail” (Edwards 2010). Because of the widespread use of the risk matrix in defining organi-
zational risk appetite (AIRMIC 2009 p.10), it is important to consider to what degree this 
popular risk management tool prevents organizations from “stuffing risk into the tails”.51
The risk matrix, which consists of a plane with an axis for the probability of occurrence 
of a risk and an axis for its consequent impact, visually expresses organizational risk appetite 
by segregating risks between an acceptable and unacceptable zone in the matrix. At its own 
discretion each organization determines the size of each zone and the shape of the boundary 
line that separates them. Originally risk matrices were based on expected value calculations, 
which imply a risk neutral attitude to risk. Most of the times, however, the risk attitude 
implied in the risk matrix remains unarticulated (Cox 2008 p.508). 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate what effect different attitudes to risk have on 
organizational risk appetite in the risk matrix. Drawing upon methods from decision theory 
51 A quote from Marc Groz in Nocera (2009).
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it derives under expected utility theory the size of each zone in the matrix as well as the shape 
of the boundary line. Prior attempts to apply expected utility theory to risk matrices failed 
to clarify how the risk attitude embodied in a utility function translates to the zoning in 
the risk matrix (Kwak & LaPlace 2005). The primary contribution of this chapter is that it 
elucidates how methods from decision theory aid in the consolidation of a prudent attitude 
to risk taking in one of risk management’s most popular risk management tools. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a detailed exposition on 
the risk matrix. The third section discusses risk attitudes under expected value theory (EV), 
expected utility theory (EU), and prospect theory (PT). It furthermore explains how util-
ity functions from these theories can be used to calculate risk measures. The fourth section 
explains how isocontours, which are derived from these risk measures, are used to determine 
the size and the shape of the zones in the risk matrix. It discusses the relationship between 
risk attitudes and preferences for outcome and probability reduction in risk management. 
The fifth section presents three examples in which risk measures are used to determine the 
acceptability of individual cells in the risk matrix. The sixth section contains a discussion. 
Appendices are in the final section.
3.2 The risk matrix
In enterprise risk management the risk matrix is one of the most popular and easy to use 
tools for expressing organizational risk appetite. The risk matrix52 consists of a grid of cells, 
defined over a probability and impact axis, in which risks are positioned on the basis of their 
probability of occurrence and negative impact on the organizational objectives. An illustra-
tive example of a risk matrix is presented in figure 3.1.
The aim of the matrix is to classify risks as acceptable or unacceptable to the orga-
nization, thereby articulating organizational risk appetite over a set of risky events that 
threaten the organization. In enterprise risk management it is generally assumed that some 
amount of pure risk needs to be accepted because the cost of risk reduction outweighs 
the benefits. To this end a boundary line in the risk matrix separates those risks that are 
deemed acceptable from those that are not. Risks that occupy the unacceptable zone re-
quire risk responses such as control activities that reduce the risk’s impact or probability 
(risk treatment), risk transfer to a third party (risk sharing), or abandoning the activity 
which causes the risk (risk avoidance). Only in special circumstances can risks in the unac-
ceptable zone be provisionally accepted (COSO 2004 p.3). An important consideration 
underlying the risk matrix is the assumption that the combined risk of all risky events 
together is tolerable if it is judged to be acceptable if taken item-by-item (Clemens & 
Swallom 2005). A shortcoming of the risk matrix is that risks in the acceptable risk zone 
are typically not mitigated even when the costs of control measures are relatively minor 
(Clemens & Pfitzer 2006). 
52 Also known as Risk assessment matrix, Risk map, Heat map, and Probability Impact Grid (PIG).
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In figure 3.1 risks positioned in the white cells are considered acceptable whereas risks in 
the grey cells are deemed unacceptable. The risk matrix employs cells because assessments 
of probability and impact in risk management are often subjective and vague, capable 
only of identifying imprecision intervals and verbal expressions of probability and impact 
instead of their precise measurements. While the natural upper boundary of the probability 
scale is 100%, the upper boundary of the impact scale is either the worst conceivable negative 
impact or is left undefined. Traditionally, and in contrast to the linear scaling in figure 3.1, 
the impact and probability axes of risk matrices have in risk analysis been scaled logarithmi-
cally in order to enhance the resolution of the risk matrix to clearly distinguish minor from 
major risks (Clemens, Pfitzer, Simmons, Dwyer, Frost, & Olson 2005, Pfitzer, Hardwick, 
Pfitzer, & Ward 2004, Clemens 1995). The isocontour in figure 3.1 partitions the cells in the 
risk matrix into an acceptable and unacceptable risk zone. When at least 50% of the area of a 
cell is located above the isocontour then all risks positioned inside that cell are considered ac-
ceptable. If not, then the risks positioned in the cell are considered unacceptable, thus falling 
outside the organizational risk appetite (see Goldberg, Everhart, Stevens, Babbitt, Clemens, 
& Stout 1994 p.3–7 figure 3–3 for a detailed explanation of this procedure). 
Commonly risk practitioners define risk as the product of probability ( p) and negative 
impact (x), i.e. p × x, an approach attributed to Blaise Pascal (Pfitzer, Hardwick, & Dwyer 
2001). Following this convention the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable risks 
has traditionally been determined on the basis of expected value calculations, thus assuming 
a neutral attitude to risk.53 The origins of risk matrices can be traced to military standards for 
system safety that are meant to mitigate mishap risk (Clemens et al. 2005). These standards 
53 The coordinates of the isocontour in figure 3.1 have an expected value of -3.
Figure 3.1 Risk matrix in which acceptable and unacceptable risks are segregated on the basis of a 
boundary line.
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leave it to their users to determine what level of risk is acceptable (see for an example MIL-
STD-882B 1984 p.A-4). Surveys indeed show that users vary in risk acceptability (Clemens 
1995). While the use of risk matrices is recommended in the COSO (2004) guidelines, there 
is a lack of generally agreed standards for their application in enterprise risk management. 
Under this lack of guidance organizations have been actively engaged in copying existing 
risk matrix formats leading to a high degree of organizational “mimicry and isomorphism” 
(Power 2007) in expressions of organizational risk appetite. 
3.3 Utility functions and risk measures
This section discusses the basic elements from decision theory and measure theory that are 
needed to articulate risk attitude in the risk matrix. It starts with discussing three different 
utility specifications from decision theory and then continues by explaining how these util-
ity functions can be used to calculate a risk measure. 
3.3.1 Utility functions 
We model risky events, or risks, by means of the binary lottery 
 X = ( p : x, 1 - p : y) (3.1)
with outcomes x, y ∈  and the probability of occurrence of x being 0 < p ≤ 1. Under 
expected utility theory (Bernoulli 1738/1954, von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) the 
preference of a decision maker for lotteries is represented by the probability weighted sum 
of utilities or, alternatively, the expected utility of a lottery
 EU(X ) = p × u(x) + (1 - p) × u( y). (3.2)
The utility function u(z) is a monotonically increasing transformation of outcomes z ∈ .
Under expected utility theory it holds that the preference relation X
1
  X
2
, implying a 
strict preference for X
1
 over X
2
, is represented by EU(X
1
) > EU(X
2
). Similarly the equiva-
lence X
1
 ~ X
2
 is represented by EU(X
1
) = EU(X
2
) and the weak preference relation X
1
  X
2
 
by EU(X
1
) ≥ EU(X
2
). 
Under expected utility theory the utility function models the risk attitude of the deci-
sion maker. Under expected utility a concave utility function expresses a risk averse attitude, 
which means that the decision maker prefers each probability distribution less than its ex-
pectation. A risk seeking attitude – the decision maker prefers each probability distribution 
to its expectation – is under expected utility theory expressed by a convex utility function. 
Under expected utility theory a risk neutral attitude, the equivalent of expected value theory, 
is expressed by a linear utility function.
The preferences of a risk neutral decision maker, representative for the original, norma-
tive approach in risk management to incorporate risk attitude into organizational risk ap-
petite using expected values, are described by a linear utility function with
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 u(z) = z. (3.3)
The normative view of economics, which assumes expected utility and adheres to concave 
utility, is for the purpose of this chapter represented by a risk averse decision maker with a 
risk tolerance (R)54 that is described by the exponential utility function 
 u(z) = 1 - e-z /R (Pratt 1964, constant absolute risk aversion, CARA). (3.4)
Finally, to provide a descriptive benchmark, the utility function of a decision maker with 
utility specifications from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, hence-
forth TK’92) is presented. In TK’92 utility is described by the power functions 
 u(z) = z α, for z ≥ 0 
 u(z) = -λ(-z)b, for z < 0 (Pratt 1964, constant relative risk aversion, CRRA) (3.5)
with the powers α = b = .88 and loss aversion coefficient λ = 2.25. Under prospect theory 
the utility function is concave over the gain domain, convex over the loss domain and has a 
distinctive kink at zero, resulting from the finding that the disutility experienced from losing 
a monetary amount by far outweighs the utility of gaining that amount (loss aversion).
In figure 3.2 the utility curves resulting from equations 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are presented 
with a normalization of u(10) = 1 and u(0) = 0. To avoid extreme cases of risk aversion, we 
let R = 11 in equation 3.4 to provide a close fit with the utility specifications in TK’92 over 
the range [-10,10] (see figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Utility functions over the loss and gain domains of a risk neutral decision maker, a risk 
averse decision maker with risk tolerance R = 11 and a representative agent from TK’92.
54  Risk tolerance is the amount an individual is willing to stake in a 50/50 bet that either returns twice the stake 
or makes one lose half of it.
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3.3.2 Zero equivalent risk measure
For the purpose of this chapter we assume throughout that utility functions are not biased 
by nonlinear probability weighting and that, under expected utility theory, these functions 
represent the unbiased risk attitude of senior management (see Definition 2.6). For each 
lottery X this unbiased utility function is used to calculate the zero equivalent risk measure 
ρze(X ). For an unfavorable lottery denoted by X -, which is a lottery that is less preferred than 
retaining the status quo, ρze(X -) is the minimum amount m that added to lottery X - makes 
the utility of lottery X - equivalent to the utility of zero (see Definition 2.7). ρze(X -) is thus 
the minimum sure amount, or ask price (a), that a decision maker, under the assumptions 
of expected utility theory and an unbiased utility function, requires as a compensation for 
accepting the unfavorable lottery X -. ρze(X -) can be interpreted as the minimum additional 
capital requirement that needs to be retained to accept X -.
For the unfavorable lottery X - = ( p : x, 1 - p : 0) with x < 0, 0 < p ≤ 1, the ρze(X -) = a, 
with a > 0, is under expected utility calculated by solving the formula in equation 3.6 for a 
 0 = p × u(x + a) + (1 - p) × u(0 + a). (3.6)
Under linear utility, concave exponential utility and the utility specifications of TK’92 the 
following formulae can be derived from equation 3.6:
 a = -EV(X -) = -px (linear utility, 3.7a)
 a = -u-1(EU(X -)) = R ln( p e-x/R - p + 1) (exponential utility, 3.7b)55
 0 = -p(λ)(-(-x + a))b + (1 - p)aα. (TK’92 utility specifications, 3.7c)56
The zero equivalent risk measure ρze(X -) is closely related to the willingness-to-accept valu-
ation method for unfavorable lotteries WTA(X -). The difference is that WTA(X -) is an ask-
price for an unfavorable lottery which is directly observable and can be biased by nonlinear 
probability weighting. The zero equivalent risk measure ρze(X -) is derived from a utility 
function and, when an unbiased utility function is used, is free from a probability distortion 
bias (see Definition 2.4). 
WTP(X -), which is the maximum sure amount that the decision maker would be will-
ing to pay to avoid the unfavorable lottery X -, is not compatible with the risk measure con-
55  u-1(u(x)), i.e. the inverse utility of the utility function is based on the relationship u(x) = 1 - e-x/R ⇒ u-1(u(x)) = 
x = - ln(1 - u(x))R. Replacing u(x) with EU(X ) results x = u-1(EU(X )) = - ln(1 - EU(X ))R = - ln(1 - p(1 - 
e-x / R))R = -R ln( p e-x/R - p + 1)), with x < 0. Ask price a is under exponential, concave utility defined by a = -u-1 
(EU(X -)) = R ln(p e-x / R - p + 1), with a > 0.
56  Equation (3.7c) can be rewritten as (x - a))b / aα = (1 - p) / p(λ). TK ’92 find b = α. Replacing b for α results 
(x/a - 1)α = (1/p - 1) / (λ) ⇒ a = x / (1 + ((1/p - 1) / (λ))1/α). Alternatively equation (3.7c) can be solved for 
a in MS Excel by the command ‘Goal Seek’.
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cept. Only under the assumptions of expected utility with linear or exponential utility the 
equality ρze(X -) = WTP(X -) holds.57 Under TK’92 the size of WTP(X -), which is typically 
assessed by the indifference between a sure loss and a risky loss, expresses under prospect 
theory a risk seeking attitude to risk in the domain of losses. Seeking risk when confronted 
with potential losses suggests an attitude to risk that is incompatible with the prudence 
proclaimed in risk management. As organizational risk appetite represents the willingness 
to accept losses in the pursuit of gains it is both semantically and conceptually incompatible 
with WTP(X -).
3.4 Articulation of risk attitude in the risk matrix
This section discusses first how two decision rules for organizational risk appetite can be 
applied to the risk matrix. On the basis of the second decision rule, marginal analysis, the 
section assesses the size and shape of the unacceptable zone in the risk matrix by means of 
isocontours, assuming either linear utility or concave exponential utility. Several observa-
tions are derived from the shape and location of these isocontours. 
3.4.1 Decision rule 1: Risk bearing constraint
An important decision rule in relation to organizational risk appetite is that the amount of 
risk that the organization is willing to bear is constrained by its risk bearing capacity (see 
Decision rule 1 in chapter 2 and equation 2.15). The risk matrix does not specify risk 
acceptance for the organization’s full exposure to risk but specifies risk acceptance for each 
risk individually (Clemens & Swallom 2005). Therefore the risk matrix does not facilitate 
the direct comparison between the organization’s risk bearing capacity and its risk exposure. 
The risk matrix requires that all risks that occupy its unacceptable zone are transferred to the 
acceptable zone or, alternatively, avoided altogether. While the risk matrix does not explicitly 
specify a risk bearing constraint it can accommodate an increase or decrease of the organiza-
tion’s risk bearing capacity by an adjustment of the size of its unacceptable zone.58
57  Proof that for exponential expected utility ρze(X -) = WTP(X -). Let ρze(X -) = WTA(X -) = ask price = a > 0 and 
WTP(X -) = bid price = -b > 0. Without loss of generality we use the u(x) = -e-x / R member of the CARA-
family of utility function. Using this function we can, given prospect X = ( p : x, 0) with 0 < p ≤ 1, x < 0, 
calculate a and b in the following way:
 0 = -ln( pe-(x + a) /R + (1 - p)e-a/R)R ⇒ 1 = pe-x / R e-a/R + (1 - p)e-a/R ⇒ ea/R = pe-x/R + (1 - p) ⇒
 a = ln ( pe-x / R + (1 - p))R
 b = -ln( pe-x / R + (1 - p) e-0 / R)R
 a = -b = ln ( pe-x / R + (1 - p))R. 
58  The location of the boundary lines in the risk matrices of a bank’s business units are derived from the amount of 
economic capital that is reserved for each business unit (personal communication by a bank’s risk officer). This 
illustrates how a risk bearing constraint influences the location of boundary lines in the risk matrix in practice. 
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3.4.2 Decision rule 2: Marginal analysis59
A second decision rule for organizational risk appetite is derived from the marginal ben-
efit-marginal cost rule (Vaughan 1997). It states that the marginal benefits of risk treat-
ment or risk sharing should at least be equal to the marginal cost of these risk responses 
(see Decision rule 2 in chapter 2 and equation 2.16). This marginal analysis enables 
to express the exact boundary between acceptable and unacceptable risks in the risk 
matrix by isocontours. This section derives these isocontours under linear and concave 
exponential utility. 
We assume diminishing marginal returns of risk reduction (Li, Pollard, Kendall, 
Soane, & Davies 2009 figure 2, Cooper, Grey, Raymond, & Walker 2005 figure 6.4 p.81). 
We describe these diminishing marginal returns by the cost function γ which is defined 
over logarithmic probability and outcome scales. These probability and outcome scales are 
described by the functions p
i
 = b(i - n) and x
j
 = x
m
 b( j - m) with growth rate b > 1, the exponent 
i (  j ) indicating the position on the logarithmic probability (outcome) scale and n (m) 
the maximum position on this scale, with i, j ∈ +, n,m ∈ 
0
+, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ m. Cost 
function γ assumes a fixed cost of risk reduction c > 0 for unitary changes60 along each 
of the logarithmic scales and defines the cost of reducing probability p
n
 to p
i
 or outcome 
x
m
 to x
j
 by 
 γ (i, j ) = c(n - i + m - j ). (3.8)61
For the purpose of this chapter the benefits of risk reduction are defined as reductions in 
the ρze risk measure that result from risk reduction. Let ρ( p
i
,x
j
) represent the benefit func-
tion for risk reduction measuring the benefit of reducing probability p
n
 to probability p
i
 
and outcome x
m
 to outcome x
j
 with ρ( p
i
,x
j
) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ p
i
 ≤ 1, and x
m
 ≤ x
j
 ≤ 0 by means of the 
equation
 ρ( p
i
,x
j
) = ρze( p
n
,x
m
) - ρze( p
i
,x
j
). (3.9)
Figure 3.3 presents an illustrative example of the total benefits curve (ρ) and the total cost 
curve (γ) under the assumption of concave exponential utility for a risk reduction strategy in 
which respectively impact and probability is reduced.
59  The following assumptions from chapter 2 hold in section 3.4.2 as well. Assumption 2.3 (independence of 
lotteries), assumption 2.5 (true preferences represented by unbiased utility), assumption 2.8 (risk resolved at 
end of single period), assumption 2.9 (probabilities relate to a single period), assumption 2.10 (risk reduc-
tion costs expensed at start of period) and assumption 2.11 (outcomes discounted to present values).
60  Unitary changes along the scales are ∆i = 1 for the logarithmic probability scale and ∆ j = 1 for the logarithmic 
outcome scale.
61  For ease of exposition we assume for that growth rate b and the same fixed cost c apply to both the probability 
and impact scale. Notice that p
0
 ≠ 0 and x
0
 ≠ 0.
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 (a) (b)
  
Figure 3.3 Benefits (ρ) under concave exponential utility and cost (γ) under diminishing marginal 
returns for (a) reducing outcomes from x
m
 to x
j
 holding probability constant at p = 1 and (b) reducing 
probabilities from p
n
 to p
i
 holding outcome constant at x = x
m
.
The marginal analysis defines the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable risks 
in the risk matrix by the condition ∂ρ/∂x = ∂γ/∂x for outcome reduction and ∂ρ/∂p = 
∂γ/∂p for probability reduction. The example62 in figure 3.3a illustrates that at p = 1 the 
condition ∂ρ/∂x = ∂γ/∂x is fulfilled at x = -2.9, or in general -c / ln b, the point at which 
the tangent line of γ runs exactly parallel to the slope of ρ. The parallel tangent lines in 
figure 3.3b illustrate that for x = -10 the condition ∂ρ/∂p = ∂γ/∂p is fulfilled at p = .24. 
The isocontours derived from the marginal analysis are presented in figure 3.4 for a risk 
matrix with linear scaling (a) and logarithmic scaling (b) (the derivation of the equations 
is for figure 3.4a provided in appendix A and for figure 3.4b in appendix B). The afore-
mentioned coordinates {1,-2.9} and {.24,-10}, derived in figure 3.3 under the condition 
of concave exponential utility, are presented in figure 3.4a on respectively the right side 
of the matrix for an outcome reduction strategy and at the bottom of the matrix for the 
probability reduction strategy. 
62 For the example in figure 3.3 and figure 3.4 it holds that n = m = 5, c = 2, x
m
 = -10, b = 2, and R = 11.
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(a) (b)
 
Figure 3.4 Isocontours derived from marginal analysis under a strategy of outcome and probability 
reduction for linear and concave exponential utility in risk matrices with (a) linear and (b) logari-
thmic probability and impact scales.
Under linear scaling (see figure 3.4a) the isocontours are curved upward and classify a large 
area in the risk matrix as unacceptable. The same area appears to be much smaller under 
logarithmic scaling (see figure 3.4b) both for the straight isocontour under risk neutrality 
and the curved inward isocontour under concave exponential utility. The 45° straight line 
downwards from the origin in both figures demonstrates that the risk neutral isocontours 
above these straight lines are an exact mirror image of their counterparts underneath. This 
symmetry hold both under linear scaling (figure 3.4a) and logarithmic scaling (figure 3.4b) 
(see appendix C for an application of the procedure outlined in Goldberg et al. (1994) to 
partition the cells in the risk matrix to the acceptable or unacceptable zone).
3.4.3 Implications of the isocontours in the risk matrix for risk management
Reflection on the isocontours in figure 3.4 suggests that the shape and location of the iso-
contours depend on both the risk attitude of the decision maker and the risk reduction 
strategy that is chosen (i.e. outcome versus probability reduction). This section investigates 
under which conditions these relationships hold. 
observAtion 3.1: In the risk matrix the isocontour under linear utility is stochastically 
dominated by the isocontour under concave exponential utility in combination with an 
outcome reduction strategy for all x < -c / ln(b). (see proof in appendix D)
Under linear utility the lotteries along the isocontour have identical means but increase in vari-
ance in the direction of small probability – large impact risks. In comparison with linear utility, 
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the isocontour derived under concave exponential utility combined with outcome reduction 
designates a larger area in the risk matrix and relatively more small probability – large impact 
lotteries as unacceptable. In contrast the isocontour under concave exponential utility combined 
with a probability reduction strategy intersects the risk neutral isocontour. In comparison with 
the isocontour under linear utility this isocontour designates relatively more small probability – 
large impact lotteries as unacceptable. Its level of losses at p = 1 is, however, higher than that of 
the isocontour under concave exponential utility and outcome reduction. 
observAtion 3.2: Under concave exponential utility the x-value on the isocontour at p = 1 
is higher for an outcome reduction strategy than a probability reduction strategy. (see proof 
in appendix D) 
Under concave exponential utility risk reduction by means of outcome reduction designates 
a larger area in the risk matrix as unacceptable than risk reduction by means of probability 
reduction.
observAtion 3.3: In the risk matrix the isocontour under concave exponential utility 
in combination with a probability reduction strategy is stochastically dominated by the 
isocontour under concave exponential utility in combination with an outcome reduction 
strategy for all x ∈  except for x = 0. (see proof in appendix D)
Under concave exponential utility the difference between total benefits and the total cost of 
risk reduction is maximized by an outcome reduction strategy. This suggests a preference for 
outcome reduction over probability reduction under concave exponential utility. 
Under expected utility theory concavity in utility implies risk aversion. Risk aversion 
implies that when the means of lotteries are preserved a sure lottery is preferred to a risky 
lottery. Holding the lottery means constant, the risk of a unfavorable lottery can be reduced 
either by reducing the spread of outcomes (outcome reduction) or reducing the probability of 
the worst outcome (probability reduction). 
proposition 3.4 [Preference for mean-preserving outcome reduction]. Under expected utility 
theory and concave utility a mean-preserving outcome reduction is weakly preferred to a 
mean-preserving probability reduction. (see proof in appendix D)
From proposition 3.4 we derive that under expected utility theory risk aversion, represented 
by a concave utility function, implies a preference for mean preserving outcome reduction 
over probability reduction. 
3.5 Deriving risk appetite for individual cells
This section presents three examples in which the acceptability of individual cells in the risk 
matrix is determined by means of marginal analysis. The net benefits of risk reduction are 
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defined as reductions in the ρze risk measure minus the cost γ of this risk reduction. These 
marginal benefits are derived under the assumptions of expected utility theory with linear 
utility, concave exponential utility, and the utility specifications from TK’92. 
The risk matrix in table 3.1 contains a portfolio of four risky, probabilistically indepen-
dent unfavorable lotteries A, B, C, and D with a total expected, present value of –16. Lottery 
D, with expected value -9, is stochastically dominated by the other three lotteries in the 
matrix. Lotteries B and C, having expected values of -3, are both stochastically dominated 
by lottery A. Assume a single period decision horizon in which this portfolio of lotteries (risk 
profile) is owned by an entity which, apart from disruptions originating from its risk profile, 
earns at the end of a particular period a steady net cash flow of NCF
t = 1 = 20. Discounted at 
a rate of k = .25 the present value of the entity’s net cash flows at the start of the period is 
calculated as PV
t = 0 = 20 / 1.25 = 16. The entity is allowed to reduce either the probability 
of occurrence or the impact of lotteries B, C and D by moving any of these lotteries to an 
adjacent cell to the left or upwards within the risk matrix at a cost of 3 per move. To be 
considered a viable investment opportunity the present value of the entity (PV
t = 0 ) should at 
least equal the sum of risk measures (Sρze) that is required by a decision maker in return for 
accepting the risk profile and the risk reduction expenses made (γ), i.e. PV ≥ Sρze + γ. For 
the purpose of this section we define the internal rate of return (IRR) for a single period by 
the formula IRR = NCF
t = 1 / (Sρze + γ) - 1. The IRR is a rate of return used to measure the 
profitability of the entity in comparison with the discount rate.
Table 3.1  Risk profile with lotteries A, B, C and D and their expected values (EV) in a 2 × 2 risk 
matrix with probability expressed in the columns with decimal values .25 and .75 and 
impact expressed in the rows with present values € -4 and € -12.63
probability in decimals
.25 .75
pr
es
en
t 
va
lu
e 
of
 im
pa
ct
 in
 €
-4 A = (.25 : -4, .75: 0)
EV(A) = -1
B = (.75 : -4, .25: 0)
EV(B) = -3
-12 C = (.25 : -12, .75: 0)
EV(C) = -3
D = (.75 : -12, .25: 0)
EV(D) = -9
63  We assume that in the event that a risk materializes impact occurs at a fixed time-period and is discounted at 
a fixed discount rate.
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3.5.1 Linear utility
A risk neutral decision maker adheres to expected value theory, i.e. expected utility theo-
ry with linear utility, to determine her risk appetite. Under linear utility the risk measure 
ρze of an unfavorable lottery is equal to the absolute value of its mathematical expectation 
(see equation 3.7a). From table 3.1 can be discerned that the sum of the expected values of 
the risk profile is -16 and that the entity’s present value of 16 is just sufficient to compen-
sate her for the inherent risk of this portfolio of lotteries. This implies that in this particular 
instance the condition PV ≥ Sρze + γ is fulfilled even before any risk reduction effort is 
considered. At Sρze = 16 the discount rate k = .25 exactly equals the entity’s internal rate of 
return (IRR = 20 / (16 + 0) - 1 = .25). Additional risk reduction increases the internal rate 
of return of the entity, however. A risk neutral decision maker can reduce the amount of risk 
measure required to accept the risk profile by reducing the probability of lottery D from .75 
to .25, a leftward move, or by reducing the impact of D from -12 to -4, an upward move. 
A risk neutral decision maker is indifferent between lottery D either joining lottery B or C 
in the risk matrix. In both cases the net benefits are 3, resulting from reducing ρze(D) from 
9 to 3 at a cost of 3. As the entity’s present value of 16 is larger than the sum of required 
risk measures of 10 and risk reduction expenses of 3 the investment opportunity is after risk 
reduction considered more viable than before (PV - Sρze - γ  = 16 - 10 - 3 = 3) and offers 
a higher internal rate of return (IRR = 20/(10 + 3) - 1 = .54). 
In this illustrative example the risk appetite of the risk neutral decision maker is ex-
pressed in the risk matrix by classifying lottery D as an unacceptable lottery, which risk 
needs to be reduced. A typical feature of a risk neutral decision maker is that small prob-
ability – large impact risks and large probability – small impact risks are considered equally 
important. 
3.5.2 Concave exponential utility
For each lottery in the risk matrix table 3.2 presents the ρze risk measure that a risk averse 
decision maker requires under expected utility and a concave exponential utility function 
(see equation 3.7b). Given that the entity’s present value is 16 and the sum of risk measures 
of the four lotteries is 18.6, the entity is an unviable investment opportunity for the risk 
averse decision maker. The risk averse decision maker can reduce the sum of risk measures 
by an upward risk reduction move in the risk matrix, reducing the impact of lottery D from 
-12 to -4. The net benefits of this move are 3.9, resulting from reducing ρze(D) from 10 to 
3.1 at a cost of 3. The net benefits of this upward move are higher than those of a leftward 
move, which reduces lottery D’s probability from .75 to .25 and produces a net benefit of 
2.6, by reducing ρze(D) from 10 to 4.4 at a cost of 3. A risk averse decision maker is thus 
not indifferent between lottery D moving to join either lottery B or C and generally prefers 
impact reduction over probability reduction (see proposition 3.4). An upward impact reduc-
tion move of lottery C to join lottery A in the risk matrix creates an additional net benefit of 
0.3, by reduction of ρze(C) from 4.4 to 1.1 at a cost of 3. The entity’s present value of 16 is 
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sufficiently large to accept the residual risk of 14.4 in the risk matrix. This makes the entity 
a viable investment opportunity (PV - Sρze - γ  = 16 - 8.4 - 6 = 1.6) with an internal rate 
of return that is higher than the discount rate (IRR = 20/(8.4 + 6) - 1 = .39).
Table 3.2  Risk matrix with lotteries A, B, C and D, and their ρze risk measure under the assumption 
of expected utility theory and concave exponential utility (R = 11).
probability in decimals
.25 .75
pr
es
en
t 
va
lu
e 
of
 im
pa
ct
 in
 €
-4
A = (.25 : -4, .75 : 0)
ρze(A) = 11 ln(.25 e4/11 - .25 + 1) = 1.1
B = (.75 : -4, .25 : 0)
ρze(B) = 11 ln(.75 e4/11 - .75 + 1) = 3.1
-12
C = (.25 : -12, .75 : 0)
ρze(C) = 11 ln(.25 e12/11 - .25 + 1) = 4.4
D = (.75 : -12, .25 : 0)
ρze(D) = 11 ln(.75 e12/11 - .75 + 1) = 10
The risk appetite of the risk averse decision maker is expressed in the risk matrix by classify-
ing lotteries C and D as unacceptable lotteries, which impact needs to be reduced. Contrary 
to the risk neutral decision maker a risk averse decision maker is not indifferent between B 
and C and prefers risk reduction for lottery C over B (B  C). Even though lotteries B and 
C have identical means (EV = -3), they differ in variability as measured by the variance mea-
sure of dispersion (Var(B) = 3, Var(C) = 27).64 Following the mean-variance criterion of risk 
aversion (Markowitz 1952a) a rational decision maker would, giving equal means, prefer the 
lottery with the lowest spread around the mean. This can intuitively be recognized by assess-
ing the worst outcome of lottery C (-12) which deviates much more from the mean (-3) 
than the worst outcome of B (-4). Taking the value of the mean as a benchmark then only 
25% of the variability in Var(B) falls below the benchmark whereas for Var(C) a substantial 
75% of all variability pertains to downside risk (Estrada 2008).65
64  Var(B) = .75 (-4 - (-3))2 + .25 (0 - (-3))2 = 3. 
Var(C) = .25 (-12 - (-3))2 + .75 (0 - (-3))2 = 27.
65  Downside Semi-Variance(B) = .75 (-4 - (-3))2 = 0.75. 
Downside Semi-Variance(C) = .25 (-12 - (-3))2 = 20.25. 
Downside Semi-Variance(B)/Var(B) = 0.75/3 = .25. 
Downside Semi-Variance(C)/Var(C) = 20.25/27 = .75.
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The number of cells that a risk averse decision maker considers unacceptable is equal or 
higher than those of a risk neutral decision maker. A typical feature of a risk averse decision 
maker is an aversion to small probability – large impact cells. Another typical feature is that 
risk aversion implies that impact reduction is favored over probability reduction. 
3.5.3 TK’92 utility specifications
For each lottery in the risk matrix table 3.3 presents the ρze risk measure that a decision 
maker with TK’92 utility specifications requires under expected utility (see equation 3.7c). 
The entity’s present value of 16 falls short of the 21.1 required sum of risk measures required 
which makes the entity an unviable investment opportunity. 
Table 3.3  Risk matrix with lotteries A, B, C and D, and their ρze risk measure under the assump-
tion of expected utility theory with utility specified by the power function with TK’92 
specifications.66
probability in decimals
.25 .75
pr
es
en
t 
va
lu
e 
of
 im
pa
ct
 in
 €
-4
A = (.25 : -4, .75 : 0)
ρze(A) = 4/(1 + ((1/.25 - 1)/ 
2.25)1/.88) = 1.7
B = (.75 : -4, .25 : 0)
ρze(B) = 4/(1 + ((1/.75 - 1)/ 
2.25)1/.88) = 3.6
-12
C = (.25 : -12, .75 : 0)
ρze(C) = 12/(1 + ((1/.25 - 1)/ 
2.25)1/.88) = 5.0
D = (.75 : -12, .25 : 0)
ρze(D) = 12/(1 + ((1/.75 - 1)/ 
2.25)1/.88) = 10.8
The total required amount of risk measures can be reduced by reducing the impact of lot-
tery D from -12 to -4. The net benefits of this move are 4.2, resulting from reducing 
ρze(D) from 10.8 to 3.6 at a cost of 3. These net benefits outweigh the effects of reducing 
the probability of occurrence of lottery D from .75 to .25, which offers a net benefit of 
2.8, by reducing ρze(D) from 10.8 to 5.0 at a cost of 3. An additional net benefit of 0.3 is 
created by reducing the impact of lottery C which reduces ρze(C) from 5.0 to 1.7 at a cost 
of 3. Together these two impact reductions still do not make the entity a viable investment 
opportunity (PV - Sρze - γ  = 16 - 10.6 - 6 = -0.6). The entity can only become a viable 
investment opportunity by accepting an internal rate of return below the discount rate 
(IRR = 20/(10.6 + 6) - 1 = .20).
66 The formula used in table 3.3 is discussed in footnote 6.
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For each lottery in the risk matrix the maximum sure amount that a decision maker under 
expected utility theory and TK’92 utility specifications would be willing to pay to avoid 
these unfavorable lotteries is presented in table 3.4. The willingness-to-pay for lottery X - = 
( p : x, (1 - p) : 0) with x < 0, 0 < p ≤ 1 is under expected utility and a power utility function 
calculated by 
 WTP(X -) = ( p(-x)b)1/b. (3.10)67
Table 3.4  Risk matrix with lotteries A, B, C and D, and their willingness-to-pay (WTP) under 
the assumption of expected utility theory with utility specifications from TK’92.
probability in decimals
.25 .75
pr
es
en
t 
va
lu
e 
of
 
im
pa
ct
 in
 € -4
A = (.25 : -4, .75 : 0)
WTP(A) = (.25(-(-4)).88)1/.88 = 0.8
B = (.75 : -4, .25 : 0)
WTP(B) = (.75(-(-4)).88)1/.88 = 2.9
-12
C = (.25 : -12, .75 : 0)
WTP(C) = ((.25(-(-12)).88)1/.88 = 2.5
D = (.75 : -12, .25 : 0)
WTP(D) = (.75(-(-12)).88)1/.88 = 8.7
Calculations of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) in table 3.4 and the zero equivalent risk mea-
sure (ρze) in table 3.3 suggest paradoxically contradictory preferences for a decision maker 
with utility specifications from TK’92. In table 3.3 the value of the ρze risk measure is lower 
for lottery B than for C (ρze(B) < ρze(C)) which suggests a preference for lottery B over C 
(B  C). In table 3.4 the decision maker is willing to pay a higher sure amount for discarding 
lottery B than for lottery C (WTP(B) > WTP(C)), which suggests the opposite preference 
(B  C). The rationale for this paradox is that the ρze risk measure is to a large degree af-
fected by loss aversion, whereas willingness-to-pay is not. Where loss aversion explains the 
majority of risk aversion embodied in ρze, risk seeking in the domain of losses explains the 
contradictory value in WTP. Mainly due to loss aversion the risk appetite of the decision 
maker in this section is comparable with that of a decision maker under concave exponential 
utility in the previous section. 
3.6 Discussion
This chapter demonstrates the role that a prudent, averse attitude to risk can play in the 
prevention of risks being stuffed into the tail of the loss distribution. Its primary contribu-
67 Notice the absence of probability weighting in equation 3.10 in comparison with equation 2.6.
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tion is that it elucidates how decision theory aids in the consolidation of such an attitude 
in one of risk management’s most popular risk management tools, the risk matrix. Current 
applications of decision theory to risk management typically assume a risk neutral decision 
maker who is indifferent between small probability – large impact and large probability – 
small impact risks. In contrast to this mainstream adoption of risk neutrality in risk man-
agement methods, several authors argue that small probability – large impact risks require 
more priority because of their devastating effects on organizations as well as society (Shaw 
2005 p.25, Pickett 2006, Taleb 2007, Ai and Brockett 2008). This practitioner viewpoint 
resounds the normative view in economics that is adopted in this chapter, which assumes a 
risk averse decision maker. In comparison with a neutral attitude to risk, articulation of risk 
aversion in the risk matrix designates more risks as unacceptable. In particular those risks 
with a small probability of occurrence and a large impact, which typically occupy the tail of 
the loss distribution, then fall outside the organizational risk appetite. In addition risk aver-
sion promotes a risk reduction strategy of outcome reduction over probability reduction, 
which directs risks more to the center of the loss distribution than to its tail. 
The exact boundary between acceptable and unacceptable risks was in this chapter de-
termined on the basis of marginal cost-benefit analysis. On the assumption of diminishing 
marginal returns of risk reduction efforts and by defining the benefits hereof in terms of the 
lower amount of risk measure that is required as a compensation for accepting risk, an optimum 
boundary for organizational risk appetite was calculated. Because the amount of risk that the 
organization is willing to bear is constrained by its risk bearing capacity (see Decision rule 1) 
the “optimum” size of the unacceptable zone may need additional adjustment to bring the risk 
exposure of the organization in line with its risk bearing capacity. The trade-off between the 
marginal cost and benefit of risk reduction demonstrates the value added of the risk manage-
ment function in capital budgeting decisions under risk. Whenever the present value of an 
investment opportunity is exceeded by a claim of its risk profile on assets, then based on the 
trade-off between marginal cost and benefits the organization can either abandon the opportu-
nity, seek less costly risk reduction measures, or accept a lower internal rate of return. 
The zero equivalent risk measure (ρze) calculated on the basis of the descriptively ac-
curate utility function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) promotes in general a risk averse 
attitude to risk in the risk matrix. The zero equivalent risk measure calculates the monetary, 
sure gain that added to a potential loss makes this risk acceptable. This measure is calculated 
under expected utility theory on the basis of the utility function for both gains and losses. 
Loss aversion in this utility curve explains why the zero equivalent risk measure promotes a 
risk averse attitude in the risk matrix. Estimates of the decision maker’s willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) under expected utility theory, which are solely based on the convex utility function 
in the domain of losses, in contrast promote a risk seeking attitude to risk. Seeking risk when 
confronted with potential losses suggests an attitude to risk that is incompatible with the 
prudence proclaimed in risk management. 
The exposition in this chapter assumed a one period time span for decision making 
under risk as well as a fixed discount rate. Given that the cost of risk reduction is certain and 
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spent in the present whereas the potential losses are uncertain and manifest themselves in 
the future, risk management decisions are not only influenced by attitudes towards risk but 
by time preferences as well. Decision makers, typically impatient, may therefore decide to 
accept more risk than is to be expected on the basis of their risk attitude alone due to their 
proneness to hyperbolic time discounting (Ainslie 1975).
By articulating risk attitude in the risk matrix, a practical tool which is used in the front 
lines of risk management, this chapter aids in the alignment of organizational risk appetite 
with risk-taking in practice, where it has been observed that risk attitudes in risk matrices are 
rarely defined and that in particular the translation of risk appetite into practical risk limits 
is wanting (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2008, Horgan 2008 p.57).
3.7 Appendices
3.7.1 Appendix A: Functional specifications of isocontours with linear scaling
Under linear utility the location of the isocontour that separates the unacceptable from the 
acceptable risky events in the risk matrix specified by the conditions ∂ρze/∂p = ∂γ/∂p and 
∂ρze/∂x = ∂γ/∂x is described by the functions
p
i
 = -c / (x
j
 ln(b)) (3.11a)
x
j
 = -c / ( p
i
 ln(b)) (3.11b)
Under concave exponential utility the location of the isocontour that separates the unac-
ceptable from the acceptable risky events in the risk matrix specified by the conditions 
∂ρze/∂p = ∂γ/∂p and ∂ρze/∂x = ∂γ/∂x is described by the functions 
p
i
 = c e xj/R / ((e xj/R - 1) (c - R ln(b))) (3.12) 
p
i
 = c e xj/R / (-x
j
ln(b) + c (e xj/R - 1)) (3.13)
Proof:
pArt 1: Find the partial derivatives of the zero equivalent risk measure for p and x
Let ρ( p
i
, x
j
) represent the benefit function for risk reduction measuring the benefit of reduc-
ing probability p
n
 to probability p
i
 and outcome x
m
 to outcome x
j
 with ρ( p
i
, x
j
) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ p
i
 ≤ 1, 
and 0 ≤ x
j
 ≤ x
m
.
ρ( p
i
, x
j
) = ρze( p
n
, x
m
) - ρze( p
i
, x
j
)
Define the zero equivalent risk measure under linear utility for X - = ( p
i
 : x
j
, 1 - p
i
 : 0)
ρze(X -) = -p
i 
x
j
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Derive the partial derivatives of ρ( p
i
, x
j
) for p
i
 and x
j
 under linear utility 
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (ρ( p
i
, x
j
))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (ρze( p
n
, x
m
) - ρze( p
i
, x
j
))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (-p
n
x
m
 - (-p
i 
x
j
))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 ( p
i 
x
j
)
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = x
j
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = d /dx
j
 ( p
i 
x
j
)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = p
i
Define the zero equivalent risk measure under concave exponential utility for X - 
ρze(X -) = R ln( p e-x / R - p + 1)
Derive the partial derivatives of ρ( p
i
, x
j
) for p
i
 under concave exponential utility 
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (ρ( p
i
, x
j
))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (ρze( p
n
, x
m
) - ρze( p
i
, x
j
))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (R ln( p
n
 e -xm / R - p
n
 + 1) - R ln( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = d /dp
i
 (-R ln( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1))
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = -R d/dp
i
 (ln( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1))
Use the chain rule with u = p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1 and dln(u)/du = 1/u 
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = -R × dln(u)/du × du/dp
i
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = -R × 1/u × d/dp
i
 ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = -R × 1/( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1) × (e -xj / R - 1)
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = -R (e -xj / R - 1) / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
Derive the partial derivatives of ρ( p
i
, x
j
) for x
j
 under concave exponential utility 
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = d /dx
j
 (ρ( p
i
, x
j
))
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = d /dx
j
 (ρze( p
n
, x
m
) - ρze( p
i
, x
j
))
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = d /dx
j
 (R ln( p
n
 e -xm / R - p
n
 + 1) - R ln( p
i
 e -xj /R - p
i
 + 1))
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∂ρ/∂x
j
 = d /dx
j
 (-R ln( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1))
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -R d /dx
j
 (ln( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1))
Use the chain rule with u = p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1 and dln(u)/du = 1/u 
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -R × dln(u)/du × du/dx
j
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -R × 1/( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1) × d/dx
j
 ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -R ( p
i
 d /dx
j
(e -xj / R) - d /dx
j
( p
i
) + d /dx
j
(1)) / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -R ( p
i
 d /dx
j
(e -xj / R)) / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
Use the chain rule with u = -x
j
/R and deu/du = eu
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -Rp
i
 × deu/du × du/dx
j
 / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -Rp
i
 × eu × d /dx
j
 (-x
j
/R) / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = -Rp
i
 × e -xj / R × -1/R / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = p
i
 e -xj / R / ( p
i
 e xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = p
i
 / ((1 - p
i
) e -xj / R + p
i
)
pArt 2: Find the partial derivatives of the cost function of risk reduction for p and x
Define the logarithmic scale for the probability dimension of the risk matrix by p
i
 = b(i - n) 
with base b defining the growth rate, exponent i indicating the position on the logarithmic 
probability scale, and n the total number of cells along this scale, with b > 1, i ∈ +, n ∈ 
0
+, 
i ≤ n, and b -n ≤ p
i
 ≤ 1.
p
i
 = b(i - n)
i = ln( p
i
) / ln(b) + n
Define the logarithmic scale of the outcome dimension of the risk matrix by x
j
 = x
m
 b( j - m) 
with base b defining the growth rate, exponent j indicating the position on the logarithmic 
outcome scale, and m the total number of cells along this scale, with b > 1, j ∈ +, m ∈ +, 
j ≤ m, and x
m
 b -m ≤ x
j
 ≤ x
m
.
x
j
 = x
m
 b( j - m)
x
j
 / x
m
 = b( j - m)
j = ln(x
j
 / x
m
) / ln(b) + m
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Let γ(i, j ) represent the cost function for risk reduction measuring the cost of reducing posi-
tion n on the logarithmic probability scale to position i and position m on the logarithmic 
outcome scale to position j, with γ(i, j ) ≥ 0, c > 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
γ(i, j ) = c(n - i + m - j)
Let γ( p
i
, x
j
) represent the cost function for risk reduction measuring the cost of reducing 
probability p
n
 to probability p
i
 and outcome x
m
 to outcome x
j
 with γ( p
i
, x
j
) ≥ 0, b -n ≤ p
i
 ≤ 1, 
and x
m
 b -m ≤ x
j
 ≤ x
m
.
γ( p
i
, x
j
) = -c /ln(b) (ln( p
i
) + ln(x
j
 / x
m
))
Derive the derivative of γ( p
i
, x
j
) for p
i
∂γ/∂p
i
 = ∂/∂p
i
 (-c /ln(b) (ln( p
i
) + ln(x
j
 / x
m
)))
∂γ/∂p
i
 = -c /ln(b) d /dp
i
 (ln( p
i
))
∂γ/∂p
i
 = -c /ln(b) × 1/p
i
∂γ/∂p
i
 = -c / ( p
i
 ln(b))
Derive the derivative of γ( p
i
, x
j
) for x
j
∂γ/∂x
j
 = ∂/∂x
j
 (-c /ln(b) (ln( p
i
) + ln(x
j
 / x
m
)))
∂γ/∂x
j
 = -c /ln(b) d/dx
j
 (ln(x
j
 / x
m
))
Use the chain rule with u = x
j
 / x
m
 and dln(u)/du = 1/u 
∂γ/∂x
j
 = -c /ln(b) × dln(u)/du × du/dx
j
 
∂γ/∂x
j
 = -c /ln(b) × x
m
 / x
j
 × d /dx
j
 (x
j
 / x
m
)
∂γ/∂x
j
 = -c /ln(b) × x
m
 / x
j
 × 1 / x
m
 d /dx
j
 (x
j
)
∂γ/∂x
j
 = -c /ln(b) × 1 / x
j
 
∂γ/∂x
j
 = -c / (x
j
 ln(b))
pArt 3: Equate the partial derivatives for the zero equivalent risk measure with the partial 
derivatives of the cost functions for probability and outcome reduction.
Marginal analysis for probability reduction under linear utility 
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = ∂γ/∂p
i
 
x
j
 = -c / ( p
i
 ln(b))
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Marginal analysis for outcome reduction under linear utility 
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = ∂γ/∂x
j
p
i
 = -c / (x
j
 ln(b))
Marginal analysis for probability reduction under exponential utility 
∂ρ/∂p
i
 = ∂γ/∂p
i
-R (e -xj / R - 1) / ( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1) = -c / ( p
i
 ln(b))
R (e -xj / R - 1) ( p
i
 ln(b)) = c( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
R (e -xj / R - 1) ln(b) = c(e -xj / R - 1) + c/p
i
R (1 - e xj / R) ln(b) = c(1 - e xj / R) + c e xj / R/p
i
c e xj / R/p
i
 = -c(1 - e xj / R) + R (1 - exj / R) ln(b)
p
i
 / (c e xj / R) = -1 / (c(1 - e xj / R) - R (1 - e xj / R) ln(b))
p
i
 = - c e xj / R / (c(1 - e xj / R) - R (1 - e xj / R) ln(b))
p
i
 = c e xj / R / (c(e xj / R - 1) - R (e xj / R - 1) ln(b))
p
i
 = c e xj / R / ((e xj / R - 1) (c - R ln(b))) 
Marginal analysis for outcome reduction under exponential utility 
∂ρ/∂x
j
 = ∂γ/∂x
j
p
i
 / ((1 - p
i
) e xj / R + p
i
) = -c / (x
j
 ln(b))
p
i 
x
j
 ln(b) = cp
i
 e xj / R - c e xj / R - cp
i
x
j
 ln(b) = c e xj / R - c e xj / R/p
i
 - c
c e xj / R/p
i
 = c e xj / R - c - x
j
 ln(b) 
p
i
 = c e xj / R / (-x
j 
ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)). 
3.7.2 Appendix B: Functional specifications of isocontours with logarithmic scaling 
Under linear utility the location of the isocontour that separates the unacceptable from the 
acceptable risky events in the risk matrix with logarithmic scaling specified by the condition 
∂ρze/∂j = ∂γ/∂j is described by the functions 
i = ln(-c/(x
m
 ln(b))) / ln(b) - j + m + n. (3.14)
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Under concave exponential utility the location of the isocontour that separates the unac-
ceptable from the acceptable risky events in the risk matrix with logarithmic scaling specified 
by the condition ∂ρze/∂j = ∂γ/∂j is described by the function
i = (n ln(b) - ln(-1 / (c e xm / R b ( j - m)) (-c e xm / R b( j - m) + x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) + c))) / ln(b). (3.15)
pArt 1: Find the partial derivatives of the zero equivalent risk measure for j
Let ρ(i, j ) represent the benefit function for risk reduction measuring the benefit of reducing 
position n to position i on the logarithmic probability scale and position m to position j on 
the logarithmic outcome scale with ρ(i, j ) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and 0 ≤ j ≤ m.
ρ(i,j) = ρze(n,m) - ρze(i, j )
Replace p
i
 by b(i - n) and x
j
 by x
m
 b( j - m) in the zero equivalent risk measure under linear utility 
for X - = ( p
i
 : x
j
, 1 - p
i
 : 0)
ρze(X -) = -p
i 
x
j
 
ρze(X -) = - b(i + j - n - m) x
m
Derive the partial derivative of ∂ρ(i, j ) under linear utility for j 
∂ρ/∂j = d /dj (ρ(i, j ))
∂ρ/∂j = d /dj (ρze(n,m) - ρze(i, j ))
∂ρ/∂j = d /dj (-b (n + m - n - m) x
m
 - (-b (i + j - n - m) x
m
))
∂ρ/∂j = d /dj (b(i + j - n - m) x
m
)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 d /dj (b (i + j - n - m))
Use the chain rule with u = i + j - n – m and dbu/du = bu ln(b)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 × dbu/du × du/dj 
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 × bu ln(b) × d/dj (i + j - n – m)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 × b(i + j - n - m) ln(b) × 1
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 ln(b) (b(i + j - n - m))
Replace p
i
 by b(i - n) and x
j
 by x
m
 b( j - m) in the zero equivalent risk measure under concave 
exponential utility for X  - = ( p
i
 : x
j
, 1 - p
i
 : 0)
ρze(X -) = R ln( p
i
 e -xj / R - p
i
 + 1)
ρze(X -) = R ln(b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
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Derive the partial derivative of ∂ρ(i, j ) under concave exponential utility for j 
∂ρ/∂j = d/dj (ρ(i, j ))
∂ρ/∂j = d/dj (ρze(n,m) - ρze(i, j ))
∂ρ/∂j = ∂/∂j (R ln(b (n - n) e -xm / R b(m - m) - b(n - n) + 1) - (R ln(b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)))
∂ρ/∂j = ∂/∂j (-R ln(b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1))
∂ρ/∂j = -R ∂/∂j (ln(b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1))
Use the chain rule with u = b (i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1 and dln(u)/du = 1/u 
∂ρ/∂j = -R × dln(u)/du × du/dj 
∂ρ/∂j = -R × 1/u × d/dj (b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = -R b(i - n) / (b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1) d/dj (e -xm / R b( j - m))
Use the chain rule with u = -x
m
/R b( j - m) and deu/du = eu
∂ρ/∂j = -R b(i - n) × deu/du × du/dj / (b(i - n) e-xm/R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = -R b(i - n) × eu × d/dj (-x
m
/R b( j - m)) / (b(i - n) e-xm/R b
( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = -R b(i - n) × e -xm / R b( j - m) × -x
m
/R × d/dj (b( j - m)) / (b(i - n) e-xm/R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
b(i - n)e -xm / R b
( j - m)
 × d/dj (b( j - m)) / (b(i - n) e-xm/R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
Use the chain rule with u = j – m and dbu/du = bu ln(b)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
b(i - n)e -xm / R b
( j - m)
 × dbu/du × du/dj / (b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
b(i - n)e -xm / R b
( j - m)
 × bu ln(b) × d/dj ( j – m) / (b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
b(i - n)e -xm / R b
( j - m)
 × b( j - m) ln(b) × 1 / (b(i - n) e -xm / R b( j - m) - b(i - n) + 1)
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 ln(b) b(i + j - n - m) / (b(i - n) - b(i - n) e xm / R b( j - m) + e xm / R b( j - m))
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 ln(b) b(i + j - m) / (bi - bi e xm / R b( j - m) + bn e xm / R b( j - m))
∂ρ/∂j = x
m
 ln(b) b( j + i - m) / (bn e xm / R b
( j - m)
 - bi (e xm / R b( j - m) - 1))
pArt 2: Find the partial derivatives of the cost function for risk reduction for j
Derive the partial derivative of ∂γ(i, j ) for j 
∂ρ/∂j = ∂/∂j (c(n - i + m - j ))
∂ρ/∂j = -c
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pArt 3: Equate the partial derivatives for the zero equivalent risk measure with the partial 
derivatives of the cost functions for outcome reduction.
Marginal analysis for outcome reduction under linear utility 
∂ρ/∂j = ∂γ/∂j
x
m
 ln(b) (b(i + j - n - m)) = -c
b(i + j - n - m) = -c/(x
m
 ln(b))
ln(b(i + j - n - m)) = ln(-c/(x
m
 ln(b)))
(i + j - n - m)ln(b) = ln(-c/(x
m
 ln(b)))
i ln(b) = ln(-c/(x
m
 ln(b))) - ( j - n - m)ln(b) 
i = ln(-c/(x
m
 ln(b))) / ln(b) - j + n + m 
Marginal analysis for outcome reduction under concave exponential utility 
∂ρ/∂j = ∂γ/∂j
x
m
 ln(b) b( j + i - m) / (bn e xm / R b
( j - m)
 - bi (e xm / R b( j - m) - 1)) = -c
x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) / (e xm / R b
( j - m)
 - 1 - b(n - i) e xm / R b( j - m)) = c
e xm / R b
( j - m)
 - 1 - b(n - i) e xm / R b( j - m) = x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) / c
b(n - i) e xm / R b
( j - m)
 = e xm / R b( j - m) - x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) / c - 1 
b(n - i) = e xm / R b( j - m) / e xm / R b( j - m) - x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) / (c e xm / R b
( j - m)
) - 1 / e xm / R b( j - m)
b(n - i) = c e xm / R b( j - m) / (c e xm / R b( j - m)) - x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) / (c e xm / R b
( j - m)
) - c / (c e xm / R b( j - m))
b(n - i) = -1 / (c e xm / R b( j - m)) (-c e xm / R b( j - m) + x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) + c)
ln(b(n - i)) = ln(-1 / (c e xm / R b( j - m)) (-c e xm / R b( j - m) + x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) + c))
i = (n ln(b) - ln(-1 / (c e xm / R b( j - m)) (-c e xm / R b( j - m) + x
m
 ln(b) b( j - m) + c))) / ln(b). 
3.7.3 Appendix C: Assigning cells to the acceptable or unacceptable zone
Using the procedure outlined in Goldberg et al. (1994 p.3-7 figure 3-3) the isocontours 
in figure 3.4 are used to determine which cells fall within and outside risk appetite. When 
50% or more of the area in the cell is above the isocontour then the cell is assigned to the 
acceptable zone. By visual observation or integral calculus we can determine which cells are 
considered acceptable. 
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Figure 3.5 partitions the risk matrices presented in figure 3.4 into 5 × 5 cells, each identified 
by a coordinate with the first number designating the column and the second the row in 
the matrix. In figure 3.5a cells (3,3), (2,4) and (2,5) are acceptable under linear utility and 
unacceptable under concave exponential utility with impact reduction. In figure 3.5b this 
holds for cell (4,5).
 (a) (b)
 
Figure 3.5 Risk matrices with 5 × 5 cells, identified by column (c) and row (r) numbers using coor-
dinates (c,r), isocontours segregating the acceptable from the unacceptable cells, and (a) linear and 
(b) logarithmic probability and impact scales.
3.7.4 Appendix D: Proofs
observAtion 3.1: In the risk matrix the isocontour under linear utility 
p
k
 = -c / (x
j
 ln(b)) (3.11a)
is stochastically dominated by the isocontour under concave exponential utility in combina-
tion with an outcome reduction strategy 
p
i
 = c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) (3.13)
for all x
j
 < -c / ln(b), which implies p
i
 < p
k
  x
j
 < -c / ln(b).
Proof:
We start by assuming this inequality holds
p
i
 < p
k
c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) < -c / (x
j
 ln(b))
83
c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) < c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) e xj / R)
-x
j
 ln(b) - c > -x
j
 ln(b) e xj / R - c e xj / R
x
j
 ln(b) + c < (x
j
 ln(b) + c) e xj / R
The condition x
j
 < -c / ln(b) implies x
j
 ln(b) + c < 0 
The inequality x
j
 ln(b) + c < (x
j
 ln(b) + c) e xj / R is conditional on the inequality 0 < e xj / R < 1 
that holds for negative outcomes (x
j
 < 0). 
observAtion 3.2: Under concave exponential utility the x
j
-value on the isocontour at p = 1 
is higher for an outcome reduction strategy than a probability reduction strategy. 
Proof:
Assess both equations 3.12 and 3.13 at p = 1
1 = c / ((1 - e- xj / R) (c - R ln(b))) (3.12) 
1 - e- xj / R = c / (c - R ln(b))
e- xj / R = 1 - c / (c - R ln(b)) 
-x
j
/R = ln (1 - c / (c - R ln(b)))
x
j
 = -R ln (1 - c / (c - R ln(b)))
1 = c e xj / R / (-x
j
ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1))  (3.13)
-x
j
ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1) = c exj / R
-x
j
ln(b) / c + exj / R - 1 = exj / R
-x
j
ln(b) / c = 1
x
j 
= -c / ln(b) 
We assume that the inequality -c / ln(b) > -R ln (1 - c / (c - R ln(b))) holds
-c / ln(b) > -R ln (1 - c / (c - R ln(b)))
c / (R ln(b)) < ln (1 - c / (c - R ln(b)))
e c/(R ln(b)) < (c - R ln(b)) / (c - R ln(b)) - c / (c - R ln(b))
e c / (R ln(b)) < -R ln(b) / (c - R ln(b)) 
1 / e c/(R ln(b)) > - (c - R ln(b)) / R ln(b)
e-c/(R ln(b)) > 1 - c/R ln(b)
Notice that - c/R ln(b) < 0
Let a = - c/R ln(b) < 0
For a < 0 holds that e a > 1 + a. 
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observAtion 3.3: In the risk matrix the isocontour under concave exponential utility in 
combination with a probability reduction strategy 
p
k
 = c e xj / R / ((e xj / R - 1) (c - R ln(b))) (3.14)
is stochastically dominated by the isocontour under concave exponential utility in combina-
tion with an outcome reduction strategy 
p
i
 = c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) (3.13)
for all x
j
 ∈  except for x
j
 = 0, which implies p
i
 < p
k
 ∀ x
j
 ∈  \ {0}.
Proof:
We start by assuming this inequality holds
p
i
 < p
k
c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) < c e xj / R / ((e xj / R - 1) (c - R ln(b)))
c e xj / R / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) < c e xj / R / (R ln(b)(1 - e xj / R) + c (e xj / R - 1))
1 / (-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1)) < 1 / (R ln(b)(1 - e xj / R) + c (e xj / R - 1))
-x
j
 ln(b) + c (e xj / R - 1) > R ln(b)(1 - e xj / R) + c (e xj / R - 1)
-x
j
 ln(b) > R ln(b)(1 - e xj / R) 
-1 / x
j
 ln(b) < 1 / (R ln(b)(1 - e xj / R))
-x
j
/R > 1 - e xj / R
-(1 + x
j
/R) > - e xj / R
(1 + x
j
/R) < e xj / R
For x
j
 = 0 it holds that (1 + x
j
/R) = e xj / R
Assess whether (1 + x
j
/R) < e xj / R ∀ x
j
 ∈  \ {0} 
e xj / R - 1 - x
j
/R > 0 ∀ x
j
 ∈  \ {0}
Let f (x
j
) = e xj / R - 1 - x
j
/R and proof that f (x
j
) > 0 ∀ x
j
 ∈  \ {0}
f ´(x
j
) = (e xj / R - 1)/R 
f ´(x
j
) = 0 if x
j
 = 0 (3.16) 
f ˝(x
j
) = e xj / R/R2 
For all x
j
 holds that f  ˝ (x
j
) > 0 (3.17)
From 3.16 and 3.17 follows that f (x
j
) has a minimum at x
j
 = 0 of f (0) = 0 
If the smallest value of the function f (x
j
) is 0 for x
j
 = 0 then it holds that for all values un-
equal to 0 that f (x
j
) > 0. 68
68 The use of derivatives to formulate the final part of this proof was suggested to me by Aad van der Star.
85
proposition 3.4: Under expected utility theory and concave utility a mean-preserving out-
come reduction is weakly preferred to a mean-preserving probability reduction.
Proof:
Define the lottery X - = ( p : x, 1 - p : 0) with x < 0, 0 < p ≤ 1
Let t be the cost of reducing either the outcome x to x + t/p (impact reduction) or the prob-
ability p to p + t/x ( probability reduction) with 0 < t < –px 
Under risk neutrality the following indifferences hold:
( p : x, 1 - p : 0) ~ ( p : x + t/p – t, (1 – p) : - t) 
( p : x, 1 - p : 0) ~ ( p + t/x : x – t, (1 – p – t/x) : - t)
We verify by calculation of expected values that the right side lotteries are mean-preserving 
risk reductions 
EV( p : x, 1 - p : 0) = px
EV( p : x + t/p – t, (1 – p) : - t) = px + t – pt - t + pt = px
EV( p + t/x : x – t, (1 – p – t/x) : - t) = px + t – pt – t2/x - t + pt + t2/x = px
Given the mean-preserving nature of the risk reductions we need to proof that expected 
utility theory and concavity of utility, imply a weak preference for outcome reduction over 
probability reduction, i.e. 
( p : x + t/p – t, (1 – p) : - t)  ( p + t/x : x – t, (1 – p – t/x) : - t)
The aforementioned preference is under expected utility theory represented by 
p U(x + t/p – t) + (1 – p) U(- t) ≥ ( p + t/x) U(x – t) + (1 – p – t/x) U(- t)
A concave utility function is defined by 
U(λy + (1 - λ)z) ≥ λ U(y) + (1 - λ) U(z), (see chapter 2 equation 2.2)
with 0 < λ < 1, y, z ∈  
Let λ = 1 + t/( px), y = (x – t), and z = -t and insert these in the definition of concavity
U((1 + t/( px)) (x – t) - (1 - (1 + t/( px)))t) ≥ (1 + t/( px)) U(x – t) + (1 - (1 + t/( px))) U(-t)
U((x – t) + t(x – t)/( px) - (t - (t + t 2/( px)))) ≥ (1 + t/( px)) (U(x – t) - U(-t)) + U(-t) 
U(x – t + t/p – t 2/( px) - t + t + t 2/( px)) - U(-t) ≥ (1 + t/( px)) (U(x – t) - U(-t)) 
U(x + t/p – t) - U(-t) ≥ (1 + t/( px)) (U(x – t) - U(-t)) 
p (U(x + t/p – t) – U(-t)) ≥ ( p + t/x) (U(x – t) - U(-t))
p U(x + t/p – t) – p U(-t) + U(-t) ≥ ( p + t/x) U(x – t) - (p + t/x) U(-t) + U(-t)
p U(x + t/p – t) + (1 – p) U(-t) ≥ ( p + t/x) U(x – t) + (1 – p – t/x) U(-t)
Under concave utility this reproduces the aforementioned representation under expected 
utility theory of weak preference for outcome reduction over probability reduction. 
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4  Utility Elicitation in the Context of Organizational  
Risk Appetite 
Summary
This chapter asserts that the conventions in decision theory to elicit utility in the domain of 
losses with gain-free lotteries and to elicit the loss aversion parameter with mixed lotteries 
with outcomes close to zero are incompatible with organizational risk appetite. It intro-
duces a new method that is capable of eliciting utility under prospect theory over the whole 
domain of outcomes without requiring the assessment of the loss aversion parameter. This 
method is compatible with organizational risk appetite, uses the trade-off method (Wakker 
& Deneffe 1996) to elicit utility in the gain domain, and derives the utility function in the 
domain of losses from these gain utility measurements. Results of initial trial sessions of the 
method with entrepreneurs are reported.
4.1 Introduction
Utility functions that describe the value that senior management assigns to the degree to 
which organizational objectives are attained can play a crucial role in the measurement and 
validation of organizational risk appetite. Organizational risk appetite is defined as “the 
broad-based amount of risk an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of its mission/vision” 
(COSO 2004 p.110) and to prevent “empty and vacuous” statements on organizational risk 
appetite, appropriate measures for this key concept in risk management need to be identified 
(Anderson 2011 p.8). Risk measures, derived from utility functions, can under the assump-
tions of expected utility theory be used to determine the “amount of risk” that, given the risk 
attitude of senior management, is acceptable (see chapter 2). Experimental evidence suggests 
that the context in which utility functions are elicited needs to be compatible with the con-
text in which they are applied (Hey, Morone, & Schmidt 2009 pp.213, 229). It is therefore 
important to verify that utility elicitation methods from decision theory are contextually 
compatible with organizational risk appetite.
Risk is in the context of organizational risk appetite defined as the possibility that an event 
will occur and adversely affect the achievement of objectives (COSO 2004 p.16). For mon-
etary objectives organizational risk appetite can then be redefined as the willingness of the or-
ganization to accept potential losses in the pursuit of gains. Utility functions, which represent 
the value that a decision maker assigns to these gains and losses, are determined on the basis of 
a decision maker’s choice between lotteries. The class of lotteries that contains both gains and 
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losses, referred to as mixed lotteries, enables the decision maker to make trade-offs between 
potential gains and losses and is a natural candidate for applications in the context of organi-
zational risk appetite. Organizations differ, furthermore, in their chances of making gains and 
losses and in the range of outcomes that are relevant for decision making. In the context of 
organizational risk appetite the realism of utility elicitation can be enhanced if organizational 
decision makers are allowed to express their willingness to accept risk by means of mixed lot-
teries that recognize both organization-specific probabilities and outcome ranges.
This chapter demonstrates that current utility elicitation methods are not fully compat-
ible with the context of organizational risk appetite and presents an alternative utility elicita-
tion method that is contextually appropriate for applications in risk management. It elicits 
utility under the assumptions of prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Kahneman 
& Tversky 1979), a descriptively accurate theory for decision making under risk, which is 
capable of accommodating well known empirical phenomena such as nonlinear probability 
weighting and loss aversion. The method proposed is nonparametric and therefore does 
not demand the specification of functional expressions and does not require any statistical 
analysis to produce the utility function. The method is an extension of the trade-off meth-
od (Wakker & Deneffe 1996). Where this method does not accommodate loss aversion 
(Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv 2007 p.1660), our extension captures this phenom-
enon without requiring an assessment of the loss aversion parameter. Our elicitation method 
constitutes a direct response to the call in the literature to specify a utility function on the 
whole of the outcome domain, in particular for large outcomes remote from zero (Wakker 
2010 p.248). The aim of this chapter is to explain the utility elicitation method, demon-
strate its novelty and investigate its merits and limitations. 
The second section of this chapter provides a brief overview of current utility elicitation 
methods. The third section starts with a short account of prospect theory and subsequently 
discusses the four-step utility elicitation method, which is compatible with organizational 
risk appetite. The fourth section presents the results of initial trial sessions of this method 
involving eight entrepreneurs. The fifth section discusses the merits and limitations of the 
method. The appendices are in the final section.
4.2 Overview of utility elicitation methods
The general convention in decision analysis, the branch of science which applies decision 
theory to actual decision counseling, is to elicit utility functions under the assumptions 
of expected utility theory (Spetzler 1968, Cozzolino 1977, Stanford University Strategic 
Decisions Group 2010). This procedure potentially contaminates the utility function with 
biases that are irreconcilable with the rational axioms underlying the expected utility model 
(Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker 2001). Elicitation of utility under the assumptions of pros-
pect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Kahneman & Tversky 1979) prevents these 
deviations from the rational expected utility model to emerge in the measurement of utility. 
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These unbiased measurements of utility, are compatible with the rational model of expected 
utility and can thus be applied in counseling decision makers (see Definition 2.4, unbiased 
utility function). They can, however, still be incompatible with organizational risk appetite. 
The mainstream convention in decision theory is to elicit the utility of gains using loss-free 
lotteries and to assess the utility of losses using gain-free lotteries. Gain-free lotteries, in which 
the best outcome is not higher than zero, coerce the decision maker into accepting unfavor-
able lotteries. An elicitation method which forces a choice between unfavorable lottery op-
tions typically measures the decision maker’s willingness-to-pay for avoiding risk. The context 
of organizational risk appetite requires, on the contrary, the assessment of her willingness- 
to-accept risk on a voluntary basis. 
To enable the specification of utility over the whole domain of outcomes, elicitation 
methods which segregate the assessment of the utility of gains and losses, necessitate a sepa-
rate assessment of the exchange rate between these two curves. The assessment of this rate 
of exchange, called the loss aversion parameter λ, requires at least the use of one mixed lot-
tery. While in the context of organizational risk appetite decisions typically resemble choices 
between mixed lotteries, their use in decision theory is often confined to the elicitation 
of the loss aversion parameter. It is recommended practice in decision theory to elicit the 
loss aversion parameter with lotteries over small monetary outcomes close to the reference 
point 0, a range of monetary outcomes that professional decision makers consider immate-
rial. Because it is plausible to assume linear utility close to zero, this procedure avoids the 
distortionary effects of differences between gain and loss curvature on this scalar (Wakker 
2010 pp.239, 267). The fact that loss aversion is assessed for small stakes only and not for 
losses that really hurt, reduces the empirical meaningfulness of loss aversion (Wakker 2010 
pp.247–248 problem 3). 
This account of mainstream utility elicitation conventions does not do justice to the 
large variety in elicitation methods that have emerged in decision theory, both in terms of 
methods that require the specification of functional forms as well as methods that do not re-
quire such a parametric specification (nonparametric methods). Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and 
Paraschiv (2007) developed a utility elicitation method that does not require a specification 
of the loss aversion parameter and accommodates the elicitation of utility over a specific, 
predefined range of gain and loss outcomes. Their elicitation method employs, however, only 
one mixed lottery, does not allow for organization-specific probabilities, and uses gain-free 
lotteries to asses utility in the loss domain. Despite being an optimally efficient elicitation 
method (Blavatskyy 2006) their method lacks compatibility with organizational risk ap-
petite. A nonparametric elicitation method that is to a very high degree compatible with 
organizational risk appetite is the trade-off method (Wakker & Deneffe 1996). The trade-off 
method elicits utility under the assumptions of prospect theory and is capable of accommo-
dating organization-specific probabilities. Fennema and van Assen (1998) used the trade-off 
method to assess the utility for gains and losses separately with mixed lotteries. They did 
not measure loss aversion and elicited utility in the loss domain over a very small range of 
outcomes. To elicit utility over the whole outcome domain current applications of the trade-
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off method require a careful specification of the method’s starting values to cover a desired, 
predefined range of outcomes and in addition a separate assessment of the loss aversion pa-
rameter. A limited overview of utility elicitation methods is provided in appendix A.
4.3 Four-step nonparametric utility elicitation method
This section extends the trade-off method and allows it to accommodate loss aversion with-
out imposing an additional parametric specification for the loss aversion phenomenon and 
the assessment of such a loss aversion parameter. The elicitation method derives utility under 
the assumptions of prospect theory. This descriptive theory for decision making under risk 
allows it to capture the decision maker’s sensitivity to outcomes in the utility function and 
her attitude towards probability in the probability weighting function. While the analysis 
of the decision maker’s responses employs a descriptive methodology, the stimuli are framed 
prescriptively as we request the respondent to indicate what lottery she should choose for the 
benefit of her organization, contrary to what she would choose in practice. Even under this 
prescriptive framing of questions it can be expected that respondents distort probabilities, 
which justifies the use of prospect theory. 
Let X = ( p : x, (1 - p) : y) represent a binary lottery with 0 < p ≤ 1 and x, y ∈ . Under 
prospect theory the decision maker derives utility U(z) from outcome z ∈ , with U(.) be-
ing a monotonically increasing utility function over the whole domain of outcomes. Distor-
tion of probabilities is captured by two separate probability weighting functions ws( p) for 
gains and losses, with s = +,- and 0 < ws( p) ≤ 1. For loss-free lotteries, 0 < y < x, and gain-free 
lotteries, x < y < 0, the value that the decision maker assigns to the lottery is represented by 
 PT(X ) = ws( p) × U(x) + (1 - ws( p)) × U( y), (4.1)
and for a mixed lottery with y < 0 < x by 
 PT(X ) = w+( p) × U(x) + w-(1 - p)) × U( y). (4.2)
For a weak preference for X
1
 over X
2
, denoted by X
1
  X
2
, it holds under prospect theory that 
PT(X
1
) ≥ PT(X
2
). Similarly the indifference X
1
 ~ X
2
 is represented by the equation PT(X
1
) = 
PT(X
2
) and the strict preference X
1
  X
2
 by the inequality PT(X
1
) > PT(X
2
). For gain outcomes 
the notation x
i
 with i = 1,...,n is used and for loss outcomes the notation x-j with j = 1,...,n 
while x
0
 = 0. The whole domain of outcomes in the elicitation of utility is thus specified by 
the following sequence of inequalities: x-n < ... < x-(j + 1) < x-j < x0 < xi < xi + 1 < ... < xn.
The nonparametric procedure to elicit utility over the whole domain of outcomes con-
sists of four steps and is summarized in table 4.1. The second column of the table describes 
the quantity that is assessed, the third the indifference that is sought, and the fourth the 
implication of this indifference under prospect theory.
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The first step of the elicitation process determines utility in the domain of gains using the 
trade-off method. This method elicits a series of intervals on the gain dimension that are 
equally spaced in terms of utility. Using the outward version of the trade-off method we de-
termine n intervals [x
i-1, xi] with i = 1,..,n by assessing the quantity xi using the indifference 
( p : x
i
, (1 - p) : g) ~ ( p : x
i-1, (1 - p) : G ) with g < G < 0 ≤ xi - 1 < xi and x0 = 0. Given that under 
prospect theory U(0) = 0 and utility is unique up to a unit we start the sequence of gains with 
x
0
 = 0 (Wakker 2010 p.348 observation 12.3.5’). The trade-off method implies that 
 U(x
i
) = i ∕ n.69 (4.3)
The second step elicits the weight of probability p in the domain of gains using the indiffer-
ence ( p : x
k
, (1 - p) : x
0
) ~ ( p : x
2
, (1 - p) : x
1
) with x
1
 and
 
x
2
 derived from step 1 and x
k
 be-
ing the value that is assessed. On the condition that x
k
 ≤ x
n
 we derive from this indifference 
under prospect theory 
 w+( p) = 1 / (nU(x
k
) - 1).70 (4.4)
69  Let ∆ = U(x
i
) - U(x
i-1) represent the equally spaced utility distance and let U*(.) represent normalized utility 
with U*(x
n
) = 1 and U*(x
0
) = 0.
 U*(x
i
) = (U(x
i
) - U(x
0
))/(U(x
n
) - U(x
0
)) = i∆/n∆ = i ∕
n
.
 For ease of exposition we let U(.) represent normalized utility in the main text.
70 w+( p)U(x
k
) + (1 – w+( p))U(x
0
) = w+( p)U(x
2
) + (1 - w+( p))U(x
1
)
 w+( p) = (U(x
1
) - U(x
0
)) / (U(x
k
) - U(x
0
) - U(x
2
) + U(x
1
))
 w+( p) = (1∕n - 0∕n) / (U(xk) - 0∕n - 2∕n + 1∕n) = 1∕n / (U(xk) - 1∕n) = 1 / (n × U(xk) - 1).
Table 4.1 Four-step nonparametric elicitation procedure.
Assessed  
quantity
Indifference sought Under prospect theory
Step 1 x
i ( p : xi, (1 - p) : g ) ~ ( p : xi - 1, (1 - p) : G) 
for i = 1,...,n 
with g < G < 0 = x
0 
< x
i
U(x
i
) = i ∕n 
U(x
0
) = 0 
Step 2 x
k ( p : xk, (1 - p) : x0) ~ ( p : x2, (1 - p) : x1)
with x
1
 and x
2
 from step 1 
w+( p) = 1 / (nU(x
k
) - 1)
Step 3 x
j - n ( p : xn, (1 - p) : xj - n) ~ ( p : xj, (1 - p) : x0) 
for j = 0,...,n - 1
with x
j
 and x
n
 from step 1
U(x
j - n) = ( j-n) ∕n w+( p) / w-(1 - p)
Step 4 x
f ((1 - p) : xf , p : x0) ~ ((1 - p) : x-2, p : x-1)
with x-1 and x-2 from step 3
w-(1 - p) = -1 / (nU*( y
f
) + 1)
U *(x-i ) = -U(xi) = - i ∕n
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U(x
k
) can be determined using interpolation or is derived from a parametric fit on the 
sequence of utilities in step 1.
The third step of the elicitation process determines utility in the domain of losses using 
the indifference ( p : x
n
, (1 - p) : x
j - n) ~ ( p : xj, (1 - p) : x0) for j = 0,...,n - 1, the values p, 
x
0
,
 
x
j
, and x
n
 derived from step 1 and x
j - n being the loss value that is assessed. The first lot-
tery assesses x-n, the worst loss in the entire elicitation process, by assessing the indifference 
( p : x
n
, (1 - p) : x-n) ~ (1 : 0). Under prospect theory we derive in total n equally spaced util-
ity distances in the loss domain 
 U(x
j-n) = (j - n)∕n w+( p) / w-(1 - p).71 (4.5)
The fourth step of the process aims to elicit the weight of probability (1 - p) in the domain 
of losses using the indifference ((1 - p) : x
f 
, p : x
0
) ~ ((1 - p) : x-2, p : x-1) with x-1 and x-2 
derived from step 2 and x
f
 being the value that is assessed. Conditional on x
f
 ≥ x-n we derive 
from this indifference under prospect theory 
 w-(1 - p) = -1 / (nU*(x
f
) + 1),  (4.6)
with the utility for losses rescaled to U*(x-i) = -U(xi) = - i∕n.72 This rescaling is allowed 
as under prospect theory utility is unique up to a unit and can be rescaled by any factor 
in . U*(x
f
) can be determined using interpolation or can be derived from a parametric 
fitting. 
We finally consolidate the nonparametric elicitation over the domain of gains and 
losses by determining the values of U(x
i
) through equation 4.5 by imputation of the 
values of w+( p) and w-(1 - p) derived in respectively step 2 and 4. The trade-off method 
is known to be susceptible to violations of procedure invariance (Fennema & van Assen 
1999). For this reason the quantity that was assessed always belonged to the lottery with 
the largest spread in outcomes, i.e. the most risky lottery. In the elicitation of gain utility 
and the probability weight for gains (step 1 and 2) the best outcome of this risky lottery 
was assessed. In the domain of losses (step 3 and 4) the worst outcome of this lottery was 
assessed.
71 w+( p)U(x
n
) + w-(1 - p)U(x
j-n) = w+( p)U(xj) + (1 - w+( p))U(x0)
 U(x
j-n) = (w+( p) (U(xj) - U(xn) - U(x0)) + U(x0)) / w-(1 - p)
 U(x
j-n) = (w+( p) (j∕n - n∕n - 0∕n) + 0∕n) / w-(1 – p) = (j-n) ∕n × w+( p) / w-(1 - p).
72   w-(1 - p)U(x
f
) + (1 – w-(1 - p))U(x
0
) = w-(1 - p)U(x-2) + (1 - w-(1 - p))U(x-1)  
w-(1 - p) = (U(x-1) - U(x0)) / (U(xf) – U(x0) - U(x-2) + U(x-1)).
  From equation 4.5 we derive U(x-i) = - i∕n × w+( p) / w-(1 – p). Because under prospect theory utility is unique 
up to a unit we rescale this utility by dividing with the constant factor w+( p) / w-(1 - p) and define U*(x-i) = 
-i∕n. w-(1 – p) = (-1∕n - -0∕n) / (U*(xf) - -0∕n - -2∕n + -1∕n) = -1∕n / (U*(xf) + 1∕n) = -1/ (n × U*(xf) + 1).
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4.4 Results of trial sessions
This section presents the results of trial sessions with eight Dutch entrepreneurs. It discusses 
some details of the utility elicitation sessions and the methodology that was used to gear 
the elicitation method to the particular circumstances of the entrepreneurs. It furthermore 
presents for each entrepreneur the weights assigned to the firm-specific probability of be-
ing profitable and unprofitable and the utility curve over the whole domain of monetary 
outcomes, expressed in Euro. Finally, it presents an overview of several issues related to the 
elicitation procedure.
4.4.1 Details of the trial sessions
In December 2011 and January 2012 trial sessions were carried out with eight entrepre-
neurs from the creative industry in The Netherlands. These entrepreneurs, active in de-
sign, entertainment, architecture, media and talent development, operate from offices in 
the Creative Factory, a former grain silo refurbished to office space on the South bank of 
the Rotterdam city center port area. Our aim thereby was not to provide a representative 
sample of a (sub)population of decision makers but instead to test the performance of the 
method in a realistic, decision analysis setting. The participants were facilitated during the 
elicitation process by undergraduate students from the Rotterdam University of Applied 
Sciences who were trained for their task and followed a written protocol in administering 
the trials. Participants were male, aged between 26 and 36 (mean personal age 32) and their 
companies had been active for 4 months up to 10 years (mean active years 5). At the outset 
of the elicitation process an inventory of the relevant range of outcomes and the firm-
specific probability of being profitable was established first. The participants were informed 
that the gains and losses mentioned in the elicitation task relate to earnings after interest 
and tax from which a compensation for the entrepreneur’s personal livelihood expenses has 
already been deducted. During the elicitation all these “excess earnings” relate to monthly 
amounts. Under guidance of their facilitator participants practiced each step of the utility 
elicitation method in table 4.1 and subsequently completed the actual elicitation process. 
In the elicitation procedure a bisection method was used in which the indifference value of 
the quantity that was assessed was derived from a sequence of five, iterative choices between 
two lotteries (details are in appendix B). Finally, participants were debriefed and invited to 
comment on the utility curve over the whole domain of outcomes which resulted from the 
elicitation process.
4.4.2 Tailoring the elicitation method to entrepreneurial circumstances
To increase the likelihood that entrepreneurs consider the choices presented to them during 
the elicitation process as contextually meaningful, insignificantly small or excessively high 
gain and loss values and unrealistic probability distributions need to be avoided. To this 
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end the elicitation procedure of each participant was tailored to the following specifications 
which the participants provided themselves: 
a realistic maximum monthly earnings (1. x
U
),
a negligible amount of monthly earnings (2. x
L
),
a negligible amount of monthly losses (3. x-U), and
a monthly loss that would terminate the enterprise (4. x-L).
This inventory provides the decision analyst with a provisional upper limit of elicitation in 
the domain of gains (x
U
), a lower limit for gains and an upper limit for losses (x
L
 and x-U), 
which can be regarded as materiality thresholds, and a lower limit for losses (x-L) at which 
organizational default is to be expected. 
The decision maker is requested to indicate a realistic probability p used for the best 
outcome and (1 - p) for the worst outcome in each lottery. On the assumption that entre-
preneurs adopt a monthly accounting discipline the probability of being profitable ( p) was 
specified by the participants by requesting them to indicate how many months a year they 
expect to be profitable in the future and derive p from this frequency distribution. In case of 
an advantageous business environment we expect p > .5 which can be conveniently applied 
to elicit the utility of large losses.73
Table 4.2 presents the specifications that the eight entrepreneurs provided and to which 
their individual elicitation process was tailored. Inspection of table 4.2 reveals large differ-
ences between the entrepreneurs. Maximum profits vary between 600 for a newly estab-
lished company and 10,000 for two companies that both had been active for 7 years.74 Three 
entrepreneurs indicated that every single dime of profit matters to them while two others 
consider any profit below 2,000 negligible. In general the entrepreneurs consider losses in a 
range between 200 and 1,500 to be immaterial. Termination of the enterprise looms already 
at a loss of 600 for the recent start-up while for a company active in business for 7 years 
this threat manifests itself only at a loss of 7,000. Noticeably four participants chose the 
probability of being profitable relatively close to ½ and 2/3, percentages that are commonly 
employed in utility elicitation methods. The four remaining participants chose their prob-
ability around .9 which is an unconventional probability for elicitation studies. 
4.4.3 Weights of the probabilities of being profitable and unprofitable
The probabilities of being profitable ( p) chosen by the entrepreneurs are moderate to high 
probabilities. The complementary probability of not being profitable corresponds with low 
73  Given the indifference ( p : x
i
, (1 - p) : x-j) ~ ( q : xi, (1 - q) : x-h) and q > p then x-h < x-j, which implies that 
ceteris paribus the larger the probability of being profitable the more negative will be the losses. 
74  These maximum profits (x
U
) correlated positively with the number of active years of the enterprise (Spearman 
correlation test ρ = .832, p = .010).
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Table 4.2  Specifications provided by eight entrepreneurs together with figures for the personal age 
of the entrepreneurs and the number of active years of their companies.
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 mean
x
U
10,000 2,000 10,000 2,000 5,000 2,500 2,000 600 4,263
x
L
2,000 0 0 0 2,000 1,900 1,000 200 888
x-U -1,000 -300 -1,500 -500 -1,000 -400 -500 -200 -675
x-L -7,000 -1,000 -2,500 -5,000 -3,000 -2,000 -2,000 -600 -2,888
p .9 .85 .9 .6 .9 .65 .5 .5 .73
personal age 36 26 36 30 31 36 28 31 32
years active 7 3 7 2.33 5 10 3 0.33 5
Table 4.3  Probabilities, probability weights, and classifications of the participants’ attitude to prob-
ability with symbols, +, - and =, respectively indicating overweighting (ws( p) > p), un-
derweighting (ws( p) < p), and linear weighting at a significance level of .02 (ws( p) = p).
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p .90 .85 .90 .60 .90 .65 .50 .50
w+( p) .89 .44 .77 .37 .39 .37 .48 1.00
attitude to probability = - - - - - = +
(1 - p) .10 .15 .10 .40 .10 .35 .50 .50
w-(1 - p) .33 .25 .22 .87 .45 .39 .16 .25
attitude to probability + + + + + + - -
w+( p) / w-(1 - p)    2.68 1.76 3.43 .43 .88 .94 2.95 4.01
to moderate probabilities. The weights that entrepreneurs assigned to these probabilities 
under prospect theory are presented in table 4.3.
The weight assigned to the probability of being profitable, w+( p), was for five entre-
preneurs below the value of p (underweighting), for one entrepreneur higher than p (over-
weighting), and for two entrepreneurs almost identical to p (linear weighting). The majority 
result for this group of entrepreneurs corresponds with the common finding under prospect 
theory of underweighting for moderate to high probabilities. This group of entrepreneurs 
thus appears to have a pessimistic attitude towards their chances for profitability. Only the 
new start-up (ID 8) did have an extremely optimistic attitude towards its probability of be-
ing profitable. Two of the entrepreneurs weigh the probability of profitability linearly which 
suggests a neutral attitude towards chance.
For the two entrepreneurs with a probability of being unprofitable of .5 the probability 
weight w-(1 - p) indicates underweighting in the domain of losses. Underweighting for 
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moderate probabilities is a common result under prospect theory in both the gain and loss 
domain and suggests for these two entrepreneurs an optimistic attitude towards their chanc-
es on making losses. Two entrepreneurs (ID 4 & 6) overweight the moderate probabilities 
.4 and .35. The weights of the four remaining entrepreneurs correspond with the common 
finding under prospect theory of overweighting for small probabilities. This result suggests 
a pessimistic attitude towards the probability of not being profitable.
4.4.4 Utility curves in the domain of gains and losses
Figure 4.1 presents the utility functions of the eight entrepreneurs that were elicited under 
the assumptions of prospect theory over the whole domain of gains and losses. The outer 
limits of the relevant range (x-L and xU) are indicated by the symbol  and the symbol  
indicates the materiality thresholds of the range of immaterial outcomes (x-U and xL). The 
ID-numbers of the entrepreneurs are presented above the graphs.
The graphs of the entrepreneurs with ID 1, 2 and 3 show a striking resemblance. For all 
three entrepreneurs utility in the gain domain is slightly concave, shows at the origin a rather 
smooth transition to the loss domain, and the curves make a very sharp decline around the 
value at which a monthly loss would terminate the enterprise (indicated by the symbol  
on the left of the horizontal axis). The three curves do not exhibit a downward kink at the 
origin and thus fail to present evidence of loss aversion. It appears, however, that imminent 
default around the lower limit of losses does cause entrepreneurs to become strongly averse 
to losses. The first two entrepreneurs characterized themselves during debriefing as very risk 
averse and expressed their preference for a stable profit over a profit that fluctuates.
The graphs of the entrepreneurs with ID 4 and 5 show slightly convex utility curves in 
both the gain and loss domains. Again the transition from gains to losses is smooth at the 
origin. Seen from the vantage point of the origin the combined effect of a rather steep utility 
curve in the gain domain and a rather flat utility curve in the loss domain suggests that these 
entrepreneurs exhibit a gain seeking attitude. During debriefing one of these entrepreneurs 
(ID 4) indicated that his enterprise has always been profitable and that he will do his utmost 
to maintain this profitability. 
The graph of the entrepreneur with ID 6 suggests several relatively haphazard alternations 
of convexity and concavity. Alternatively this wobbly curve could be interpreted as linear util-
ity with errors. What favors the latter interpretation is that the curve falls almost entirely in the 
range of negligible, small gains and losses for which linearity is plausible (Wakker 2010).
The most striking feature of the graphs of the entrepreneurs with ID 7 and 8 is their very 
steep section in the utility curve in the domain of losses. For the first entrepreneur (ID 7) the 
steep section is located close to the materiality threshold and for the other (ID 8) close to zero 
within the range of negligible losses. While a kink in the utility at zero is a common finding in 
many studies, the slope of the curve of the second entrepreneur is extraordinarily steep. During 
debriefing the first entrepreneur indicated that his responses were provided under time pressure. 
The second entrepreneur, having just started a company, characterized himself as risk averse.
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Figure 4.1 Utility curves in the domain of gains and losses with the symbol  indicating the outer 
limits x-L and xU and symbol  the inner limits x-U and xL.
 (1) (2)
 (3) (4)
 (5) (6)
 (7) (8)
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4.4.5 Issues related to the elicitation procedure 
In analyzing the results of the trial sessions several issues related to the elicitation procedure, 
which is discussed in appendix B, were identified. These issues are related to the range of 
outcomes over which utility is elicited, the iteration sequences of five choices which deter-
mine the indifference values, and the determination of probability weights.
Ideally the upper limit of utility in the gain domain should neither fall short nor exceed 
x
U
, which is the decision maker’s estimate of a realistic maximum monthly amount of earn-
ings. To this end the upper gain limit x
U
 and the upper loss limit x-U were in combination 
with predictions from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992) used to 
determine the gauge values G and g in step 1 (the details are explained in appendix B). For 
six out of the eight entrepreneurs these gauge values were not conducive in assuring that the 
trade-off sequence in step 1 included x
U
 (the exceptions were ID 1 & 2). If x
n
, the highest 
gain in step 1, is not sufficiently large to compensate the entrepreneur for x-L, the lower limit 
of the loss range, then the entrepreneur will choose the largest loss x-n to be less negative than 
this lower limit. For five of the eight entrepreneurs utility in the loss domain did cover the 
relevant range of losses (ID 1, 2, 3, 5, & 7). 
Closer inspection of the choices of the entrepreneurs reveals that in the five iterations 
that lead to the quantity that is assessed, frequently either the choice option with the larg-
est spread in outcomes or the one with the smallest spread is preferred in all five choices. 
From table 4.4 can be discerned that in step 3 the choice option with the largest spread of 
outcomes was frequently preferred all of the time. This causes the quantity that is assessed, 
i.e. x
j - n, to be only slightly less negative than the indifference value that resulted from the 
previous iteration, i.e. x
j - n - 1. The steep sections in figure 4.1 for utility in the domain of 
losses are the result of these choice patterns.
Table 4.4  Assessed quantities for which the lottery with the largest spread or the lottery with the small-
est spread in outcomes, indicated by (*), was preferred in all of the five iterative choices.75
ID Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
1 x
1-n, x2-n, x3-n, x4-n
2 x
0-n
3 x
4-n xf 
(*)
4 x
4-n
5
6 x
2-n, x7-n
7 x
3-n, x4-n, x5-n, x6-n, x7-n
8 x
4
x
k x1-n, x2-n(*), x4-n, x5-n, x6-n, x7-n
75  The choice-options with the largest spread in outcomes are the lotteries on the left of the indifference sign in 
table 4.1. Choice-options with the smallest spread are those on the right of the indifference sign. 
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In step 3 such a steep section occurs beyond the default level x-L when the choice option 
with the largest spread in outcomes is preferred to a choice-option which contains negligible 
and zero gains (see ID 1). These gains are so low that the alternative choice-option, which 
contains the highest gain x
n
 is, even in combination with the loss x
j-n, relatively more attrac-
tive. In two other cases (ID 7 & 8) loss x
j-n had in previous iterations been reduced to an 
(almost) negligible level. As a result this loss has become so low that, in combination with 
the highest gain x
n
, it is consistently more preferred than the outcomes offered in the alterna-
tive choice-option, even when these include substantial gains. In step 2 a consistent prefer-
ence of the new start-up (ID 8) for the choice-option with the largest spread in outcomes 
led to the indifference (.5 : 26, (1 - .5) : 0) ~ (.5 : 26, (1 - .5) : 14). Under prospect theory 
this indifference is resolved by the equating 1 - w+(.5) with zero, which implies w+(.5) = 1. 
From figure 4.1 can be derived that for one of the more experienced entrepreneurs (ID 3) 
the range between the negligible amount of monthly losses (x-U) and the monthly loss which 
would terminate the enterprise (x-L) is very small. In step 4 the value of the quantity that is 
assessed (x
f
 ) is -3,140, which is located outside of this range in a very steep section of the 
utility curve for losses. 
The probability weight for gains and losses can only be determined when respectively 
the conditions x
k
 ≤ x
n
 and x
f
 ≥ x-n are fulfilled. In the trial sessions these two conditions 
were fulfilled for all eight entrepreneurs. For the calculation of w+( p) the condition x
k
 ≤ x
n
 
was already satisfied within a sequence of 3 up to 4 indifference values, well within the 
minimum number of 5 intervals. For the calculation of w-(1 - p) the condition x
f
 ≥ x-n 
required a sequence of 3 up to 8 indifference values.76 It is important to note that the five 
and eight intervals that were elicited for the entrepreneurs with respectively ID 2 and 7 were 
just sufficient to fulfill these conditions and determine the w-(1 - p).77 Probability weights 
are frequently entirely derived on the basis of values in a range of negligible outcomes. For 
gains this was the case for five entrepreneurs (ID 2, 5, 6, 7, & 8) and for losses for three 
entrepreneurs (ID 5, 6, & 8).
4.5 Discussion
This chapter specified the utility function on the whole domain of outcomes using an ex-
tension of the trade-off method that is compatible with organizational risk appetite. The 
novelty of this extension of the trade-off method is that utility in the domain of losses is not 
elicited independently but is instead derived from the utility of gains. The specification of 
the loss utility function in equation 4.5 directly derives the fraction (j-n)∕n from the utility 
76  The condition x
k
 ≤ x
n
 was satisfied by x
k
 ≤ x
3
 (ID 1, 3, & 8) and x
k
 ≤ x
4
 (ID 2, 4, 5, 6, & 7). The condition 
x
f
 ≥ x-n was satisfied by xf ≥ x0-n (ID 2 & 7), xf ≥ x2-n (ID 3 & 8), xf ≥ x3-n (ID 1), xf ≥ x4-n (ID 5 & 6), and 
x
f
 ≥ x
5-n (ID 4).
77 The number of intervals elicited were n = 7 (ID 1), n = 5 (ID 2), and n = 8 (ID 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8).
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of gains whereas the fraction w+( p) / w-(1 - p) contributes to the expression of loss aversion 
by means of probability weights (Zank 2010). Our method thus does not require a separate 
specification and assessment of the loss aversion parameter. With the exception of the first 
iteration sequence in step 3 our method assesses trade-offs between two lotteries in which 
the same set of organization-specific probabilities p and (1 - p) is employed. Just as in the 
trade-off method these can, at the convenience of the decision maker, be exchanged for ver-
bal probability expressions or event indicators. 
Its dominant use of favorable, mixed lotteries allows this method to assess a decision 
maker’s willingness to accept potential losses in the pursuit of gains and makes it conducive 
to the measurement of organizational risk appetite.78 Most studies in decision theory measure 
the utility of losses by using unfavorable lotteries, usually gain-free lotteries, and therefore 
measure willingness-to-pay instead of willingness-to-accept. A notable exception are studies 
in decision analysis that use mixed lotteries in combination with a certainty equivalent of 
zero (Walls 1995, Walls & Dyer 1996 zero equivalence). To elicit utility these studies require 
the specification of functional forms and statistical data fitting, which is not required in our 
method. Additionally these studies assume expected utility theory, which makes their results 
prone to probability distortion. Our study assumed prospect theory, a descriptively accurate 
theory for analyzing decisions under risk, which isolates the distortion of probabilities from 
the utility of outcomes by means of probability weighting functions. 
In trial sessions with eight entrepreneurs we identified the utility function over the 
outcome domain [x-n, xn] using a maximum of 18 indifference points. The most striking 
result of these trial sessions is the absence of the loss aversion phenomenon in the utility 
curvature. The utility curves of the three entrepreneurs (ID 1, 2, & 3) for whom the utility 
of losses was measured beyond the bankruptcy threshold (x-L) demonstrate an immediate 
aversion to losses beyond this threshold. Empirical findings on prospect theory suggest that 
the utility of money becomes concave again near ruin (Wakker 2010 p.264, hypothesized 
by Kahneman & Tversky 1979). For the aforementioned three entrepreneurs our prelimi-
nary results provide additional empirical support hereof. The probability weights of the 
entrepreneurs that participated in our study are to a very large extent in agreement with 
the predictions of prospect theory.
Most choice problems used in our method compare two risky lotteries and these are 
considered more difficult to evaluate than choice problems that compare a risky lottery with 
a sure outcome. For this reason each of the entrepreneurs was allowed to practice prior to 
the start of the elicitation process. Because the assessed quantities are chained our method is 
susceptible to error propagation. Participants were therefore, after each iteration sequence of 
five choices, required to affirm the equivalence of lotteries. Admittedly, given vulnerability 
to error propagation it is unclear whether our results represent the genuine preferences of the 
78  The method mainly employs favorable lotteries. Exemptions are the first sequence(s) in step 1 where unfavor-
able lotteries are employed and the two sequences in step 2 and 4 where respectively a loss-free and a gain-free 
lottery are used.
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entrepreneurs. In particular the steep sections in negligible outcome ranges raise doubts in 
this direction. While decision analysts should be aware of the limitation of this method and 
intervene when this is demanded, future research should, furthermore, investigate the pos-
sibility of triangulating the results of our utility elicitation method by means of other meth-
ods. While gauge values in step 1 were chosen on the basis of cumulative prospect theory, 
a descriptive theory of decision making under risk, the sequence of utility values elicited in 
the domain of gains did not always include the upper limit of gains (x
U
). Given the large 
heterogeneity in utility curvature in the population and the small number of entrepreneurs 
contributing to this study such a misfit should, in hindsight, not have come as a surprise. If 
we had anticipated the general lack of loss aversion in our sample and would have settled for 
a lower λ in determining gauge g in equation 4.8, then the value of g would have been more 
negative, would have induced the entrepreneurs to seek compensation for this by choosing 
higher values of x
i
, which may have stretched the sequence to a desirable level.
A more practical limitation of this method is that entrepreneurs do not always under-
stand the concept of gains and losses. They are more familiar with revenue as a performance 
indicator while earnings are frequently determined at year-end only or are assessed on a 
project rather than a periodic basis. They complained that occasionally the losses in step 3 
were very low, leading to irrelevant choice alternatives, which suggests the introduction of 
a cut-off point for x
j-n beyond the negligible amount of monthly losses (x-U). They further-
more would have appreciated more context in the choice alternatives presented to them. 
The need for the elicitation method introduced in this chapter arose from a call in the 
risk management literature for meaningful measurements of organizational risk appetite. In 
addition the method addressed the call in the decision theory literature to specify a utility 
function on the whole of the outcome domain, in particular for large outcomes remote from 
zero. This study therefore emphasizes the importance of problems of a practical nature as a 
source of inspiration for theoretical contributions. 
4.6 Appendices
4.6.1 Appendix A: Overview of utility elicitation methods
The central element in many utility elicitation methods is that they seek to elicit the indif-
ference point between two lotteries with the general structure 
 (q : v, (1 - q) : w) ~ ( p : x, (1 - p) : y), (4.9)
with v > w, x > y for gain and mixed lotteries and v < w, x < y for loss lotteries, and 0 < q ≤ 
p ≤ 1. Each method is made up of a particular combination of the elements of this general 
structure and by directly assessing or adjusting one of these elements each method accom-
plishes the elicitation of an indifference point. 
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Table 4.4 summarizes six elicitation formats that play a prominent role in the decision theory 
literature. For each of these formats the table indicates which quantity is assessed, which indif-
ference is sought, and how this indifference is derived from the aforementioned general struc-
ture. It also indicates for each method how the outcomes in the lottery are ranked and whether 
they remain fixed during the process of elicitation. This overview of utility elicitation methods 
is restricted to methods that involve revealed choices between two lotteries (binary choice) and 
thus does not cover methods where each outcome is rated on a utility scale directly (introspective 
judgment; see Abdellaoui, Barrios, & Wakker 2007 for an experimental investigation using both 
approaches). The primary focus in this overview is furthermore on methods where the partici-
pant is requested to directly impute a missing value in a lottery (direct matching) and methods 
where such an indifference point is elicited by giving participants a series of two lottery choices 
that eventually lead to indifference between the lotteries (sequential bisection). A method that 
requires the participant to express preferences in a list of lottery choices is also discussed (choice 
list or multiple price list, see references in Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström 2006).79 
79  A fourth method demands the participant to directly choose between lotteries (discrete choice). It allows to 
combine a variety of lottery pairs that are employed in the other methods. Contrary to the other methods 
discrete choice does not aim to elicit an indifference point. 
Table 4.5 Elicitation methods for eliciting indifference between binary lottery pairs.
Method Assessed 
quantity
Indifference sought Derivation 
from general 
structure
Probability equivalent
Certainty equivalent
p
v
(1 : v) ~ ( p : x, (1 - p) : y)
with x > v > y for gain and mixed lotteries,
and x < v < y for loss lotteries
v = w
Lottery equivalent q (q : v, (1 - q) : 0) ~ ( p : x, (1 - p) : 0)
with v > x for gains,
with v < x for losses, 
and v fixed
w = y = 0
Trade-off outward
Trade-off inward
v
x
( p : v, (1 - p) : w) ~ ( p : x, (1 - p) : y)
with v > x > y > w or y > w > v > x for gains  
and mixed lotteries,
with v < x < y < w or y < w < v < x for losses,  
and w and y fixed
p = q
Choice list p ( p : v, (1 - p) : w) ~ ( p : x, (1 - p) : y)
with v > x > y > w for gains and mixed lotteries,
with v < x < y < w for losses,
and v, w, x and y fixed in each choice list
p = q
Zero equivalent gain
Zero equivalent loss
x
y
(1 : 0) ~ ( p : x, (1 - p) : y)
with x > 0 > y
v = w = 0
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Traditional certainty and probability equivalent methods for eliciting utility use the stan-
dard gamble format. The probability equivalent method requires participants to respond 
to lottery choices in the probability-mode instead of the outcome-dimension of the lot-
teries, which induces a response mode bias (Hershey & Schoemaker 1985, Hershey, 
Kunreuther, & Schoemaker 1988). The certainty equivalent method requires participant to 
state a sure outcome that is equivalent to a risky lottery. Comparison of a sure and risky lot-
tery creates probability distortion and exaggerates risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for 
losses (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). By comparing two risky lotteries the lottery equivalent 
method avoids this certainty effect and reduces boundary effects by fixing the upper-limit 
for gains or lower-limit for losses (McCord & de Neufville 1986). In the trade-off method 
the participant weighs the pros and cons of a lottery with a large variance in outcomes ver-
sus a lottery with a small variance. In each of these lotteries a gauge or reference outcome is 
fixed and because both lotteries employ the same probability the trade-off method is resilient 
to probability distortion (Wakker & Deneffe 1996). The procedures of eliciting trade-offs 
from the origin outward or inward to the origin create different results, violating procedure 
invariance (Fennema & van Assen 1999). All these four methods can independently be used 
to elicit utility without assuming a functional form of utility (nonparametric elicitation). 
When used nonparametrically the first three methods assume expected utility theory while 
the fourth accommodates expected utility as well as prospect theory. The next two methods 
require either that a functional form is specified ( parametric elicitation) or that they are used 
in combination with the previous methods. The choice list method presents the participant 
with a list of small versus large variance lotteries with all outcomes fixed. Starting with a low 
probability in the lottery pair in the first row, the probability level is row by row increased 
to the level of certainty in the final row. For each lottery pair the respondent indicates pref-
erence and at the point where her preference switches the probability indifference point is 
assumed to be (Holt & Laury 2002). Although its structure resembles the trade-off method 
it is susceptible to probability distortion and response mode bias. In the zero equivalent 
method a mixed lottery is compared with a sure, zero outcome. Keeping probability fixed 
it either requires the respondent to specify the minimum gain that a lottery should offer to 
compensate for the acceptance of a potential loss or what maximum loss a lottery should be 
allowed to have relative to its potential gain (Walls 1995, Walls & Dyer 1996).
4.6.2 Appendix B: Elicitation procedure
During the trial sessions the indifferences in table 4.1, column 3 were elicited by means 
of the bisection method (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L’Haridon 2008 p.263, Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv 2007 p.1671). In this method each indifference was derived from 
a sequence of five, iterative choices between two lotteries (binary choice). When the lottery 
containing the quantity that is assessed is chosen by the participant, then in the next itera-
tion this quantity is made less favorable. When the other lottery is preferred, however, then 
this quantity is made more favorable. After a series of five iterations the midpoint of the 
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interval in which the indifference value of the quantity that is assessed should lie is taken as 
the indifference value. The participant is then requested to confirm the equivalence of the 
lotteries that result. In comparison with a procedure in which the participant directly states 
which quantity leads to indifference this choice-based elicitation procedure leads to fewer 
inconsistencies (Bostic, Herrnstein & Luce 1990, Luce 2000). During the trials lotteries 
were presented in a pie-chart format in which the size of the slices corresponds with the 
probabilities that are used. 
In step 1 the utility for gains is elicited with the trade-off method, which uses chained 
questions in the assessment of equally spaced utility intervals. The standard number inter-
vals elicited in both the gain and loss domain is at minimum 5 and at maximum 8. Because 
of the chained nature of these questions the largest indifference value in the elicitation pro-
cess (x
n
) may fall short of reaching the provisional upper limit x
U
 or may exceed this limit. 
When x
i
 exceeds x
U
 then no further indifference points in the gain domain are assessed 
unless the minimum number of intervals is not yet reached. If x
n
 falls short of x
U
 then the 
utility function for gains does not enclose the relevant range of the participant. If the indif-
ference value exceeds x
U
 then utility is assessed beyond a realistic maximum amount of gains. 
To increase the likelihood that the indifference value x
n
 is at least located in the vicinity of 
x
U
 we carefully chose the gauge values g and G that are used in the elicitation process. We let 
G = x-U to honor the decision maker’s materiality threshold for losses. Gauge value g is deter-
mined on the basis of predictions from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 
1992), using the functional specifications u(x) = xα for x ≥ 0, u(x) = -λ((-x)b) for x < 0, and 
ws( p) = pθ / ( pθ + (1 - p)θ)1/θ for s = +,-, 0 < p ≤ 1 with the parameter values α = .88, b = .88, 
λ = 2.25, θ = .61 for s = + and θ = .69 for s = -. Using these specifications and parameter 
values we first predict x
1
 by solving equation 4.7 for i = 1
 x
i
 = u-1[u(x
U
) i ∕ n].80 (4.7)
We then determine the size of g by solving equation 4.8 for i = 1
 g = u-1[(u(x
i-1)-u(xi)) w+( p) / λw-(1 - p)) + u(G)].81 (4.8)
The starting, minimum and maximum values of quantity that is assessed are presented in 
table 4.6.
80 u(x
i
) = u(x
n
) i∕n
  
 
  x
i
 = u-1[u(x
n
) i∕n] = [xnα i∕n]1/α
     Let x
n
 = x
U
.
81 w+( p)u(x
i
) + λw-(1 - p)u( g) = w+( p)u(x
i-1) + λw-(1 - p)u(G)
     g = u-1[(u(x
i-1)-u(xi)) w+( p) / λw-(1 - p)) + u(G)] 
     g = -((-(-((-G)b) + ((x
i-1)
α - (x
i
)α) pγ( pδ + (1 - p)δ)1/δ ⁄ λ(1 - p)δ( pγ + (1 - p)γ )1/γ ))1/b).
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Table 4.6 Starting, minimum and maximum values of the quantity that is assessed.
Starting value Minimum value Maximum value
Step 1 x
i
 derived from expected value x
i - 1 5 × starting value of xi
Step 2 x
k
 derived from expected value x
2 5 × starting value of xk
Step 3 x
j-n = x-L (first iteration)
x
j-n = .5(xj - n - 1)
2(x-L) (first iteration)
x
j - n - 1
x
0
Step 4 x
f
 derived from expected value 5 × starting value of x
f
x-2 
Except for step 3 the starting value of the assessed quantity was always derived from an 
equivalence between the lotteries in terms of expected value. Applied to step 3 this proce-
dure typically would result in starting values that are a multiple of the amount that would 
terminate the enterprise (x-L). The starting value of step 3 was in the first iteration therefore 
fixed at x-L and the minimum value at twice this amount. The minimum values in subse-
quent iterations in step 3 were set equal to indifference value that resulted from the previous 
iteration (x
j-n-1) and starting value was fixed at half this amount. This procedure forced the 
sequence of indifference values to increase monotonically.
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5 Describing Organizational Risk Appetite using Decision Theory
Summary
This chapter presents the results of a field study in which the introspective judgments re-
garding organizational risk appetite of senior managers of a large Dutch company were 
compared with their professional risk attitudes, derived from predictions under prospect 
theory, unbiased expected utility theory, and expected value theory. In this study utility and 
probability weighting functions of senior managers were elicited under prospect theory us-
ing the elicitation method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007). In the domain 
of losses median results are a risk seeking attitude, a utility function that is slightly concave, 
implying diminishing marginal utility of losses, and a probability weighting function that 
is considerably convex, implying an optimistic attitude towards probabilities. The median 
introspective judgment of organizational risk appetite expresses both risk neutrality and risk 
aversion and is significantly more accurately described by expected value theory than by 
prospect theory. 
5.1 Introduction
Organizations accept different levels of risk in order to reach their objectives. Why a specific 
risk is acceptable to one organization and unacceptable to another remains an open empiri-
cal question. Several explanations for differences in organizational risk appetite have been 
suggested in the practitioner literature (for an overview see Verbaan 2009). One of these 
is that the professional risk attitude of senior management is driving organizational risk 
appetite (Hillson & Murray-Webster 2005, HM Treasury 2006a & 2006b). This explana-
tion corresponds with the normative paradigm of management control, which states that 
employees are to only take on those risks that their senior management considers accept-
able for the organization (Merchant 1985, Flamholtz 1983 p.154 organizational control ). A 
misalignment between statements of the organization that specify its risk appetite and the 
intended risk attitude of its senior management is essentially a management control prob-
lem and leads it to accept more, or less, risk than intended. Because of the large impact that 
organizational risk-taking can have on its external environment - consider the dot-com crisis 
(2000) and the financial crisis (2008) - exertion of control over organizational risk appetite 
is not only an important topic for individual organizations but also for society as a whole.
In decision theory the attitude of senior management to events that potentially have 
a negative impact on organizational objectives can be analyzed from a normative and a 
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descriptive perspective (for an overview see Starmer 2000). Prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992), a descriptive theory for decision making under 
risk, accommodates empirical evidence that shows that risk attitude is not only determined 
by the decision maker’s attitude towards the impact of a risk but is also affected by nonlinear 
probability weighting, a bias that is irreconcilable with normative, rational decision models 
(see, however, references in Wakker 2010 p.179 normativity of rank dependence). It describes 
attitude to impact by means of a utility function, which under prospect theory is resistant 
to probability distortion. This utility function, elicited under the assumptions of prospect 
theory, can be used to describe the unbiased risk attitude (see Definition 2.6) of a decision 
maker under expected utility theory, a normative theory of decision making under risk (see 
Schoemaker 1982). Risk management has traditionally employed expected value theory, a 
normative theory of choice under risk in which risk neutrality is assumed. A priori it is un-
known whether organizational risk appetite is most accurately described by a risk attitude in 
which probabilities are distorted, an unbiased risk attitude, or a neutral risk attitude.
To get an initial test of the relationship between organizational risk appetite and the 
risk attitude of its senior management we chose to perform a case study with a large Dutch 
company. In this study we compare the introspective judgments of senior managers regard-
ing organizational risk appetite with their risk attitudes, derived from predictions under 
prospect theory, unbiased expected utility theory,82 and expected value theory. We elicit the 
utility and probability weighting functions of 43 of the case company’s senior managers 
under prospect theory using the elicitation method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv 
(2007). We then request the senior managers to indicate what the risk appetite of their or-
ganization should be. Finally, we establish which decision theory makes the most accurate 
prediction of their introspective judgment on organizational risk appetite.
The findings of our study are that in the domain of losses the utility function of the me-
dian participant is slightly concave, which implies diminishing marginal disutility of losses. 
The probability weighting function of the median participant is considerably convex, which 
implies an optimistic attitude towards probabilities in the face of losses. These results predict 
a risk seeking attitude under prospect theory and a risk averse attitude under unbiased ex-
pected utility theory. The median participant’s introspective judgment of organizational risk 
appetite clearly expresses risk neutrality and risk aversion and is significantly more accurately 
described by expected value theory than by prospect theory. 
Where studies in decision theory primarily focus on student subjects and their attitude 
to risk in the domain of gains, this paper provides more insight into the risk attitudes of pro-
fessionals in the domain of losses. Studies on applications of decision theory are rare. Our 
study presents an application of decision theory to the measurement of organizational risk 
appetite, which is in important topic in risk management. It illustrates how senior managers 
82  For the purpose of this chapter expected utility theory is considered unbiased when the utility function is 
elicited under the assumptions of prospect theory. 
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can determine their unbiased risk attitude and how these can be expressed in statements of 
organizational risk appetite in order to exert control over the acceptance of risk within an 
organization. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The second section discusses the risk matrix of the 
case company. The third section provides an overview of three relevant theories from deci-
sion theory. The fourth section derives isocontours in the risk matrix from these decision 
theories. The fifth section describes the details of the field study we performed. In the sixth 
section we analyze the results of this study. In the seventh section we discuss these results. 
5.2 The case company risk matrix
As a formal statement to communicate its organizational risk appetite to its employees the 
case company uses a risk matrix. The risk matrix is an easy-to-use, popular risk management 
tool, which focuses on the negative consequences of risk only. Its use is recommended in 
the COSO-ERM (2004) guidelines and it can be applied by organizations of all sorts and 
sizes. Contrary to other ways to formally express risk appetite, in particular Value-at-Risk, 
economic capital, and risk-return diagrams, it has received relatively little attention in the 
academic literature. To illustrate its use we present an abbreviated version of the risk matrix 
of our case company in figure 5.1.83
A risk matrix consists of a plane in which events are plotted on the basis of their prob-
ability of occurrence and their negative impact on organizational objectives. In figure 5.1 the 
horizontal axis of the risk matrix contains verbal expressions for five probability/frequency 
levels (A to E) together with a specification of these terms. The vertical axis presents verbal 
expressions and specifications for five ranges (1 to 5) defining the negative impact that events 
may have on the case company’s financial objective. The verbal probability and outcome ex-
pressions facilitate in the qualitative, subjective assessment of probability and impact. In the 
case company risk matrix quantitative descriptors are absent on the probability dimension 
and on the impact dimension they increase logarithmically by a factor 10. In combination 
the five probability and impact levels segregate the matrix into 25 cells. Once the risks that 
the company faces have been identified these are, based on an assessment of their probability 
and impact, allocated to cells in the matrix. Each of the events that are allocated to the cells 
in the risk matrix can be interpreted as a risky lottery with a negative outcome x with associ-
ated probability p, and a zero outcome with associated probability (1 – p). The shades in the 
risk matrix indicate whether these risks are acceptable or not and specify a risk response (see 
the legend below figure 5.1 for an explanation of the shades). The number of cells assigned 
to each zone and the shape of the boundary lines between the zones specify the organiza-
tional risk appetite. For the case company it was unclear whether its current prioritization 
83 Some nonessential elements have been deleted to ensure anonymity of the case company and improve clarity.
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of risks led to investments in control measures that were in line with the intentions of its 
leadership. Our field study therefore allowed the case company to test whether its existing 
formal statement of risk appetite reflected the risk attitude of its senior management.
   Acceptable risk zone: no additional control effort is required.
   Temporarily acceptable risk zone: additional control effort is required.
    Unacceptable risk zone: additional control effort is required and risk can only be accepted 
by an appropriate authority within the organization.
Figure 5.1 Abbreviated version of the risk matrix of the case company.
5.3 Risk attitude and three decision theories
Decision theory studies the risk attitude of individual decision makers. In organizations it is 
not the private risk attitude of the decision maker that is of interest but her professional risk 
attitude, i.e. her attitude towards risks taken in the pursuit of the organization’s mission. In 
this context it is assumed that the individual, professional risk attitudes of the organizational 
decision makers are absorbed in organizational policy or in behavior that can be attributed 
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to the organization (Coumou 2003, Van den Brink 2007). In decision theory most studies 
elicit preferences of individuals towards their own, private objectives (for an exception see 
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Kammoun 2009).
The professional risk attitudes of senior managers can be elicited using methods from 
decision theory. In decision theory the risk attitudes of individual people are determined by 
revealing their preference over lotteries. A lottery is a set of outcomes with associated proba-
bilities.84 For risks that are allocated to the risk matrix the notation for such a lottery is 
 X = ( p : x, (1 - p) : y), (5.1)
with x < 0, y = 0, and 0 < p ≤ 1.
Commonly risk practitioners define risk as the product of probability p and negative impact 
x, an approach attributed to Blaise Pascal (Pfitzer, Hardwick, & Dwyer 2001). This product is 
referred to as the expected value which for X, given that y = 0, is defined by the equation
 EV(X ) = p × x (5.2)
Expected value theory (EV) assumes a risk neutral decision maker. Traditionally boundaries 
between zones in the risk matrix are derived from expected value calculations.
Whether a person has a risk averse, risk neutral or a risk seeking risk attitude is de-
termined by offering this person the choice between a risky lottery X and a sure amount 
which value is equal to the expected value of X. Risk aversion holds if every lottery is less 
preferred than its expected value, denoted by X  EV(X ). Risk seeking holds for the re-
verse, X  EV(X ). Being indifferent between the two options is indicative for a risk neutral 
attitude, denoted by X ~ EV(X ) (Wakker 2010 p.52). Risk aversion also implies that, given 
identical expected values, the lottery with the smallest spread between outcome x and y 
is preferred (Wakker 2010 p.75 aversion to elementary mean-preserving spreads).85 Natu-
rally the opposite holds for risk seeking. A risk matrix that reflects a risk averse attitude is 
characterized by an unacceptable risk zone that includes relatively many cells with a large 
impact. A risk seeking attitude is reflected in the risk matrix by an unacceptable risk zone 
with relatively many cells with a large probability of occurrence. Risk aversion is in eco-
nomics considered to be a rational attitude towards risk that, given equal expected values, 
aims to reduce variance. 
A decision theory that accommodates risk aversion, risk seeking, and risk neutrality is 
expected utility theory (EU). The origins of this theory can be traced to Daniel Bernoulli 
84  Lotteries are in decision theory also referred to as prospects, gambles, or probability distributions.
85  Let X = (p : x, (1 - p) : 0) with x ∈ , 0 < p ≤ 1. Define X * as lottery X with outcome x replaced by lottery 
Z = (q : z, (1 – q), 0) with z = x/q, 0 < q ≤ 1. Lottery Z is an elementary mean-preserving spread. X * can be 
rewritten as X * = ( pq  : z, 1 - pq) : 0) with pq < p, z > x for x > 0, and z < x for x < 0. The spread in outcomes 
is for X the distance between x and 0 which is smaller than the distance between z and 0 for X *. Under risk 
aversion holds aversion to elementary mean-preserving spreads which implies X  X *.
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(1738/1954) and the rational foundations of this theory were established by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944). The theory replaces the negative outcome x in the product of 
equation 5.2 with u(x), the utility of the negative outcome x, such that 
 EU(X ) = p × u(x), (5.3)
with EU(X ) being referred to as the expected utility of the lottery X and u(.) being a mono-
tonically increasing function that transforms outcomes to utility values. The utility function 
reflects the attitude of a decision maker towards outcome.
Under expected utility theory risk aversion holds when the shape of the utility function 
is concave, i.e. curved inward. This concave shape reflects diminishing marginal returns, 
which implies that a unit reduction in negative outcome at a high impact level returns more 
utility than that same reduction at a low impact level. The curved shape of the utility func-
tion is frequently modeled by a power function in which utility is represented by 
 u(x) = -((-x)b). (5.4)
(Pratt 1964, Constant Relative Risk Aversion). Concave utility holds when the b-parameter 
is higher or equal than 1. A convex utility function (b ≤ 1) reflects under expected utility 
theory a risk seeking attitude to risk. Risk neutrality is under expected utility theory reflected 
by linear utility (b = 1). 
Descriptive studies in decision theory report empirical evidence that risk attitude is to a 
large degree determined by a decision maker’s attitude towards probability. Prospect theory 
(PT, Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Kahneman & Tversky 1979) accommodates both a deci-
sion maker’s attitude towards probability and attitude to outcome. Under prospect theory, 
probability p in the product in equation 5.3 is replaced by w( p), which stands for the weight 
that is assigned to probability p in making the decision, so that 
 PT(X) = w( p) × u(x), (5.5)
with PT(X ) referred to as the prospect theory value of X and w(.) being a monotonically 
increasing function that transforms probabilities to probability weights. Under prospect 
theory the utility function u(.) has the same properties as under expected utility theory. 
Only under linear probability weighting, i.e. w( p) = p, the shapes of these utility functions 
are identical. Nonlinear probability weighting describes actual choices and is in general not 
assigned any normative status.
Under prospect theory, risk attitude is determined by the shape of the probability weight-
ing function as well as the utility function. For risky lotteries that have a negative outcome, 
a strictly concave shape of the probability weighting function indicates that a decision maker 
assigns more weight to probabilities than their numerical values justify. This suggests a pessi-
mistic attitude towards probability and promotes risk averse behavior. A convex shape, on the 
other hand, implies underweighting of probabilities. It implies an optimistic attitude to risk 
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and promotes risk seeking behavior.86 Apart from this motivational aspect, being optimistic 
or pessimistic, decision makers differ in their sensitivity to moderate probabilities as well. 
The following specification of the probability weighting function 
 w p p py y
( )
(1
= +
δ
δ
p y
- )  (5.6)
(Goldstein & Einhorn 1987, Lattimore, Baker, & Witte 1992) distinguishes between motiva-
tion and sensitivity by means of the δ and γ parameters.87 The δ-parameter mainly measures 
the motivation for deviating from linear probabilities, which can be pessimistic (δ ≥ 1) or opti-
mistic (δ ≤ 1). This parameter determines the elevation of the function. The γ-parameter main-
ly measures how sensitive a decision maker is to moderate probabilities. This parameter thus 
determines the curvature of the function. If γ > 1 then choice behavior is sensitive to changes 
in probabilities leading to an S-shape in the probability weighting function and when γ < 1 an 
inverse S-shape results which promotes insensitivity to probabilities. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) observed underweighting for high probabilities and 
overweighting for small probabilities, which translates into an inverse S-shape of the 
weighting function. Parameter values that describe this function are γ = 0.64, indicat-
ing that curvature is inversely S-shaped, and δ = 0.83, suggesting an optimistic attitude 
towards probabilities. They observed a slightly convex shape for the utility function that is 
described by a power function with b = 0.88. The combined effect of these shapes of the 
utility and probability weighting functions results in the domain of losses in predominantly 
risk seeking behavior and risk aversion for lotteries that involve small probabilities.
By filtering out the phenomenon of nonlinear probability weighting from a decision 
maker’s risk attitude, prospect theory enables us to describe the unbiased risk attitude 
(Definition 2.6) of senior management in terms of utility only. We assume that the 
true preferences of a decision maker are represented by this unbiased utility function 
(Assumption 2.5). Because this utility function is assumed to reflect the true or unbiased 
risk attitude of the decision maker, it can then be implemented in equation 5.3 to calcu-
late EU*(X ), with the star-symbol indicating unbiased expected utility. 
5.4 Isocontours in the risk matrix under decision theory
This section specifies isocontours in the risk matrix under expected value theory, unbiased 
expected utility theory, and prospect theory. Isocontours in the risk matrix are curves that 
specify, under the three aforementioned decision theories, which lotteries are considered 
86 See Wakker (2010 p.174) for formal definitions of concavity and convexity of probability weighting functions.
87  Gonzalez and Wu (1999 p.140) indicate that a completely independent separation of curvature and elevation 
is not possible for the specifica tion in equation 5.6.
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equivalent by a decision maker. These isocontours can be used to specify the boundary 
lines between the cells in the risk matrix (see section 3.7.3 Appendix C for an explanation 
of this procedure). The isocontours in the risk matrix are derived from the utility function, 
the probability weighting function, in combination with an isocontour that describes the 
equivalence condition with, respectively, EV-, EU*- and PT-values.
Under expected value theory the decision maker has a neutral attitude to risk. This im-
plies both linear utility and linear probability weighting. Figure 5.2 contains a diagram that 
illustrates the relationship between EV-values, linear utility, linear probability weighting, 
and the risk matrix. 
Figure 5.2 Diagram illustrating the relationship between EV-values, linear utility, linear probability 
weighting, and the risk matrix.
The adjacent axes of the four separate planes in this diagram are interconnected. The 
relationship between p and w( p) in the probability weighting function (plane W) is linear. 
The utility function (plane U), with horizontal and vertical axes interchanged, illustrates the 
linear relationship between x and u(x). Outcome x is in this utility function scaled on the 
range [-1,0]. The isocontour in plane E describes the equivalence condition u(x) × w( p) = c, 
with constant c ∈ [0,1]. Under linearity of both u(.) and w(.) this equivalence condition is 
represented by the expected value x × p = c. In the example in figure 5.2 the value of c is -.4. 
Under expected value theory, the isocontour in the risk matrix (plane R) is an exact reflec-
tion of the isocontour describing the equivalence condition. The dotted lines that connect 
the curves emphasize the alignment of the adjacent axes of the four planes and illustrate 
that the shape of the isocontour in the risk matrix (plane R) is derived from the equivalence 
condition (plane E) by mediation of both the utility function (plane U) and the probability 
weighting function (plane W).
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Economics traditionally assumes a concave utility function and a linear probability 
weighting function which, under expected utility theory, implies a risk averse attitude 
to risk. 
Figure 5.3 Diagram illustrating the relationship between EU*-values, a concave power utility func-
tion (b = 2), linear probability weighting, and the risk matrix.
The utility function in figure 5.3, which only appears convex because its axes are inter-
changed, contains a concave power function specified by b = 2. When this utility function 
has been elicited under prospect theory, then the isocontour that describes the equivalence 
condition u(x) × p = c represents the unbiased expected utility, EU*. In the example in 
figure 5.3 the value of c is -.16. At this value the isocontour in the risk matrix in figure 5.2 
and 5.3 coincide with the sure “lottery” X = (1 : -0.4).88 The isocontour that under 
concave utility is derived in the risk matrix, designates in comparison with linear utility 
(see figure 5.2) a larger area in the risk matrix and relatively more small probability - large 
impact lotteries as unacceptable. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) seminal paper on cumulative prospect theory pro-
vides empirical evidence for convex utility and inverse-S probability weighting in the 
domain of losses. These specifications are used in figure 5.4. The isocontour that de-
scribes the equivalence condition u(x) × w( p) = c represents the prospect theory value, 
PT. In figure 5.4 the value of c is -.45. The isocontour in the risk matrix, derived 
88  At p = 1 there is certainty which implies the absence of risk. Therefore all three decision theories under risk 
that are discussed in this section should coincide at p = 1. 
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under prospect theory from functional specifications that are descriptive in nature, desig-
nates, in comparison with expected value and expected utility theory, comparatively less 
small probability - large impact lotteries and a smaller area in the risk matrix as unac-
ceptable.
Figure 5.4 Diagram illustrating the relationship between PT-values, a convex utility function 
(b = .88), an inverse-S probability weighting curve (δ = .83, γ = .64), and the risk matrix.
This section illustrates the relationship that in general exists between a decision maker’s 
risk attitude and the expression of organizational risk appetite in the risk matrix. The next 
section describes the details of a field study in which the risk attitudes of several individual 
decision makers were elicited under prospect theory and compared with their individual 
judgments regarding organizational risk appetite. 
5.5 Field study details
In a field study we elicited the professional risk attitudes to financial damages of senior 
managers employed by a large privatized government service body in The Netherlands. We 
also requested these senior managers to judge what, in their professional opinion, the risk 
appetite of their organization should be. The relationship between their professional risk 
attitude and their judgment regarding organizational risk appetite is assessed in the results 
section of this chapter.
The senior management, consisting of 68 managers and directors, was invited by the 
corporate controller of the case company to participate in the study. In total 43 members of 
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senior management participated in the study of which 4 female participants. One third of 
the participants was director.89 
Both in the invitation letter and in written instructions the participants were informed 
that their response would be used in the policy development of the case company. They 
received confirmation in advance of the confidential treatment of their individual results 
and were informed that their individual results would be sent to them by e-mail after-
wards. The case company did not allow the use of tangible incentives, such as financial 
rewards, presents, or donations to charity. These types of incentives are commonly used 
in studies that elicit the risk attitude of individual people in relation to their own, private 
objectives. In this study, with its focus is on company objectives, this type of incentives 
creates a confound.
Participants received written and spoken instructions and were allowed to practice 
the decision tasks. On average participants spent 21 minutes on instructions and practice, 
21 minutes on the utility and probability weight elicitation task, and 5 minutes on the risk 
appetite judgment task.90 The study was conducted in July and August 2009. Monetary 
amounts that are mentioned are in euro.
5.5.1 Elicitation of professional risk attitudes
In the first part of the study the professional risk attitude of the senior managers was 
elicited in the domain of financial damages. To describe the risk attitudes of senior man-
agement a descriptive rather than a normative theory for decision under risk is required. 
Professional risk attitudes were therefore elicited under prospect theory. Using the non-
parametric utility elicitation method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) we 
elicited each participant’s utility curve for financial damages first. These individual utility 
curves were then used to elicit individual probability weighting functions by means of a 
nonparametric elicitation method using certainty-equivalents (see 4.6.1 Appendix A) in 
combination with interpolation. These curves can be elicited using parametric methods, 
that require prior specification of the functional form of the curves, and nonparamet-
ric methods, where such specification is not required and these curves can be directly 
observed. The method of Abdellaoui et al. was chosen because it is nonparametric and 
accommodates a large range of outcomes, from zero to catastrophic loss, that needs to be 
specified when a risk matrix is used. The nonparametric approach was selected because it 
89 Count of directors includes regional directors, program directors, and assistant-directors. 
90  In addition to what is reported in this study, participants expressed their professional risk attitude and pro-
vided their introspective judgment as well for lotteries involving verbal outcome expressions with respect to 
three of the case company’s objectives: limiting financial damage, maintaining key performance, and avoiding 
reputational damage. These data are retained for future analysis and the results hereof are not reported in this 
dissertation.
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was ex ante unclear whether functional forms that usually hold for risk attitudes of student 
subjects in laboratory experiments, also hold for the senior managers in our field study. 
Under nonparametric elicitation complementary parametric estimation ex post always 
remains possible.
To assess utility and probability weights indifference values were assessed using the 
bisection method (see 4.6.2 Appendix B), which consisted of five iterative choices be-
tween lotteries, each composed of negative outcomes. In each session, consisting of five 
subsequent choices, the iteration sequence was completed by a request to the participant 
to confirm her indifference between the lottery pair that resulted from the iterations. In 
each choice the participants were requested to choose the option that the case company 
should make according to their professional opinion. This wording was chosen to ensure 
that the choices made by the senior managers reflected their risk preferences as profes-
sionals. Each lottery was presented to the participants in a pie-chart format. Figure 5.5 
presents a print screen of the choice menu that was used in the first iteration of the first 
choice session.
In figure 5.5 choice A (left) consists of a .67 probability of a financial damage of 600K 
and a .33 probability of a financial damage of 1M. In choice B (right) there is a .67 prob-
ability of a financial damage of 100K and a .33 probability of a financial damage of 3M. 
This choice menu was used in 27 choice sessions.
Figure 5.5 Print screen of the choice menu used in the elicitation of professional risk attitudes.
119
Sessions 1 & 2 were used to elicit two intervals of financial damage that are equally spaced 
in terms of utility using the trade-off method (Wakker & Deneffe 1996). This sequence 
was then used in sessions 3-to-7 to elicit the probability of occurrence of financial damage 
p for which holds w( p) = .5 using certainty equivalents.91 In sessions 8-to-14 the resulting 
probability p was used to elicit a sequence of certainty equivalents xi from which the utilities 
u(x
i
) = i, with i ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 0.25, 0.875, 0.125, 0.938, 0.062}, were derived. In sessions 
15-to-23 certainty equivalents were used to elicit the probability weight of the probabilities 
p ∈ {.01, .1, .25, .33, .5, .67, .75, .9, .99}. Finally in sessions 24-to-27 indifference values 
were elicited as a consistency check.92 
5.5.2 Elicitation of introspective judgments of organizational risk appetite
In the second part of the study participants were requested to provide their professional, 
introspective judgment about the desired risk appetite of their organization regarding 
financial damages. Participants used a 5 point Likert-scale, a survey response scale to 
which most businessmen are accustomed, to indicate the degree to which, in their pro-
fessional opinion, a lottery with negative outcomes should be accepted by the case com-
pany or not. The pie-chart format was maintained in this part of the study, to reduce 
the cognitive burden on the participants who had already familiarized themselves with 
this format in the first part of the study. This in addition forestalls that any difference 
between professional risk attitude and judgments on organizational risk appetite can be 
attributed to a difference in presentation format. The pie-chart format, furthermore, 
creates a contrast effect between financial damage and the complementary zero outcome 
in a lottery, which is lost when lotteries are shown in a risk matrix format. 
Figure 5.6 shows a print screen of the choice menu that was used. It displays only one 
possible event with five choice buttons underneath. Participants were instructed to tick the 
most left choice button when in their professional opinion the event shown should be ac-
cepted by the case company and to tick the most right choice button when the event should 
not be accepted. The other three choice buttons indicate a degree of acceptability that lies 
between these two extremes. 
91  The probability equivalent method was not used because this method induces a response mode bias (Hershey 
& Schoemaker 1985, Hershey, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker 1988). During the five choice sessions, probability 
stayed the same in each of the five iterative choices belonging to a session. In response to the choice of the 
participant in the first iteration of a session, the probability that was used in the next session was adjusted. It 
was therefore not obvious to the participants that this change in probability resulted from a choice made by 
them at the start of the previous session.
92  The consistency checks consisted of repetitions of session 1, 3, 8 and 18.
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Figure 5.6 Print screen of the choice menu used in the elicitation of introspective judgments on 
organizational risk appetite.
The example in figure 5.6 shows the first choice presented to the participants, a possible event 
with a .9 probability of a financial damage of 10M and a .1 probability of no financial dam-
age. The choice menu in figure 5.6 was used in 41 choice sessions, consisting of 30 regular 
choices and 11 consistency checks. For each probability in the sequence .9, .7, .5, .3, .1, 
and .01 the participants provided their introspective judgments for lotteries with subsequent 
impact levels of 10M, 3M, 1M, 300K, and 100K. When the lowest impact level in this 
sequence was reached, a new sequence of impact levels commenced for a lower probability level. 
This approach was adopted to prevent a response mode bias (Hershey & Schoemaker 1985, 
Hershey, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker 1988). Consistency checks consisted of six lotteries 
with a financial damage of 1M in combination with the aforementioned sequence of prob-
abilities and five lotteries with a probability of .9 and with ascending impact levels. 
These lotteries were almost completely derived from the case company’s risk matrix 
shown in figure 5.1. To be able to associate the introspective judgments on organizational 
risk appetite in the second part of the study with the attitude towards probability in the 
first part of the study probability percentages were introduced. These percentages replaced 
the confounding mix of verbal expressions for either probability or frequency that the case 
company employed.93 To reduce the cognitive burden on the participants a linear and not an 
93  The risk matrix of the case company presented in figure 5.1 employs a mix of verbal probability and frequency 
expressions. It was anticipated that these expressions could not be rank ordered unequivocally by the partici-
pants in the study for which reason probabilities were employed in the case study instead. The existence of this 
confound was confirmed by a matching task at the end of our study were participants were requested to match 
percentage probabilities to the verbal expressions. The median response for each expression is shown in brackets: 
Likely (.01), Unlikely (.125), Incidental (.1), Regularly (.5), and Very likely (.8). Notice that the relationship 
between the set of verbal expressions and the probabilities is not strictly increasing. In response to this finding, 
the case company chose a different set of verbal expressions that could be rank ordered unequivocally. 
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exponential probability scale was used. The scale for financial damages in the risk matrix was 
augmented with the amounts 3M and 300K to add precision. The amount 10K was omit-
ted as earlier pilot tests with company representatives clearly demonstrated its irrelevance in 
decision making. 
5.6 Results
This section presents the professional risk attitude of the senior managers, their util-
ity functions for financial damages, and their probability weighting functions. It re-
ports their introspective judgment regarding organizational risk appetite and reveals 
which decision theory makes the best prediction for this judgment of organizational risk 
appetite. 
5.6.1 Professional risk attitudes
In the first part of the study 18 choice sessions contain a direct test of risk attitude. In these 
sessions participants are offered a choice between a risky lottery X and a sure amount equal to 
the expected value of X. For 16 out of these 18 choice problems the median response of the 
participants is to choose the risky lottery, which suggests a preference for risk seeking. The 
percentage share of risk seeking choices in all choices of the participants is 68%. A majority 
of participants being risk seeking in the domain of losses is a common empirical finding in 
decision theory.
5.6.2 Utility functions for financial damages
Contrary to most empirical studies that find convex utility for losses our nonparametric 
median94 data find the utility of financial damage to be slightly concave indicating dimin-
ishing marginal returns (see figure 5.7a). This implies that the median participant in our 
study gains relatively more utility from a reduction of a large financial damage than from a 
reduction of identical size involving a small financial damage. Thus, even though our direct 
tests of risk attitude reveals risk seeking behavior, closer analysis reveals that participants 
experience a concave utility for losses which under unbiased expected utility theory suggests 
risk averse behavior. 
94  The medians are derived by selecting the value in the middle of the ordered set of the indifference values of all 
participants for each of the utilities u(x
i
) = i with i ∈ {0.062, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.875, 0.938}.
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 (a) (b)
    
Figure 5.7 Utility function for financial damages: (a) median nonparametric results, and (b) group 
parametric results.
Additionally we present a parametric estimate of the utility function for financial damages for 
the responses of all participants together (referred to as “group parametric results”). For this 
we assume a model with utility and probability weighting functions respectively specified by 
equations 5.4 and 5.6 and use the distance measure presented in Wakker (2010) and nonlin-
ear regression to find a parametric fit.95 In line with the nonparametric analysis these group 
parametric results find utility to be slightly concave (see figure 5.7b) with a b-parameter of 
1.16 (R2 = 0.85). Fitting the power function in equation 5.4 to the medians in figure 5.7a 
we find b = 1.24. When we compare these findings with the b = 0.88 result of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) we notice that both have a slight deviation from linearity in common but 
differ completely in the direction that this deviation takes. 
5.6.3 Probability weighting functions
The nonparametric results indicate that the probability weighting function for the 
medians96 is convex (see figure 5.8a). This convexity implies that the median partici-
95  Using the functional specifications from equations (5.4) and (5.6) we calculate certainty equivalents (CE) for 
each indifference in part 1. We take for all participants the sum of the squared distances between the CE of 
the left and right lotteries in the indifference and minimize this sum using nonlinear regression (Wakker 2010 
p.361, Appendix A.2: A distance measure for parametric fitting).
96  The median weights for the probability ( p) values .1, .25, .33, .5, .67, .75, and .9 are determined using the 
curvature for utility and interpolation. We use a lottery where a maximum amount x
1
 can be lost with prob-
ability p and where there is a (1 – p) probability of a zero loss x
0
 and then use the indifference (x
1
, p; x
0
) ~ x
p
 to 
elicit the certainty equivalent x
p
. Under prospect theory the indifference (x
1
, p; x
0
) ~ x
p
 implies w(p) × u(x
1
) + 
(1 - w(p)) × u(x
0
) = u(x
p
). Setting u(x
1
) = –1 and u(x
0
 ) = 0 then results w( p) = –u(x
p
 ). u(x
p
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pant adopts an optimistic attitude towards the probability of occurrence of financial 
damage. The median participant thus assigns less weight to probabilities than their 
numerical values justify. Optimism induces risk taking and this underweighting of 
probabilities explains the risk seeking attitude of most participants in this study. The 
group parametric results find the probability weighting curve to be convex as well 
(see figure 5.8b).
 (a) (b)
  
Figure 5.8 Probability weighting function: (a) median nonparametric results and (b) group parame-
tric results.
Contrary to the findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) figures 5.8a and 5.8b do not 
display a typical inverse-S shape. Compared to a γ-parameter of 0.64 in their study, we 
find less insensitivity in our parametric results (γ = 0.76) and almost no insensitivity in our 
median nonparametric data (γ = 0.96). Nonparametric and parametric results indicate that 
participants in our study are more optimistic (respectively δ = 0.52 and δ = 0.53) than in 
the Tversky and Kahneman study (δ = 0.83).
5.6.4 Introspective judgment regarding organizational risk appetite
The introspective judgment for the degree of acceptability of lotteries is for the median 
participant presented in the risk matrix in figure 5.9. 
Figure 5.9 provides evidence for risk aversion as well as risk neutrality. The risk matrix 
identifies with a variety of shades three lottery pairs with identical expected values. On 
the basis of the judgment provided by the median participant the lottery with the smaller 
spread is in each of these pairs preferred to the lottery with the larger spread. This preference 
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implies risk aversion. From the introspective judgments in figure 5.9 we derive the prefer-
ence relationships 
 (.10 : -1M, .90 : 0)  (.01 : -10M, .99 : 0) 
 (.30 : -1M, .70 : 0)  (.10 : -3M, .90 : 0) (5.7)
 (.90 : -100K, .10 : 0)  (.30 : -300K, .70 : 0)97 
For five other lotteries pairs with identical expected values the median judgment of accept-
ability is identical for both lotteries.98 This equality in preference implies risk neutrality.
5.6.5 Decision theoretic predictions for organizational risk appetite
In this section it is our aim to identify which decision theory makes the best prediction for 
the introspective judgment of organizational risk appetite provided by the participants. We 
do this by comparing the number of errors of expected value theory (EV), unbiased expected 
utility theory (EU*), and prospect theory (PT) in predicting which lotteries a participant 
97   Figure 5.9 differs from figure 5.1 in several ways. Where figure 5.1 shows the current risk matrix of the case 
company, figure 5.9 shows what the risk matrix should look like when we take into account the median re-
sponse of the participants in our study. Where the first employs verbal probability/frequency expressions and 
financial impact classes, the second uses probabilities and single point monetary outcomes.
98  These five lottery pairs are: (.10 : -100K, .90 : 0) ~ (.01 : -1M, .99 : 0),  
(.30 : -100K, .70 : 0) ~ (.10 : -300K, .90 : 0), (.30 : -100K, .70 : 0) ~ (.01 : -3M, .90 : 0),  
(.10 : -300K, .90 : 0) ~ (.01 : -3M, .90 : 0), and (.30 : -3M, .70 : 0) ~ (.90 : -1M, .10 : 0).
Figure 5.9 Organizational risk appetite: median response for each cell in the risk matrix.97
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considers unacceptable in the second part of the study. When a participant chose either 
one of the two points on the right of the 5 point Likert-scale (4th and 5th position), we infer 
from this that the participant considers the lottery unacceptable. When any of the three 
remaining points on the scale is selected (1st, 2nd, and 3rd position), we infer from this that 
the participant considers the lottery acceptable.
Each of the 30 cells in the risk matrix represents a lottery in the domain of financial 
damages. For each of these lotteries EV-, EU*- and PT-values are calculated. For unbiased 
expected utility theory and prospect theory these calculations are derived from the indi-
vidual utility and probability weighting functions of the participants that were elicited in 
the first part of the study. We then use the EV-, EU*- and PT-values to rank order the cells 
in the risk matrix, with cells with higher values being preferred to cells with lower values. 
For each of the three decision theories this rank order predicts the shape of the unaccept-
able zone in the risk matrix. The size of this predicted unacceptable area is inferred by 
the count of cells for which participants chose the 4th and 5th position on the Likert-scale 
in the second part of the study. We then compare, for each of the three decision theories, 
two matrices: one with the lotteries that participants actually judged as unacceptable and 
the other with those that the decision theory predicts as unacceptable. The number of 
differences between the two matrices count as prediction errors. On the basis of this pro-
cedure we derive prediction errors for the median response of participants, mean predic-
tion errors, and differences between the prediction errors of three decision theories per 
individual participant. The decision theory with the lowest count of prediction errors is 
considered to be the best predictor of the participants’ introspective judgment on organi-
zational risk appetite.
All three theories rather accurately predict the median judgment of acceptability of cells 
in the risk matrix. Both expected value theory and expected utility theory predict the me-
dian response without errors and prospect theory with only one error. Figure 5.10 presents 
the expected value theory prediction (a) and the actual median response (b). 
 (a) (b)
  
Figure 5.10 Prediction for organizational risk appetite: (a) expected value prediction of the unac-
ceptable area and (b) the actual median response for each cell.
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For each cell in the risk matrix in figure 5.10a the expected value is calculated by multiplica-
tion of the probabilities on the horizontal axis with the amounts of financial damage on the 
vertical axis divided by 10M. In figure 5.10b the dark shaded, unacceptable area consists of 
thirteen cells with values that correspond with the 4th and 5th position on the Likert-scale. 
We use this amount of cells to determine the size of the unacceptable area in figure 5.10a 
by identifying the thirteen cells with the lowest expected value and assign dark shades to 
these cells as well. We then compare the dark shaded areas in the two figures to assess any 
difference. Whenever we identify a light shaded cell in the predicted risk matrix that is dark 
shaded in the risk matrix containing the actual responses, we count this as one prediction 
error. Comparison of figures 5.10a and 5.10b indicates that for expected value theory there 
is no prediction error for the median response. 
Results for the median response provide a weak support for the predictive superiority of 
expected value and expected utility theory over prospect theory. The mean amount of pre-
diction errors is 1.42 for expected value theory and for expected utility theory and prospect 
theory, both 1.74. This provides additional support for expected value theory. Nonparamet-
ric pair wise statistical tests in table 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that the number of prediction errors 
of expected value theory is significantly lower than those of prospect theory, that prediction 
errors of unbiased expected utility theory and prospect theory do not significantly differ 
from each other, and that the statistical comparison between expected value theory and un-
biased expected utility theory remains inconclusive. Based on these data we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that expected value theory has the lowest number of prediction errors compared 
to unbiased expected utility theory and prospect theory.
Table 5.1 Wilcoxon signed ranks test.
EV - PT EV - EU* PT - EU*
Z -2.562a -1.686a -.267a
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)    .010   .092 .789
a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Based on negative ranks.
Table 5.2 Sign test.
EV - PT EV - EU* PT - EU*
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .031a .031a 1.000a
a. Binomial distribution used.
5.7 Discussion
The results indicate that the organizational risk appetite, as expressed by the senior man-
agement of the case company, is best described by a neutral attitude to risk. This finding 
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corresponds with the expected value approach commonly adopted by risk practitioners in 
the field of system safety. The median introspective judgments for organizational risk appe-
tite elicited in the second part of the study contain both risk neutral and, to a lesser degree, 
risk averse preferences. These do not correspond with the risk seeking attitude of the senior 
managers and their optimistic attitude to probabilities that were elicited in the first part of 
the study under prospect theory. The median result for the attitude of the senior managers 
towards outcomes is described by a concave utility function which under unbiased expect-
ed utility theory represents a risk averse attitude. This averse attitude to risk, which under 
unbiased expected utility theory represents the true risk preference of senior management, 
can be used to determine the organizational risk appetite of the case company in the risk 
matrix. It is concluded that the professional unbiased risk attitude of the senior managers 
in our study did not drive organizational risk appetite.
The high speed at which participants provided their judgment on organizational risk 
appetite suggests that they employed an intuitive rather than a rational approach to decision 
making. The fact that prospect theory, a descriptive theory of choice under risk, did not 
have a bearing on their judgment regarding organizational risk appetite is therefore surpris-
ing. This result resembles that of Cokely and Kelley (2009) who found that expected value 
choices rarely involved the actual calculation of expected values but instead resulted from 
trade-off like decision processes. When we assume that participants did make expected value 
calculations in the judgment task, then it is conceivable that an approximate amount for 
investments in control measures is used as a cut-off point for deciding on the acceptability 
of cells in the risk matrix. Such a heuristic explains the prominence of expected value in the 
second part of the study and explains why the behavioral traits of the participants in the 
first part of the study did not show up in the judgment task. An additional explanation for 
absence of behavioral biases in the judgment task is that the professional experience of the 
senior managers with organizational risk appetite in practice may have prevented them from 
making the same “mistakes” as students in a laboratory setting. 
The approach demonstrated in this study allows an organization to make explicit what 
the risk attitude of its senior management is and allows it to integrate its unbiased risk at-
titude into organizational risk appetite. In line with the unbiased risk averse attitude of its 
senior management the response of the case company was to become more risk averse in its 
expression of organizational risk appetite in the risk matrix in order to exert more control 
over the acceptance of risk within its organization.
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6  The Utility and Weight of Verbal Outcome and Probability 
Expressions: A Field Experiment
Summary
This chapter employs prospect theory to reveal the utility and probability weights that a 
unique population of consultants, experienced in the management of project risks, assigns 
to verbal probability and outcome expressions. In this study utility and probability weight-
ing functions of consultants were elicited under prospect theory using the elicitation meth-
od of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon (2008). The results from prior studies that 
find surprisingly similar response patterns in the verbal and numerical probability mode, are 
corroborated in this study for moderate probabilities using probability weights. In line with 
findings from previous studies, the utility of losses in the verbal mode is found to be much 
more negative than in the numerical mode, which suggests a strong aversion to vague out-
comes. From these results the inference drawn is that the source of uncertainty dominates 
the mode of uncertainty representation whenever this source does not allow an ambiguous 
interpretation of the response mode. 
6.1 Introduction
In organizations decisions are often made on the basis of verbal expressions of probability 
and outcome instead of their numerical counterparts. However, an overwhelming amount 
of evidence indicates that people differ considerably in their interpretation of qualitative 
terms like ‘low probability’ or ‘very high impact’. Given the popular use of verbal quantifiers 
in daily life it is not unthinkable that this great intersubject variability in the interpretation 
of verbal quantifiers is causing an ‘illusion of communication’ in business life (Wallsten and 
Budescu 1995 p.53). This has led some authors in risk management (Chapman & Ward 
2003 p.170) and decision analysis (Keeney 1992 p.117) to advise against the use of these 
vague expressions in applications altogether, favoring numerical measurements instead. 
Arguing from the maxim ‘quantification promotes understanding’ (Loosemore, Raftery, 
Reilly, & Higgon 2006 p.27) they are engaged in a systematic attempt to measure risk in 
order to build a rational risk management system.
There exists an opposing faction in risk management which emphasizes the qualitative 
side of risk management and whose view is summarized by the adage ‘good information 
need not be numerical’. They state that conducting a qualitative, verbal analysis first is 
imperative while the need for a complementary quantitative, numerical assessment of risk 
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is only to be contemplated for particularly important risks and is conditional on practical 
matters such as data availability (Loosemore et al. 2006 pp.119–120).
The large amount of intersubject variability, inherent to qualitative risk analysis, can 
be reduced by transforming the qualitative method to a semi-quantitative risk analysis 
(Loosemore et al. 2006 p.124, Cooper, Grey, Raymond, & Walker 2005 p.67) whereby 
the descriptive, verbal classes of probability and outcome are associated with their numeri-
cal counterparts using scaling techniques (Theil 2002). The need for a scaling of its verbal 
probability and outcome expressions was exactly the motivation for the Dutch subsidiary of 
a large international consultancy company to cooperate with the researchers in this study. 
In this framed field experiment (Harrison & List 2004) introspective numerical judg-
ments were elicited from consultants for a set of verbal probability and outcome expressions 
employed by the case company. Additionally the meaning that these professionals assign to 
these verbal probability and outcome expressions was inferred under prospect theory from 
their choices. Both the judged and inferred probabilities in our study appear to be prone to 
a base rate bias which results in a word-to-percentage scaling that seems overly optimistic. 
Inferred outcomes are furthermore significantly more negative than judged outcomes which 
suggests vagueness aversion for negative outcomes. Both judged and inferred outcomes vary 
exponentially with the rank order of the verbal outcome expressions and are significantly 
more negative for large projects compared to small projects. 
This paper is a response to the call in Du & Budescu (2005 p.1801) to study the factors 
which affect the perception of vagueness in both the probability and outcome dimension. 
The contribution of this study is that it bridges the findings of choice-studies involving ver-
bal expressions of probability and outcomes with choice-studies that aim to elicit probability 
weights and utility values. It furthermore demonstrates how to design a semi-quantitative 
risk analysis method by using probabilities and outcomes that under prospect theory can be 
inferred from choices involving verbal quantifiers. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section discusses the introspective and 
inferred scaling methods and introduces prospect theory as well as some necessary nota-
tions. Section 6.3 discusses vagueness studies and develops hypotheses for both the weight 
of verbal probability expressions and the utility of verbal outcome expressions. Section 6.4 
describes the details of the field experiment including the details of the elicitation method 
that was employed. Section 6.5 contains an analysis of the results of this field experiment 
and in section 6.6 these results are discussed.
6.2 Scaling methods
Scaling techniques for verbal probability and outcome expressions can be introspective, using 
the respondents’ direct word-to-number translations, or they infer these translations indi-
rectly from the decision makers’ choices between options in which either the probability or 
the outcome dimension is defined in the verbal mode. While previous studies assumed the 
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subjective expected utility (SEU, Edwards 1962) model and focused exclusively on inferred 
probabilities, our study employs the descriptively more accurate prospect theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1992, Kahneman & Tversky 1979) to not only infer probabilities but also calcu-
late the inferred outcomes from choices involving verbal expressions. 
Prospect theory assumes that people, when offered a choice involving at least one risky 
option (prospect), assign a particular weight to its probabilities and derive utility from its 
outcomes. To designate a two-outcome prospect in the domain of monetary losses, with 
one outcome zero, the notation x
i pi0 is used, with xi < 0, i = 1,...,n, representing the loss 
outcome with probability p
i
, with 0 < p
i
 ≤ 1, and a zero outcome for which its probability 
of occurrence (1 - p
i
) is understood.99 The symbol ~ is used to designate that the decision 
maker is indifferent between two prospects. The attitude of a decision maker towards losses 
is modeled by a monotonically increasing utility function u(x
i
), normalized with u(0) = 0 
and u(x
n
) = -1. The decision maker’s attitude towards probabilities is modeled by the mono-
tonic probability weighting function w( p
i
), with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Under prospect 
theory the decision maker’s preferences for prospects of the type x
i pi0 are represented by the 
multiplication of the weight of the probability, w( p
i
), and the utility of the outcome, u(x
i
), 
i.e. w( p
i
) × u(x
i
). For the utility of verbal outcomes expressions we use the notation u
v
(.), 
with subscript ‘v’ designating “verbal”, in order to clarify that the inverse utility of the utility 
of a verbal outcome expression is not the identity of this expression, i.e. u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) ≠ r
i
. For 
the weight of verbal probability expressions we use w
v
(.) to clarify that w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) ≠ q
i
. 
Incorporation of verbal outcome expressions r
i
 and verbal probability expressions q
i
 
into prospects allows us to determine the utility and probability weights associated with 
these verbal quantifiers, i.e. u
v
(r
i
) and w
v
(q
i
). The notation r
i pir0 then represents a prospect 
for which one outcome is verbally expressed by r
i
 and the alternative outcome r
0
 repre-
sents a non-perceptible loss. A prospect for which only the probability is verbally expressed 
is described by x
iqi0. From the values uv(ri) and wv(qi) we can, using the inverse utility 
and probability weighting functions u-1(.) and w-1(.), infer a precise, numerical outcome 
u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) and probability w-1(w
v
(q
i
)). This inferred outcome (probability) is a precise out-
come (probability) that leads to the same choice as a vague outcome (probability) expression. 
Inferring subjective probabilities from preferences is standard practice in decision theory (see 
Tversky & Kahneman 1974 p.1130 for a reality check on this convention). Inferred prob-
abilities have been calculated for verbal probability expressions under subjective expected 
utility (SEU) assuming linear utility (Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten 1988, Wallsten 1971, 
adjusted bids) and for probability intervals under prospect theory (Baillon, Cabantous, & 
Wakker 2011, matching probabilities). Inferred probabilities and outcomes are choice-based 
and are thus aligned with the revealed preference paradigm.
For word-to-number scalings which are based on introspective judgments we employ 
the notation s(r
i
) for a precise, judged outcome that matches a verbal outcome expression 
99 Alternatively prospects are in decision theory referred to as lotteries or gambles.
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and s(q
i
) for a judged probability associated with a verbal probability expression. Using the 
utility and probability weighting functions we can on the basis of these values calculate the 
utility associated with judged outcomes, u(s(r
i
)) and the probability weight that is associated 
with the judged probability, w(s(q
i
)).
6.3 Vagueness studies
This section provides an overview of studies on verbal probability and outcome expressions. 
The main concepts in this overview are defined in the first section. Hypotheses on the weight of 
verbal probability expressions and the utility of verbal outcome expressions, formulated on the 
basis of this literature review, are presented at the end of the second and third section.
6.3.1 Vagueness, source of uncertainty, and mode of representation
Vagueness is defined as an inexactness where there are no precise boundaries to the mean-
ing of an expression (Zwick & Wallsten 1989 p.70, Black 1937 p.430). The Ellsberg 
paradox (1961), a demonstration of the human preference for precision over vagueness, 
inspired an abundance of studies on vagueness aversion.100 Vagueness aversion is a typical 
finding in the gain domain. For losses the majority of studies finds vagueness seeking 
behavior, albeit that in this domain there is much mixed and opposing evidence (Wakker 
2010 p.354, Camerer and Weber 1992 table 3 stylized fact 9). Empirical studies have dem-
onstrated that risk attitude and vagueness attitude are independent constructs (stylized fact 
10) and have found vagueness seeking for low probabilities in the domain of gains and for 
high probabilities in the domain of losses (stylized fact 7). Fox and Tversky (1995) found 
that vagueness aversion was prevalent when decision makers were offered choices which 
facilitate a direct comparison between vagueness and imprecision, whereas in the absence 
of such a clear comparison this preference for precision did not hold. In the first, com-
parative choice condition vagueness and precision become salient characteristics of the 
decision context whereas in the second condition decision makers, acting in ignorance of 
this comparative condition, assign less value to these characteristics (comparative ignorance 
hypothesis). 
The need to explain noticeable exceptions to vagueness aversion, such as vagueness 
seeking in areas in which one is competent or knowledgeable (Tversky & Fox 1995 p.280 
100  In decision theory, vagueness aversion is usually referred to as ambiguity aversion. Arguments in favor of using 
the term ‘vagueness’ instead of ‘ambiguity’ can be found in Budescu, Weinberg and Wallsten (1988 footnote 1 
p.282) and an explanation of the difference between these two terms in Zwick and Wallsten (1989 p.70). In 
this chapter the term ambiguity is reserved for describing a kind of inexactness where there is a finite number 
of alternative, precise meanings to the same phrase. When referring to articles that use the term ambiguity, 
we will nevertheless use the term vagueness.
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competence hypothesis), led to the generalization of vagueness aversion to source preference. 
In studies on source preference a source of uncertainty is defined as a group of events that 
is generated by the same mechanism of uncertainty (Tversky & Wakker 1995, Abdellaoui, 
Baillon, Placido, & Wakker 2011). A source can be a group of events with known objective 
probabilities (risk), unknown probabilities (uncertainty), probability intervals (imprecision), 
or conflicting probability estimates. Examples of sources of uncertainty are the value of a 
stock index, the temperature in a particular city, and the number of colored marbles in an 
opaque urn. Source preference is logically independent of source sensitivity, which measures 
the degree of nonadditivity of decision weights of a single source (Fox & Tversky 1995 
p.601), and which for decision making under risk is expressed in the nonlinearity of prob-
ability weighting functions. 
In this study our focus is on events generated by a single mechanism of uncertainty. This 
single source of uncertainty is, however, expressed by different representation modes of un-
certainty. Examples of uncertainty representations are numeric probability intervals, verbally 
qualified point estimates, second order probability distributions, unreliable probabilities, 
imprecise probability estimates, and linguistic probabilities (see also the review by Budescu 
& Wallsten 1987). In terms of the three-way taxonomy offered by Budescu and Wallsten 
(1995 pp.277–279) our study holds the stimuli ‘nature of the event’ and ‘the nature of the 
underlying uncertainty’ constant while it varies the stimulus ‘representation of uncertainty’. 
The next section discusses empirical findings on vagueness in linguistic probabilities, also 
referred to as verbal probability expressions. 
6.3.2 Verbal probability expressions
In studies that compare the verbal and numerical mode of expressing probability three 
main themes can be distinguished: (1) mode preference, (2) mode translation, and (3) mode 
effectiveness. The findings of these three lines of research are discussed in this section. 
6.3.2.1 Mode preference studies
Various studies demonstrate that people prefer conveying information about uncertainty in 
the verbal mode while preferring to receive this information in the numerical mode (Erev & 
Cohen 1990 communication mode preference paradox, Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, & Kemp 
1993). This communication mode preference reversal holds in particular when the decision 
making context itself lacks precise boundaries (Budescu & Wallsten 1995 principle 3, Olson 
& Budescu 1997). One explanation for the preference to provide likelihood information 
in the verbal mode is that the vagueness surrounding the verbal assessments makes these 
messages more justifiable to the conveyor than would be the case if the precise numerical 
mode would have been used (Piercey 2009). Another explanation is that verbal phrases 
more clearly suggest the inferences that should be drawn from the estimates (Teigen & Brun 
1999) and are more consistent with human reasoning which is similar to putting forward 
linguistic arguments as opposed to computing numerical parameters (Moxey & Sanford 
134
2000). Whether the prediction of the probability of occurrence of an event is better served 
by the deliberate and rule-based reasoning that is induced in the numeric mode or the as-
sociative and intuitive thinking that is invoked by the verbal mode (see Windschitl & Wells 
1996), is an open empirical question. An explanation for the preference to receive probabi-
listic information in the numerical format is that numbers suggest an accuracy which makes 
these estimates appear superior to vague, verbal estimates (Erev & Cohen 1990).
6.3.2.2 Mode translation studies
Empirical studies on the meaning of verbal probability expressions unequivocally find a 
great intersubject variability in the numerical values assigned to probability terms (Theil 2002, 
Sanford, Moxey, & Paterson 1994, Wallsten, Budescu, & Zwick 1993, Mosteller & Youtz 
1990 and comments by Wallsten and Budescu, Wallsten & Budescu 1985, Beyth-Marom 
1982). This intersubject variability is contrasted by the within-subject variability which is not 
minor, but considerably less (Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth 1986 p.349). 
The numerical outputs that can be used to match with the probability phrases can be single 
point estimates (Mosteller & Youtz 1990), probability ranges (Tversky & Koehler 1994 p.563 
staircase method), fuzzy membership functions (Verkuilen 2005, Wallsten, & Budescu 1995 
p.46), and probability signatures (Wallsten & Jang 2008). The interpretation of verbal prob-
ability expressions in terms of these outputs is structurally influenced by context (Pepper & 
Prytulak 1974, Brun & Teigen 1988, Visschers, Meertens, Passchier, & de Vries 2009 p.275). 
Contextual factors that have been found to influence the interpretation of verbal probability 
expressions are the base rate of the event (Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & Cox 1986), the emotional 
desirability or valence of potential outcomes (Cohen 1986, Weber, & Hilton 1990), the sever-
ity of the consequences (Weber & Hilton 1990, Cohen & Wallsten 1992), whether a set of 
verbal expressions is self-selected or not (Fillenbaum, Wallsten, Cohen, & Cox 1991), various 
contextual and framing manipulations (Windschitl & Wells 1996), arbitrary anchors (Mc-
Glone & Reed 1998), and preferences of superiors (Piercey 2009). In a reversed interpretation 
task, where a verbal interpretation of a numerical probability is requested, the translation is in 
the presence of hazardous activities influenced by one’s attitude towards these activities (Ver-
planken 1997). Receivers of probabilistic phrases typically interpret these terms to be closer to 
0.50 and with a broader interval than intended by the sender (Fillenbaum, Wallsten, Cohen, 
& Cox 1991, Budescu & Wallsten 1990, Wallsten, Budescu, & Erev 1988, see also Wallsten 
& Budescu 1990 p.24, Budescu, Por, & Broomell 2011), in particular when negative wording 
is used (Smithson, Budescu, Broomell, & Por 2011).
6.3.2.3 Mode effectiveness studies
Given the aforementioned mode preferences, which suggest that people regard either the 
verbal or the numerical mode as superior, and the large variability in verbal-to-numerical 
translations, it is surprising that studies on the use of verbal probability expressions in 
various tasks show relatively small differences in the decision makers’ response between 
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the verbal and numerical mode (Wallsten, Budescu, & Erev 1988 p.291). Studies employ-
ing bids, rankings and choices involving verbal and numerical expressions find similar 
response patterns between the two modes (Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten 1988 p.291, 
González-Vallejo & Wallsten 1992), no significant differences in profits earned (Erev & 
Cohen 1990), and no significant response differences when the role of forecaster and deci-
sion maker are separated (Budescu & Wallsten 1990 dyadic decisions). However, the verbal 
mode does induce fewer preference reversals (González-Vallejo & Wallsten 1992), in the 
numerical mode rank-orderings correlate with probabilities and in the verbal mode with 
outcomes (González-Vallejo, Erev, & Wallsten 1994), and better decisions are obtained 
when the precision/vagueness of the decision context matches that of the mode of uncer-
tainty expression (Burkell 2004 p.206, Olson & Budescu 1997). 
On the expectation that forcing people to predict in the numerical mode requires 
them to exert more mental effort and therefore induces more bias (Zimmer 1983, 1984 
p.123), several studies have investigated the mode-effect on biases. In a Bayesian updating 
(revision) task verbal probability judgments were indeed less biased towards conservatism 
than numerical estimates (Rapoport, Wallsten, Erev, & Cohen 1990). However, the con-
junction bias and wishful thinking (motivated reasoning) bias appear equally present in either 
mode (Erev & Cohen 1990). 
Finally, in a selection of other studies the verbal mode was found to induce more over-
confidence (Wallsten, Budescu, & Zwick 1993), reduce the speed of comparison (Jaffe-Katz, 
Budescu & Wallsten 1989), improve judgment consistency and consensus among experi-
enced auditors (Stone & Dilla 1994), and improve probability comprehension of females on 
the topic of breast cancer (Vahabi 2010).
While vagueness aversion is able to account for the preference for receiving precise 
probabilities in the preference mode reversal paradox, its apparent absence in the bidding, 
ranking and choice studies involving verbal probability expressions was unanticipated. The 
main results of studies on verbal and numerical mode effectiveness suggest that participants 
will be equally sensitive to verbal expressions as to numerical expressions. On the basis of 
this null-hypothesis of no difference between the verbal and numerical mode we expect that 
in the domain of losses the probability weights of a set of verbal probability expressions q
i
 
with i = 1,...,n, will be equal to the probability weights of s(q
i
), the numerical interpretations 
of these expressions by the respondents.
Hypothesis 1:  In the domain of losses the probability weight of a verbal probability expres-
sion [w
v
(q
i
)] is not significantly different from the probability weight of its 
single point numerical translation [w(s(q
i
))].
6.3.3 Verbal outcome expressions
It is a convention in decision theory to restrict the modeling of vagueness to the probability 
dimension on the argument that the outcomes are probability-contingent because of which 
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outcome vagueness can be reinterpreted as probability vagueness.101 The potential confound 
in modeling vagueness in the outcome dimension is then to confuse vagueness attitude for 
risk attitude (Camerer & Weber 1992 p.331; see, however, arguments by Du & Budescu 
2005 pp.1793–1794 and Budescu & Wallsten 1995 p.279 challenging this view). Con-
founding as it may be, given the wide use of verbal outcome expressions in practical applica-
tions of risk management, further investigation into the utility assigned by practitioners to 
vague expressions of outcome seems warranted. Studies that measure vagueness attitude in 
the outcome dimension typically model imprecision through outcome ranges and, as yet, no 
studies on vagueness attitude have been performed with choices involving verbal outcome 
expressions. Generally studies employing outcome intervals find support for a preference 
for vagueness in the gain domain, a preference for precision in the loss domain and overall 
stronger preferences in the outcome dimension in comparison with the probability dimen-
sion (Du & Budescu 2005, Budescu, Kuhn, Kramer, & Johnson 2002, Kuhn, Budescu, 
Hershey, Kramer, & Rantilla 1999, Kuhn & Budescu 1996, González-Vallejo, Bonazzi, & 
Shapiro 1996). The opposite directions of vagueness preference in both domains suggests 
that outcome valence, i.e. whether the outcome is positively or negatively valued (Wallsten 
& Budescu 1995 p.51), is important. The general pattern of vagueness seeking for gains 
and vagueness aversion for losses has met several psychological motivational explanations 
(goal framing Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth 1998, desirability-bias Krizan & Windschitl 2007, 
asymmetrical loss functions Weber 1994) and perceptual explanations (attentional salience 
attributed to Daniel Kahneman in Weber 1994 footnote 8). The common idea behind the 
motivational explanations is that humans have a need for security which, driven by fear, 
leads to a focus on negative outcomes, and a need for potential which, driven by hope, 
focuses on positive outcomes. On the basis of these findings we expect that in the domain 
of losses the utility of a set of verbal outcome expressions r
i
 with i = 1,...,n, will be signifi-
cantly higher than the utility of s(r
i
), the numerical interpretation of these expressions by the 
respondents. 
Hypothesis 2:  In the domain of losses the utility value of a verbal outcome expression 
[u
v
(r
i
)] is significantly more negative than the utility value of its single point 
numerical translation [u(s(r
i
))].
The field experiment described in the next section enables the test of these two hypotheses in 
the domain of losses.
101  The following example illustrates how outcome vagueness can be reinterpreted as probability vagueness. A 
10% probability of gaining outcomes in the range (0,5) suggest that outcomes are vague and that probability 
is precise. However, given that the probabilities of the outcomes in the range (0,5) are unknown, it is the 
probabilities that are vague and not the outcomes. Applied to verbal outcome expressions this line of argu-
mentation suggests that the probabilities of the outcomes in the range (-∞, +∞) are unknown.
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6.4 Field experiment
The request of the Dutch subsidiary of a large worldwide consultancy firm (referred to as 
the case company) to calibrate its set of verbal probability and outcome expressions allowed 
us to test the two hypotheses in section 6.3. Standard procedure within the case company is 
to assess the probability of occurrence and the impact of events that threaten the company’s 
projects using a standard set of verbal expressions for probability (q
i
) and outcome (r
i
). 
The sets of verbal probability and outcome expressions are with their respective rank-orders 
i = 0,...,10 shown in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Case company’s verbal probability and outcome expressions and their rank order.
Probability (qi ) Rank (i ) Impact (ri )
Absolute certain 10 Catastrophic
Very high 9 Very high
High 8 High
Fairly high 7 Fairly high
Above average 6 Above average
Average 5 Average
Below average 4 Below average
Fairly low 3 Fairly low
Low 2 Low
Very low 1 Very low
Impossible 0 Not perceptible
Apart from the fact that participants did not preselect the set of verbal probability expres-
sions, the set employed by the company fulfills the requirements of the modified equal spac-
ing method (Wallsten, Budescu, & Zwick 1993). Such a set is composed of no more than 
11 to 15 phrases, contains anchor phrases for the two end and the middle points of the prob-
ability continuum to which the probabilities 0, 1 and 0.5 are assigned, and assumes that the 
remaining expressions are equally spaced between these three anchor phrases.
The request to participate in the study was issued to 212 employees and a total of 
143 staff members participated in the study (5% female).102 The average age of the partici-
pants was 45 years of which on average 13 years with the case company. Participants were 
invited by their colleagues to motivate them to participate in the study. They were informed 
in advance and at the start of their response tasks, that their participation would contrib-
ute to the development of the risk policy of their organization and that their participation 
102 One additional employee did not finish the questionnaire and was discarded from the analysis.
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would be anonymous. Participants were already acquainted with the set of verbal probability 
and outcome expressions which had been in use with the case company for several years. A 
software application developed with VBA in MS Excel which contained all choice options 
and questions was sent to the participants and returned by e-mail. The study was conducted 
during December 2010 – January 2011.
In two tasks, utility and probability weights (task 1) and introspective judgments of the 
meaning of verbal outcome and probability expressions (task 2) were elicited. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either a small or large project manipulation (financial revenue 
500K versus 2M)103, different task orders (1–2 versus 2–1), and eight randomized question or-
derings.104 When relevant, the full set of verbal outcome or probability expressions (table 6.1) 
was shown to the participants with the expression v
i
 or q
i
 that was under consideration high-
lighted. The participants were requested to respond to the questions descriptively in their 
role as employee of the case company.105 Despite the absence of financial incentives in this 
study, which is a general characteristic of survey studies, we believe that participants pro-
vided informative responses because of the personal, professional significance of the work-
related events presented in our study (Manski 2004 footnote 11, p.1370).
6.4.1 Elicitation of utility and probability weights
The participants’ attitudes to risk and vagueness are assessed by eliciting utility values and 
probability weights in both the numeric and verbal mode. Discussions with case company 
personnel suggested that relevance, realism and less (cognitive) burden could be attained 
by using certainty equivalents (x
Si 
) in the elicitation process. In all four steps of the elicita-
tion procedure certainty equivalents are employed, which results in a homogeneous task, 
that does not require participants to switch cognitively, and prevents results from being 
impaired by changes in elicitation procedure (Delquié 1993). A financial penalty (claim) 
from a client was put forward by the case company as an understandable and unambiguous 
operationalization of the negative impact of events in a project setting. Utility functions for 
financial claims were elicited using the semi-parametric method by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt 
and L’Haridon (2008) and the exponential family of utility (CARA, Pratt 1964, Constant 
103  All monetary amounts are in Euro. The case company distinguishes between small projects (< € 1,000,000) 
and large projects (≥ € 1,000,000). We choose € 500,000 as being representative for small projects and 
€ 2,000,000 for large projects.
104  Sales and Delivery personnel were randomly assigned to these conditions as well. Randomization was applied 
using the procedure outlined in Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002 pp.297–298, p.313).
105  After finishing the two main tasks participants were asked questions on the following topics: manipulation 
check for the small (500K) versus large (2M) project conditions, perceived representativeness of answers for 
sales versus delivery personnel, age, gender, function, number of years of working experience in sector and 
case company, involvement in public versus the private segments, experience in small or large projects, desire 
to receive feedback on study results, and 10 questions added by request of the case company that were not 
used in this study.
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Absolute Risk Aversion), which specification depends on the parameter θ, an index for con-
cavity (Wakker 2010 p.80). 
In a four-step procedure we elicited the utility function u(x
i
), the utility values u
v
(r
i
) for 
five verbal outcome expressions, the probability weighting function w( p
i
), and the probabil-
ity weights w
v
(q
i
) for five verbal probability expressions.
Table 6.2 Four-step elicitation procedure for utility and probability weights.106
Assessed quantity Indifference sought Under prospect 
theory
Step 1 x
Si xi p0 ~ xSi, with  
x
i
 ∈ {-200K, -600K, -1100K, -1500K, -2M}, 
p = .5 
w( p)u(x
i
) = u(x
Si
),  
with u(0) = 0 and  
u(-2M) = -1
Step 2 x
Si ri pr0 ~ xSi, with  
r
i  
∈ {very low, low, average, high, very high},  
p = .5, and r
0
 = {not perceptible}
u
v
(r
i
) = u(x
Si
) / w( p),  
with w(p) and u(.) 
from step 1
Step 3 x
Si xw pi0 ~ xSi, with  
p
i
 ∈ {.05, .25, .50, .75, .95},  
x
w
 = -2M
w( p
i
) = u(x
Si
) / u(x
w
),  
with u(.) from step 1
Step 4 x
Si xw qi0 ~ xSi, with  
q
i
 ∈ {very low, low, average, high, very high},  
x
w
 = -2M
w
v
(q
i
) = u(x
Si
) / u(x
w
), 
with u(.) from step 1
In steps 1 to 4 participants choose between a risky prospect with a particular chance of 
having to pay a financial penalty or a prospect which offers to settle this claim by a sure pen-
alty of amount x
Si
. In step 1 and 2 utility is elicited by varying the outcomes in respectively 
the numerical and verbal mode and holding probability constant at p = .5. Step 1 derives 
the parameter θ which specifies u(.), and the value of w(.5), the probability weight of p = .5. 
Using these specifications of u(.) and w(.5) we derive in step 2 the utility of five verbal out-
come expressions, u
v
(r
i
). In step 3 and 4 probability weights are consecutively elicited in the 
percentage and linguistic format while holding financial penalty constant at its worst out-
come, x
w
 = -2M. For five numeric probabilities ( p
i
) and five verbal probability expressions 
(q
i
) step 3 and 4 respectively derive probability weights using the u(.) specification from step 1. 
Relatively more measurements are taken at the low and high end extremities because there 
typical behavioral patterns have been observed in previous studies. The comparative igno-
106  In addition the experiment involved the elicitation of 3 indifferences between a sure revenue and a risky 
revenue prior to step one, 4 indifferences to assess multriattitribute scaling constants after completing step 
four, and 25 introspective judgments of risk appetite at the very end of the experiment. Publication of these 
results in a multiattribute study is in preparation.
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rance effect (Fox & Tversky 1995) was neutralized by avoiding a direct comparison between 
verbal expressions and their numeric equivalent. One group of participants determined their 
choices for a small project (500K) and the other for a large project (2M).
A novelty in this study is that it fully takes into account the information on the elevation 
of the probability weighting function which is elicited in step 1 using the Abdellaoui et al. 
(2008) method. From the value of w(.5) estimated in step 1 we can derive the parameter 
δ, which mainly measures the elevation of the Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) probability 
weighting function
 w( p) = δpγ / (δpγ + (1 - p)γ), (6.1)
using the equality 
 δ = w(.5) / (1 – w(.5)).107 (6.2)
The value of w(.5) was estimated in step 1 on the basis of five data points. Insertion of 
equation 6.2 in equation 6.1 and fitting this equation to the five probability weights w( p
i
) 
derived from step 3, then only requires the estimation of parameter γ, which mainly mea-
sures the curvature of the probability weighting function, using nonlinear regression. This 
approach enables the integration of the semi-parametric utility elicitation method of Abdel-
laoui et al. (2008) and the full parametric elicitation of probability weights. This integrated 
procedure is an alternative to a full parametric fitting.
The utility specification u(.) from step 1 allows us to infer the outcome value x
i
 and 
probability value p
i
 that are implied in the utility values of the verbal expressions elicited in 
step 2 and 4.108 These inferred estimates can be contrasted with introspective judgments of 
outcomes and probabilities. 
6.4.2 Introspective translation of verbal outcome and probability expressions
In line with the mode translation studies in §6.3.2.2 we assess the meaning that partici-
pants assign to verbal expressions of probability and outcome by letting the participants 
match each expression with a single point estimate that, according to them, best repre-
sents the meaning of that expression. Consecutively participants match the verbal out-
107  Because the equality .5γ  = (1 - .5)γ holds then given that p = .5 we find that p γ = (1 - p)γ. For p = .5 equation 
6.1 can be rewritten as w( p) = δpγ / (δpγ + pγ) ⇒ δpγ = w( p) (δpγ + pγ) ⇒ p γ = w( p) pγ + w( p) pγ/δ ⇒ 1 = 
w( p) + w(p)/δ ⇒ δ = w( p) / (1 - w( p)).
108  Using the CARA exponential utility specification (Pratt 1964) the inferred outcome x
i
 = u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) can be 
calculated using the formulae x
i
 = -ln (1 - u
v
(r
i
)) / θ, for θ > 0; x
i
 = u
v
(r
i
), for θ = 0; x
i
 = -ln (1 + u
v
(r
i
)) / θ, for 
θ < 0. Using the Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) specification of the probability weighting function the inferred 
probability p
i
 = w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) can be calculated using the formula p
i
 = ([δ / w
v
(q
i
) - δ]1/γ + 1)-1.
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come and probability expressions r
i
, q
i
,
 
∈ {very low, low, average, high, very high} with 
their respective monetary best estimate s(r
i
) or best percentual estimate s(q
i
). Because the 
interpretation of verbal expressions is structurally influenced by context, these introspec-
tive judgments were not elicited in the ‘unknown context condition’ (Clark 1990 p.14) 
but instead were made in a contextual setting which is identical to the one used to elicit 
utility and probability weights. For verbal outcome expressions this contextual setting 
is described as ‘a deal with a size of 500K (2M) with a .5 likelihood on a claim with r
i
 
impact’ and for verbal probability expressions the context is ‘a deal with a size of 500K 
(2M) with a q
i
 likelihood on a claim of 2M’. 
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Manipulation and reliability checks
The small versus large project manipulation was successful. Respondents interpreted their 
exposure to either the 500K or the 2M financial revenue manipulation as representative for 
respectively small versus large projects (n = 143, Mann-Whitney test, p = .003).
The certainty equivalent for the prospect -2M.50 was elicited both in step 1 and 3 
which enabled a test of reliability of the responses of the participants. Correlation between 
the two measurements was ρ = .72 (n = 143, Spearman, significant at the p = 0.01 level, 
2-tailed) and the median value of the measurements was significantly more negative in step 
1 than in step 3 (n = 143, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p = .000). These results indicate that 
the participants in this study were not always consistent in their choices and suggest an order 
effect. On the assumption that there exists a general tendency in our data to stimulate the 
elicitation of less negative certainty equivalents x
Si
 as the experiment proceeds, the ordering 
in table 6.2 is expected to produce lower values for u
v
(r
i
), w( p
i
), and w
v
(q
i
) than would have 
been the case under a randomized ordering of steps 1-to-4.
6.5.2 Median utility and probability weights
The median response of participants (n = 143) for utility in the domain of financial claims 
(step 1) illustrates that the median response assigns relatively more utility to a decrease in 
a small claim vis-a-vis a large claim. The curvature of this utility function, represented by 
the index of concavity θ = -5.09 × 10-7 significantly differs from a straight line (Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test, p = .000, IQR: 1 × 96 10-6).109 This result indicates that the median util-
ity function for financial claims is convex, a typical finding in the domain of losses, which 
expresses increasing marginal utility of losses.
109 IQR = interquartile range = the difference between the upper and lower quartiles.
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For probability weighting (step 3) the results indicate that the median responses do 
not distort probability but weigh probability linearly. The median probability weight for 
p = .5 was w(.5) = 0.48, a value which is not significantly different from .5 (Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test, p = .377, IQR: 0.34). Both the median value for the elevation indicator 
of the probability weighting function δ = 0.93 and the curvature indicator γ = 0.94 were not 
significantly different from one (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests, p = .270 and p = .150, IQR: 
1.45 and 0.60). All three tests suggest the absence of probability distortion for the median 
respondent.
The combination of convexity of utility and linearity in probability weighting suggests 
that the median response is in line with expected utility theory and is risk seeking in the 
domain of losses. The choices of individual respondents may, however, differ considerably 
from this median response.
6.5.3 Verbal probability expressions
When the weight of a verbal probability expression is higher than the probability weight 
transformation of the numerical translation of this expression, i.e. w
v
(q
i
) > w(s(q
i
)), then 
the participant assigns relatively more weight to vagueness than to precision, which in the 
domain of losses suggests vagueness aversion. The reverse inequality w
v
(q
i
) < w(s(q
i
)) in this 
domain suggests vagueness seeking behavior. Equality implies vagueness neutrality.
The participants’ individual utility and probability weighting functions were used 
to calculate the probability weights and inferred probabilities of the verbal expressions in 
table 6.3.110 Each participant’s introspective numerical translation of a verbal probability 
expression was, using the participant’s individual probability weighting function, trans-
formed to the probability weight w(s(q
i
)). These transformed numerical estimates of the 
verbal probability expressions did not significantly differ from the choice-based probability 
weights of the verbal probability expressions that were derived from the choices of the par-
ticipants (n = 630, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test p = .428).
When a verbal expression’s inferred probability differs from its judged probability then 
this implies that choices involving the linguistic probability descriptor will be different 
110  Excluded from the analysis in §6.5.3 were the responses of 17 participants: three participants whose intro-
spective judgment of probability monotonically decreased with the rank of the verbal probability expressions 
(S025, S064, S101) and two participants who responded using extreme percentages only (S042, S084) and 
apparently expressed their strength of belief in the statement (see also Wallsten, Fillenbaum & Cox 1986 
p.578), three participants with erratic or invariant responses (S030, S081, S098), one participant whose 
probability weighting is monotonically decreasing (S115), and nine participants for which R2 could not be 
computed for the nonlinear estimation of γ and thus no reliable model specification could be found (S016, 
S068, S077, S098, S110, S119, S177, S184, S202). Participant S098 is mentioned twice but not double 
counted. 
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from those involving its judged numerical identity. An inferred probability is calculated by 
transforming the probability weight of a verbal expression w
v
(q
i
) to a numerical probabil-
ity using the inverse probability weighting function w-1(.). Vagueness aversion is implied 
when in the domain of losses the inferred probability is higher than the judged probability, 
i.e. w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) > s(q
i
). The reverse inequality implies vagueness seeking. The introspective 
numerical estimates of the verbal probability expressions did not significantly differ from 
the probabilities that were, using the participants’ individual inverse probability weighting 
functions, inferred from the choices of the participants (n = 630, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
test p = .199). The inferred probabilities did not include much more variability than the 
judged probabilities (standard deviation of w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) = 0.33 and of s(q
i
) = 0.30) which 
suggests that the degree of vagueness of the two measures is similar (Budescu & Wallsten 
1990 p.258).
In these tests we use five observations from the same respondents, i.e. one for each verbal 
probability expression. The results of the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, which assumes statis-
tical independence, may therefore have been inaccurate. For this reason we apply the same 
test to each verbal probability expression separately. Table 6.3 presents median results for 
probability weights, inferred and judged probabilities for five verbal probability expressions 
together with a test of significance.
Table 6.3  Median choice-based probability weights [w
v
(q
i
)], and probability weight transforma-
tions of numerical estimates [w(s(q
i
))], inferred probabilities [w-1(w
v
(q
i
))], and judged 
probabilities [s(q
i
)] for five verbal probability expressions (q
i
) and Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks tests (p), n = 126.111
term (q
i
) rank (i) w
v
(q
i
) w(s(q
i
)) p w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) s(qi) p
very high 9 0.79 0.75 .046 0.84 0.75 .043
high 8 0.59 0.57 .521 0.62 0.60 .296
average 5 0.25 0.31 .143 0.30 0.33 .270
low 2 0.10 0.11 .190 0.10 0.10 .769
very low 1 0.04 0.06 .027 0.04 0.05 .822
The significant differences in table 6.3 suggest vagueness seeking for the ‘very low’ prob-
ability expression q
1
 and vagueness aversion for the ‘very high’ expression q
9
. For q
9
 this 
111  Because of nonlinearities in w-1(.) the p-values of the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests for each of the verbal 
probability expressions in table 6.3 differ when the test is executed over probability weights in comparison 
with probabilities. Let e = w
v
(q
i
) - w(s(q
i
)) and e′ = w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) - s(q
i
) then under a linear transformation the 
equality e′ = w-1(e) holds and test results would be identical.
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contradicts the common finding of vagueness seeking for high probabilities in the do-
main of losses (Camerer and Weber 1992 table 3 stylized fact 7). 
The correlation between the probability weights of the verbal probability expressions and 
the probability weights calculated on the basis of judged probabilities is ρ = .76 and inferred 
and judged probabilities correlate at ρ = .70 (n = 630, Spearman, significant at the p = 0.01 
level, 2-tailed). This corresponds with results in previous studies (e.g. in Budescu, Weinberg, & 
Wallsten 1988 p.288 correlation between inferred and displayed probability is ρ = .70). 
Both the inferred and the judged probabilities were significantly lower than the 
values of the modified equal spacing method (n = 630, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests 
p = .000). If the modified equal spacing method is chosen as a benchmark, then the in-
ferred and judged probabilities in table 6.3 reflect an optimistic attitude towards probabil-
ity. Even though for a single project any of the verbal probability expressions in table 6.1 
may be applicable, the percentages and probability expressions employed in step 3 and 
4 are not representative for the average frequency of the occurrence of a claim in the 
case-company. Because the base rate for the occurrence of a claim within the case com-
pany is much lower than the percentages shown in table 6.3, the optimistic attitude 
of the respondents can be explained by a base rate effect (Wallsten, Fillenbaum, & 
Cox 1986).
The sequencing of the choice task versus the introspective judgment task (1–2 versus 
2–1) had a significant influence on judged probabilities (n = 630, Mann-Whitney test, 
p = .000). When introspective judgments were elicited after subjects had expressed their 
preferences for prospects, the introspective translations of the verbal probability expres-
sions resulted in significantly higher single point estimates for the expressions q
5
, q
8
, 
and q
9
 (n = 126, Mann-Whitney tests, p = .000). This significant order effect suggests 
that exposure of the participants to the choice tasks made claim occurrence more avail-
able to them and therefore increased the subjective estimate associated with the verbal 
probability expression (Tversky & Kahneman 1973). When judgment precedes choice 
then judged probabilities are significantly lower than inferred probabilities, which sug-
gests a preference for precise probabilities in the domain of losses (n = 315, Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks test, p = .000).112 But when instead choice precedes judgment then this 
relationship is reversed (n = 315, p = .041) and reveals itself as well in probability weights 
(n = 315, p = .008), in both cases suggesting a preference for vague probabilities in the 
loss domain. 
Table 6.4 presents median results for probability weights, inferred and judged prob-
abilities for five verbal probability expressions and demonstrates that taking the reversing 
of task order into account reveals more significant differences between choice-based and 
judged estimates.
112  The probability weights of verbal probability expressions w
v
(q
i
) and the transformed numerical estimates 
w(s(q
i
)) did not differ significantly (p = .119).
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Table 6.4  Median choice-based probability weights [w
v
(q
i
)], probability weight transformations of 
numerical estimates elicited 1st or 2nd [w(s(q
i
))], inferred probabilities [w-1(w
v
(q
i
))], and 
judged probabilities elicited 1st or 2nd [s(q
i
)] for five verbal probability expressions (q
i
) and 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests (p), n = 126.
term 
(q
i
)
rank 
(i)
w
v
(q
i
) w(s(q
i
))
1st
p w(s(q
i
))
2nd
p w-1(w
v
(q
i
)) s(qi)
1st
p s(q
i
)
2nd
p
very 
high
9 0.79 0.67 .006 0.80 .978 0.84 0.70 .001 0.85 .691
high 8 0.59 0.50 .010 0.63 .163 0.62 0.50 .005 0.75 .244
average 5 0.25 0.24 .612 0.34 .010 0.30 0.25 .273 0.50 .013
low 2 0.10 0.11 .396 0.10 .295 0.10 0.10 .579 0.10 .827
very low 1 0.04 0.07 .013 0.06 .603 0.04 0.05 .816 0.05 .603
Table 6.4 repeats for q
9
 and in addition demonstrates for q
8
 significant differences which 
contradict the common finding in the loss domain of vagueness seeking for high probabili-
ties. The significant differences for q
5
 and q
1
 suggest vagueness seeking for the ‘average’ and 
‘very low’ probability expression. 
In the experimental studies Tversky and Fox (1995 p.278), Fox and Tversky (1998 
p.883) and Baillon, Cabantous and Wakker (2011) choice-tasks precede judgment-tasks. 
In Budescu, Weinberg and Wallsten (1988) judgment precedes choice. There are no 
definitive arguments why either of the two task orderings better represents the prefer-
ences of the participants. For studies that let judgments precede choice, the fact that 
introspective estimates are then not in any way biased by the experimental choice task, 
argues in favor of the judge-choose sequence. On the other hand, participants in the 
choice-task involving verbal probability expressions (step 4) had already been involved 
in several earlier choice tasks (step 1 – 3). The prior exposure to choices in both step 4 
and the successive judgment task argues in favor of the choose-judge sequence. Without 
a clear preference for either of the two, their combined effect as expressed in table 6.3 
is presumed to be best representing the participants’ preferences. The results in this sec-
tion demonstrate that judgments and choices lead to approximately the same probability 
weights for moderate probabilities but not for extreme probabilities. We conclude that 
the null-hypothesis of ‘no-difference’, emanating from previous studies, cannot be re-
jected for moderate probabilities but is rejected for extreme probabilities.
6.5.4 Verbal outcome expressions
Each participant’s numerical interpretation of a verbal outcome expression was, on the 
basis of the utility function of the individual participant, transformed to the utility value 
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u(s(r
i
)). These utility transformations of the single point estimates of the verbal outcome 
expressions were significantly less negative than the choice-based utility values of the verbal 
outcome expressions, i.e. u
v
(r
i
) < u(s(r
i
)) (n = 674, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p = .000). 
The value of the outcomes implied by choices with verbal outcome expressions is signifi-
cantly more negative than the value of the outcomes that were matched with the verbal 
outcome expressions in the introspective judgment task, i.e. u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) < s(r
i
) (n = 617, 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p = .000).113 Both results suggest strong aversion to vagueness 
in the domain of losses.
The inferred outcomes included much more variability than the judged outcomes (stan-
dard deviation of u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) = 968K and of s(r
i
) = 583K) which reflects the greater vagueness 
associated with the former in comparison with the latter (Budescu & Wallsten 1990 p.258).
Table 6.5 presents median results for utility values, inferred and judged outcomes for 
five verbal outcome expressions.
For all verbal outcome expressions the tests in table 6.5 indicate that utility values and 
outcomes inferred from choices are significantly more negative than those resulting from 
introspective judgments. This means that ceteris paribus the median respondent prefers a 
prospect with a numerical expression to its counterpart in the verbal mode. This suggests 
vagueness aversion for outcomes in the domain of losses, a finding which can be explained 
by the salience of the outcome dimension due to its compatibility with the monetary re-
sponse scale and the participants’ need for security motivating them to focus on the nega-
tive outcomes (Budescu, Kuhn, Kramer, & Johnson 2002, Du & Budescu 2005, Fischer 
& Hawkins 1993 p.376 scale compatibility effect).
The correlation between the utility of the verbal outcome expressions and the utility 
calculated from the judged outcomes is ρ = .73 (n = 674) whereas inferred and judged out-
113  Excluded from the analysis §6.5.4 were six participants: four participants whose introspective judgment 
of outcome monotonically decreased with the rank of the verbal outcome expressions (S064, S085, S103, 
S112), two participants with erratic responses (S081, S154). For 41 participants the inferred outcome of 
one or more verbal outcome expressions could not always be calculated because the u
v
(r
i
) is smaller than the 
limit to minus infinity of the CARA-utility function with θ < 0 (amounting to 8% of all responses, which is 
an aggregrate of 62 from the responses of the following participants: S003, S004, S005, S007, S008, S015, 
S020, S024, S026, S041, S046, S058, S061, S062, S067, S078, S080, S082, S084, S095, S098, S103, 
S112, S114, S133, S138, S142, S145, S147, S158, S169, S178, S179, S181, S189, S190, S191, S192, 
S196, S197, S207). For 12 participants some outcomes were not judged and others judged twice due to a 
programming error (S039, S047, S058, S098, S103, S104, S127, S162, S166, S181, S191, S207). These 
double judgments were averaged and missing observations were left blank. For judged and choice-based 
outcomes n = 617 results from (143 - 6) × 5 - 62 - 12 + 6 multiple counts (S103 (2×), S112, S058, S098, 
S181). For weight of the verbal outcome expression and probability weight transformations of judged 
probabilities n = 674 results from (143 - 6) × 5 - 12 + 1 multiple count (S103). In determining the utility 
of verbal outcome expressions an indifference point was not always reached. When these responses were 
exempted from the analysis the aforementioned test results remain the same (n = 512, Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks test, p = .000).
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comes correlate at ρ = .67 (n = 617, Spearman, significant at the p = 0.01 level, 2-tailed). 
These results are comparable with the aforementioned findings for verbal probability 
expressions.114 
Just as was the case with verbal probability expressions the sequencing of the choice task 
versus the introspective judgment task (1–2 versus 2–1) had a significant influence on judged 
outcome (n = 674, Mann-Whitney test, p = .000). When introspective judgments were elic-
ited after subjects had expressed their preferences for prospects, the introspective translations 
of the verbal probability expressions were approximately two times more negative than in 
114   For inferred and judged outcomes the number of responses for which the Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were 
calculated were the total number of participants minus six monotonically decreasing and erratic responses 
minus the missing responses due to programming error minus the incalculable values for high verbal expres-
sions plus double counts. 
 r
1
: 132 = 143 - 6 - 5 - 0;
 r
2
: 136 = 143 - 6 - 1 - 0;
 r
5
: 136 = 143 - 6 - 0 - 1;
 r
8
: 110 = 143 - 6 - 6 - 26 + 5 (S058, S098, S103, S112, S181); 
 r
9
: 103 = 143 - 6 - 0 - 35 + 1 (S103).
  For the utility of verbal outcome expressions and the utility transformation of judged outcomes the number 
of responses for which the Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were calculated were the total number of participants 
minus six monotonically decreasing and erratic responses minus the missing responses due to programming 
error plus double counts. 
 r
1
: 132 = 143 - 6 - 5;
 r
2
: 136 = 143 - 6 - 1;
 r
5
: 136 = 143 - 6 - 0;
 r
8
: 110 = 143 - 6 - 6 + 1 (S103) 
 r
9
: 103 = 143 - 6 - 0.
Table 6.5  Median choice-based utilities [u
v
(r
i
)], utility transformations of numerical estimates 
[u(s(r
i
))], inferred outcomes [u-1(u
v
(r
i
))], and judged outcomes [s(r
i
)], for five verbal out-
comes expressions (r
i
) and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests (p).114
term (r
i
) rank 
(i)
u
v
(r
i
) u(s(r
i
)) p u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) s(ri ) p
very 
high
9 -0.97  
(n = 137)
-0.40  
(n = 137)
.000 -1368K  
(n = 103)
-500K  
(n = 137)
.000
high 8 -0.77  
(n = 132)
-0.27  
(n = 132)
.000 -1029K  
(n = 110)
-275K  
(n = 132)
.000
average 5 -0.26  
(n = 137)
-0.10  
(n = 137)
.000 -325K  
(n = 136)
-100K  
(n = 137)
.000
low 2 -0.06  
(n = 136)
-0.03  
(n = 136)
.000 -75K  
(n = 136)
-45K  
(n = 136)
.000
very low 1 -0.02  
(n = 132)
-0.01  
(n = 132)
.001 -25K  
(n = 132)
-10K  
(n = 132)
.000
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the reverse condition and significantly different for the expressions r
1 
(Mann-Whitney test, 
p = .041), r
5 
(p = .001), r
8 
(p = .003), and r
9
 (p = .015). This suggests that the exposure to 
an abundance of losses under outcomes creates an availability effect similar to that under 
verbal expressions. Despite this difference inferred outcomes were in both task orders more 
negative than judged outcomes (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests, 1–2 sequence: n = 319, 
p = .000; 2–1 sequence, n = 298, p = .000). 
Under the large project condition the responses of the participants were significantly 
more negative than those under the small project condition for the utility of judged out-
comes, judged outcomes (n = 674, Mann-Whitney tests, both p = .000) and inferred out-
comes (n = 617, p = .013).115 The descriptors for ‘average’ and ‘very high’ impact were in 
terms of inferred outcomes significantly different between small and large projects (Mann-
Whitney-tests, r
5
: p = .026 and r
9
: p = .035) whereas other expressions were not significantly 
different at α = .05. For judged outcomes all verbal outcome expressions were significantly 
different between small and large projects (Mann-Whitney-tests, r
1
: p = .038, r
2
: p = .023, 
r
5
: p = .003, r
8
: p = .001, r
9
: p = .001). 
For small and large projects and five verbal outcome expressions median results are 
presented in table 6.6 for inferred and judged outcomes. Figure 6.1 presents choice-based 
utility values of verbal outcome expressions, utility transformed judged outcomes, and linear 
utility defined over the ranks of the verbal probability expressions. 
Table 6.6  Median inferred outcomes [u-1(u
v
(r
i
))] and judged outcomes [s(r
i
)] for small and large 
projects for five verbal outcomes expressions (r
i
) and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests (p).116 
term 
(r
i
)
rank 
(i)
small project (500K) large project (2M)
u-1(u
v
(r
i
)) s(ri) p u
-1(u
v
(r
i
)) s(ri) p
very 
high
9 -1236K  
(n = 47)
-400K  
(n = 67)
.000 -1735K  
(n = 56)
-1000K  
(n = 70)
.000
high 8 -922K  
(n = 52)
-250K  
(n = 65)
.000 -1259K  
(n = 58)
-500K  
(n = 67)
.000
average 5 -256K  
(n = 66)
-100K  
(n = 67)
.000 -387K  
(n = 70)
-150  
(n = 70)
.000
low 2 -70K  
(n = 67)
-25K  
(n = 67)
.000 -88K  
(n = 69)
-50K  
(n = 69)
.003
very 
low
1 -26K  
(n = 65)
-10K  
(n = 65)
.000 -24K  
(n = 67)
-15K  
(n = 67)
.090
115  The utility of the verbal outcome expressions was not significantly different (n = 674, Mann-Whitney test, 
p = .085). 
116  The number of respondents in the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests correspond with the numbers in the inferred 
outcome columns.
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 (a) (b)
 
Figure 6.1 Median choice-based utility values of verbal outcome expressions [u
v
(r
i 
)] and utility transfor-
med judged outcomes [u(s(r
i
))] for (a) small projects [500K] and (b) large projects [2M] for five verbal 
outcomes expressions (r
i 
) with rank i = 1, 2, 5, 8, 9.
 
Both table 6.6 and figure 6.1 demonstrate that the step size between verbal outcome expres-
sions measured in outcomes and utility is increasing with the rank of the expressions. This 
corresponds with a tradition in risk management to express the severity of negative events 
exponentially (e.g. Clemens et al. 2005). Figure 6.1 together with the test results in table 6.6 
and at the start of this section all indicate that in the domain of losses the utility value 
of a verbal outcome expression is significantly more negative than the utility value of its 
single point numerical translation. From this we conclude that the null-hypothesis can be 
rejected.
6.6 Discussion
This study was undertaken among a population of consultants with a unique, professional 
experience in applying a common set of verbal probability and outcome expressions to assess 
project risks. For a relevant selection of these expressions a probability weight or utility value 
was determined under prospect theory, thereby extending the application of this descriptive 
theory for decision making under risk to vague expressions of both probability and outcome. 
An interesting finding is that, while prospect theory was assumed in the elicitation process, 
the median response of the participants corresponds with expected utility theory. This re-
sult was derived using a novel estimation procedure for the probability weighting function 
which is compatible with the Abdellaoui et al. (2008) semi-parametric utility elicitation 
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method. For moderate probabilities the study corroborates in the field earlier, counterintui-
tive results discovered in laboratory studies, revealing surprisingly similar response patterns 
in the verbal and numerical probability mode using probability weights. As in many studies 
results for large and small probabilities were different, with the note that the usual vague-
ness seeking for high probabilities is in this field study replaced by vagueness aversion. The 
analysis of choices involving verbal outcome expressions, not studied previously, upholds the 
previous finding of vagueness aversion in the domain of losses, established in prior studies 
under alternative vague representations of uncertainty.
The fact that the null-hypothesis of ‘no-difference’ between the verbal and numerical 
probability representations of uncertainty could not be rejected for moderate probabili-
ties in this and previous studies suggests that the nature of the event and its uncertainty, 
but not its representation mode, are the drivers of a decision maker’s choices under the 
two modes. When the nature of uncertainty is precise, such as in laboratory experiments 
with spinners, then decision makers apparently are successful in finding clues for the real 
mechanisms of objective chance in both the verbal and numerical mode. When the nature 
of uncertainty is vague, such as in our field experiment, then decision makers are obviously 
equally susceptible to contextual influences in either the verbal or the numerical mode in 
the construction of their preferences. The finding that groups of events and their uncer-
tainty mechanisms easily drown any effects of the verbal and numerical representation 
mode suggests that for verbal probability expressions source dominance over representation 
holds. The consultants in our study, not used to receiving precise numerical estimates for 
the vague uncertainties in their professional life, assign an equal degree of vagueness to the 
numerical as to the verbal representations of those uncertainties. A precise representation 
of a vague source of uncertainty in the form of a probability percentage will then not be 
interpreted as an objective measure of risk but as a best estimate from a range of possible 
values. Numerical probability estimates can thus be ambiguous, portraying alternative 
meanings dependent on whether the nature of their source of uncertainty is precise or 
vague. On the other hand, being accustomed to processing monetary figures in their daily 
profession they will, when provided with a precise monetary estimate, reasonably assume 
that the rationale for it being mentioned in precise terms is its precise nature. People’s 
degree of familiarity with working with numerical estimates may thus help to explain the 
mode indifference phenomenon for probabilities and the mode preference phenomenon for 
outcomes. This suggests that source dominance over representation does not hold when it 
is unknown to the decision maker if the nature of uncertainty of a source is vague of pre-
cise. Future studies should assess under what circumstances source dominance over repre-
sentation holds by manipulating the ambiguity that is associated with both the numerical 
and verbal modes of representation. 
The large amount of verbal probability expressions employed by the case company 
and their symmetry around the verb ‘average’, suggests that a natural and reasonable word- 
to-number translation consists of a linear scaling using an equal probability space of .1 
between the probability descriptors (modified equal spacing method).  Both the introspec-
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tive judgments and inferred probabilities of the participants fell, however, significantly 
below this line, suggesting that participants anchored their interpretations and choices on 
the low base rate of claim occurrence. The application of a formalized scaling of its verbal 
probability expressions would enable the case company to employ an ‘anchoring-and-ad-
justment strategy’ (Einhorn & Hogarth 1985 p.436) but then in reverse. Instead of leaving 
the editing operation of ‘vagueness resolution’ (Budescu, Kuhn, Kramer, & Johnson 2002 
p.765) to the professional, the case company itself can resolve the vagueness by prescrib-
ing the best numerical anchors for its set of expressions and reduce the large intersubject 
variability that exists in the interpretation of verbal expressions. To further reduce cogni-
tive biases under uncertainty these anchors could additionally be expressed in frequencies 
instead of probabilities (Ayton & Pascoe 1995 pp.37–38, Gigerenzer 1991, Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting 1991). 
Both the inferred and judged outcomes in our study become exponentially more nega-
tive with the rank of verbal outcome expressions, both for small and large projects. Further-
more, the absolute size of the outcomes assigned to these expressions is for large projects 
significantly larger than for small projects. Tradition in risk management endorses both the 
exponential scaling of impact, which creates a natural, large divide between the ‘minor’ and 
the ‘major’ impact, and the aforementioned relationship between impact and entity size, 
suggesting that large entities can have a larger risk appetite than small entities. A formalized 
scaling of these qualitative terms to outcome ranges can take account of this exponentiality 
and project size thereby reducing the large intersubject variability that exists in the interpre-
tation of verbal outcome expressions.
It should be noted that the case company’s tradition to employ imprecise natural 
language only, is conducive to the social interaction between employees with multiple, 
sometimes conflicting goals (comparable with social undesirability of precision in Erev, 
Wallsten, & Neal 1991). A transformation of the case company’s current qualitative risk 
assessment method to a semi-quantitative method with its verbal expressions scaled to 
numerical probability and outcome ranges, enables its staff to engage both in rule-based 
reasoning in the numerical mode and associative and intuitive thinking in the verbal 
mode. 
In this field study we demonstrate how to design a semi-quantitative risk analysis with a 
solid decision theoretic foundation. The focus of this study is on one source of uncertainty 
(a group of events resulting in financial claims) and contrasted two modes of uncertainty 
representation (numerical versus verbal expressions). While rating scales in risk management 
appear to be entirely based on introspective judgments, our application of prospect theory to 
verbal expressions allows us to derive rating scales entirely from a decision maker’s revealed 
choices. The field accommodates an abundance of sources of uncertainty, a variety of modes 
of uncertainty representation, and numerous companies that are currently engaged in risk 
management. This offers a clear and present opportunity for decision theorists to study 
risk in daily-life while at the same time provide a relevant contribution to the management 
of risk.

153
7 Curbing Risk Appetite with Performance-based Incentives
Summary
This chapter reports the results of a laboratory experiment among lecturers of the Rotterdam 
University of Applied Sciences that was designed to test the effect of performance-based 
financial incentives on the participants’ efficient use of risk management resources and on 
their effectiveness in assuring that financial buffers exceed the losses that they sustain. The 
experiment is designed around the risk matrix, a tool commonly used in risk management 
to visualize the portfolio of risks that an entity faces. A fixed incentive scheme induced an 
averse appetite to risk in the risk matrix and a variable incentive scheme promoted a neu-
tral risk appetite. In comparison with the fixed scheme, participants were under a variable 
scheme equally effective in assuring that losses are absorbed by financial buffers but were 
significantly more efficient in their use of risk management resources. Participants could 
have attained more optimum levels of efficiency and effectiveness by choosing to reduce risk 
by impact reduction instead of probability reduction. 
7.1 Introduction
In the wake of high-profile company failures and preventable large losses, the mid-1990s 
saw the dawn of a systematic and integrated approach to the management of all risks that a 
company faces, called enterprise risk management (Dickinson 2001). The premise under-
lying enterprise risk management (ERM) is that every entity exists to provide value for its 
stakeholders and, faced by risk and opportunity that have the potential to erode or enhance 
value, needs to determine how much uncertainty it accepts in order to grow stakeholder 
value. The relationship between enterprise risk management and value is formulated by the 
COSO-ERM (2004) framework as follows:
“Enterprise risk management enables management to effectively deal with uncertainty 
and associated risk and opportunity, enhancing the capacity to build value. Value is 
maximized when management sets strategy and objectives to strike an optimal balance 
between growth and return goals and related risks, and efficiently and effectively de-
ploys resources in pursuit of the entity’s objectives.” (p.3)
Empirical evidence on the relation between enterprise risk management and firm value is 
mixed, finding either a positive relationship (Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011, Gordon, Loeb, & 
Tseng 2009) or the absence of any value added compared to traditional risk management 
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practices (McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov 2011). While enterprise risk management aims 
to provide a “reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” (COSO 
2004 p.4), its criticasters argue that this assurance is at best limited and illusory at worst, 
resulting in “the risk management of nothing” (Power 2009).
According to COSO-ERM, maximization of stakeholder value is conditional on 
the efficient and effective deployment of an entity’s resources (see the aforementioned 
quote from COSO). This implies that resources available for risk management should 
be used efficiently and effectively as well. The entity’s risk appetite, i.e. its willingness 
to accept potential losses in the pursuit of value (COSO 2004 p.6), is managed by an 
entity by striking a balance between the efficiency and effectiveness of risk management. 
The management of this organizational risk appetite is considered to be one of the least 
mature competencies of organizations (RIMS 2009, 2008, Spinard, Faris, Culp & Nunes 
2010) and a failure to manage risk appetite properly is seen as one of the causes of the 
2007–2009 financial crisis (McDonald 2009). Financial incentives, directed at aligning 
the actions of agents with the objectives of the principals of the organization, have since 
the crisis been blamed for stimulating an excessively large appetite for risk by neglecting 
low-probability, high-impact events (Edwards 2010 pp.255, 297). The resulting call for 
a compensation reform in risk management led to various legislative and regulatory ini-
tiatives that aimed at “balancing risk, performance and pay” (Reda 2009). To assess the 
value added of different incentives for the risk management of an enterprise this chapter 
explores experimentally the effect of two very different financial incentive schemes on 
risk appetite, the efficient use of risk management resources, and the effectiveness of 
maintaining sufficiently large financial buffers to absorb losses.
The study reports the choices of 34 lecturers from the Rotterdam University of 
Applied Sciences who participated in an experiment designed to test these effects, as a 
prelude to future artifactual field experiments (Harrison & List 2004). The study em-
ployed a fixed incentive scheme, which awarded a fixed fee contingent on the participant 
being able to effectively avoid default, and a variable incentive scheme that awarded a 
percentage of the participant’s risk management resources that remained at the end of the 
experiment. The results indicate that the fixed incentive scheme induced an averse appe-
tite to risk and that a variable incentive scheme promoted a neutral risk appetite. Under 
the variable incentive condition participants were able to accomplish the same level of 
effectiveness in a more efficient way. However, in neither compensation scheme partici-
pants attained a choice that would have maximized their earnings potential. 
This study contributes to the design of institutions which provide proper incentives 
for economic agents, which is a central theme in economics (Laffont & Martimort 2002 
p.1) and as old as economics itself (Laffont 2003 p.xi). The principal-agent theory of 
incentives has up to now motivated empirical studies in risk management that employ 
general indicators of risk, such as investment in R & D, leverage, stock volatility, and 
derivatives usage (e.g. Coles, Daniel, & Naveen 2006, Daníelsson, Jorgensen, & De 
Vries 2002, Rogers 2002, Tufano 1996). Our experimental design allows us to study 
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in detail how participants choose to manage specific risks by reducing their impact and 
probability and is arranged around the risk matrix, a popular risk management tool. This 
novel experimental set-up allows us to study when participants prefer impact reduction, 
as in studies on insurance, and when they choose to reduce a risk’s probability of occur-
rence, which is a more preventive control measure. Our study contributes to the ongoing 
debate about the role of performance-based incentive schemes in risk management by 
assessing the effectiveness of two very dissimilar incentive schemes in curbing excessive 
risk taking as well as excessive expenditure on risk management. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the disputed role of per-
formance-based incentives and their hypothesized influence on organizational risk appetite. 
The third section discusses the empirical finding of risk seeking for losses in relation orga-
nizational risk appetite. The fourth section describes the experimental design, the optimum 
choices that maximize the earnings potential of participants in the experiment and develops 
the hypotheses for this experimental study. In the fifth section the results of the experiment 
are analyzed. These results are discussed in the final section. Appendices contain additional 
figures, proofs and computer codes for data-fitting.
7.2 Performance-based incentives and organizational risk appetite
This section discusses how the public and the professional community’s attitude towards 
the use of performance-based incentives in risk management has changed because of the 
2007–2009 financial crisis. Next the influence of incentives on risk taking are discussed 
from the viewpoint of principal-agent theory. 
7.2.1  The influence of the 2007–2009 financial crisis on performance- 
based incentives
Performance-based compensation packages have been blamed for excessive risk-taking prac-
tices in the financial sector during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. In the USA this has led regu-
latory agencies to jointly issue a guidance on incentive compensation for banks (Cai, Cherny, 
& Milbourn 2010) and in the UK this had led to the introduction of a new Financial Services 
Bill which aims to promote effective risk management by regulating financial sector re-
muneration (Stilitz 2011, Smith 2010, Wighton 2009). The reason why performance-
based compensation schemes allegedly gave an incentive to gamble, is their asymmetric 
pay-off structure which allows management to share in the organizational gains but does 
not let them share equally in its losses (Edwards 2010 p.286, Panning 2008). When based 
on general performance measures, such as current year income, these incentives align 
the motivation of those responsible for risk management with the rest of management 
(Lindorff 2009). Instead of inducing a more conservative stance towards risk such an in-
centive scheme improperly motivates those responsible for risk management to take on a 
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more aggressive and entrepreneurial role and “chances are that they will cut corners in order 
to maximize profits” (Taleb, Goldstein, & Spitznagel 2009 p.81).
Because of their presumed detrimental effects on risk management, there is a call for 
a reform of performance-based incentives. At the executive level this reform is poised to 
encourage executives to focus on and commit to the long-term value of the firm, by means 
of restricted stock, restricted stock options (Bhagat & Romano 2009), indexing, and claw-
backs (Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala, & Senbet 2010). At lower organizational levels 
reform initiatives aim to tie incentives to specific performance measures of secondary manag-
ers (Schwarcz 2009) and key professionals who are able to directly influence the risk profile 
of the organization (Taylor 2007). Some authors emphasize the continuing importance of 
performance-based incentives for risk management because they believe that the “systemic-
risk-generating incentives”, which have caused the financial crisis, are still intact and cannot 
be curbed by more rules and regulation (Edwards 2010 p.255). Contrary to a move “from in-
centives to controls”, as suggested by the subtitle of Lam’s (2003) textbook on enterprise risk 
management, this suggests a move in the opposite direction. A reformation in performance-
based incentives is believed to be able to induce desirable behavior in economic agents and 
contribute to the avoidance of catastrophic risk management failures.
Best practice guidelines in enterprise risk management advise companies to create and 
promote incentives and disincentives for risk management throughout the firm, with features 
that influence individual behavior and assure that staff members are focused on optimizing 
risk on a day-to-day basis (Hoffman 2002 p.167, best practice #9 ). However, it is argued that 
the more such an incentive scheme is based on quantitative performance measures, the more 
it distorts and corrupts the action patterns and thoughts of the individuals it is intended 
to monitor, and causes them to commit actions that are accountable but not responsible 
(Darley 1994, Darley’s Law). Based on this argument an incentive scheme should be com-
posed of an appropriate blend of rules and subjectivity, in which incentives are reinvested in 
the company, and can be forfeited afterwards (Koenig 2006). Designing incentive schemes 
in risk management that reward desirable behavior with compensation, requires more 
understanding of how humans respond to incentives (Koenig 2008 p.12).
7.2.2 The influence of compensation on risk taking
Many economic studies have investigated the “behavior-altering abilities of incentives” (Skog 
2009 p.6) albeit with a completely opposite concern in mind: the problem that the degree 
of risk taking by the agent is less than that desired by the principal. In this principal-agent 
incentive conflict the agent, unable to diversify risks specific to her managerial wealth (sal-
ary, bonus, shares) and human capital tied up in the firm (firm-specific competencies), acts 
risk averse, in fear of losing this capital, and does not maximize the value of the organization 
(Smith & Stulz 1985, managerial self-interest hypothesis). Shareholders, being able diversify 
their personal wealth, are assumed to be risk-neutral (Milgrom & Roberts 2000) whereas 
executives, precluded from effectively diversifying employment and personal wealth risk, 
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are assumed to be risk-averse (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Executives who, for self interested 
reasons, avoid taking risk do this, assuming large returns accrue to large risks (Sharpe 1964), 
at the expense of organizational returns. Principal-agent theory suggests that incentive pay 
has the potential to align the risk preference of executives with those of shareholders by 
curbing executive opportunism and discouraging risk aversion (Devers, Cannella, & Yoder 
2007 pp.1025, 1028).
Theoretical models in principal-agent theory suggests several ways in which incentive 
pay can aid in solving the problem of self-interested unobservable behavior by the agent, 
also known as moral hazard (see Prendergast 1999 for a literature overview and Laffont & 
Martimort 2002 for a textbook treatment). In an incentive scheme in which the compen-
sation of the agent is a linear function of performance, the sensitivity (slope) and fixed fee 
component (intercept) of this line influence risk-taking by the agent. A high sensitivity to 
performance promotes risk-taking and a high fixed fee promotes risk-aversion (Holmstrom 
& Milgrom 1987, 1991). The result of this linear function of performance can be approxi-
mated by a two-wage scheme which pays a fixed fee (bonus) unless performance is below a 
threshold in which case a very low fee is paid (Holmstrom & Hilgrom 1987 pp.305–306). 
Less risk aversion can be induced in the agent by making her incentives a more convex func-
tion of the measure of performance (Ross 2004 p.224). This is comparable with owning 
a call option, i.e. a right to buy a security, where performance below the threshold results 
in a flat reward (out-of-the-money) while rewards increase sharply when above this hurdle 
(in-the-money). Call options on the stock of the entity only offer upside potential and limit 
downside risk, resulting in the aforementioned asymmetric pay-off structure. The intro-
duction of a maximum limit on rewards (cap) can prevent unwanted excessive risk taking 
while excessive risk aversion, which results in low performance, can be penalized by intro-
ducing a minimum reward (floor) and a bonus which is triggered only when performance 
exceeds a particular hurdle rate (Grinblat & Titman 1989 p.819). 
Several empirical, archival-based studies on the efficacy of incentive pay in aligning 
the risk preferences of executives and shareholders find that stock option pay encourages 
CEOs to undertake riskier investments (Datta, Iskander-Datta, & Raman 2001, Rajgopal 
& Shevlin 2002, Sanders 2001) while stock ownership negatively influences risk taking 
(Sanders 2001). However, in other studies high levels of stock option awards were found 
to have a negative effect on risk-taking (Chen & Ma 2011, Knopf, Nam, & Thorton 
2002), and, unless firms were well-governed, stock option pay did not result in risk pref-
erence alignment (Desai & Dharmapala 2006). The behavioral agency model (Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejia 1998, BAM) challenges principal-agent theory’s simplistic depictions of 
risk by suggesting that certain decision situations (e.g., monitoring, problem framing, and 
performance) differentially influence executive risk taking. BAM assumes executives to be 
loss averse, such that their desire to minimize losses exceeds their desire to maximize gains, 
which is descriptively more accurate than the more normatively oriented assumption of 
risk aversion adopted in principal-agent theory. Most theoretical models in the executive 
compensation research literature assume a normative rather than a descriptive executive 
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risk attitude and empirical studies use ambiguous proxies for executive risk preferences. 
The influence of compensation on risk taking therefore largely remains an open question 
(Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder 2007 pp.1040–1041).
7.3 Risk preference in the domain of losses and organizational risk appetite
Experimental studies on decision making under risk typically report risk aversion in the do-
main of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman 
1992, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, prospect theory). The empirical finding of risk seeking 
in the domain of losses suggests that humans, given a choice between a risky and a sure loss 
with the same mathematical expectation, generally tend to behave in a risk seeking manner 
by choosing the risky alternative. This descriptive finding of risk seeking for losses is in stark 
contrast with the content of textbooks on risk management that typically employ expected 
loss calculations, which assume a risk neutral decision maker (e.g. Coleman 2012, Crouhy, 
Galai, & Mark 2006, Lam 2003). Recent risk management failures have led some authors 
in risk management to promote the adoption of a more averse attitude to risk whereby more 
attention is assigned to low probability – high impact events (Edwards 2010 footnote 35, Ai 
& Brockett 2008, Taleb 2007). Risk averse behavior is also promoted by the aforementioned 
new remuneration rules that emerged from the financial crisis (Wighton 2009). These rules 
specify that the ratio of variable to fixed fees in the compensation of the executive should be 
decreased while the absolute level of the executive’s fixed fee should be increased (Smith 2010 
p.38). This lower sensitivity of compensation to the entity’s performance will make the 
executive incentive scheme under the new remuneration rules less convex and, according to 
principal-agent theory, stimulate risk averse behavior. The inherent stimulus in these new 
remuneration rules to promote risk aversion can then be interpreted as a method to curb the 
general tendency of humans to be risk seeking in the domain of losses.
The empirical finding from decision theory that decision makers are risk seeking in 
the domain of losses derives from stand-alone risk and need not necessarily apply to the 
context of organizational risk appetite, which is concerned with portfolio risk.117 In decision 
theory the decision maker evaluates pairs of one-shot events whereas in risk management a 
portfolio of multiple risky events is evaluated. In choice experiments in the laboratory typi-
cally only one randomly selected choice is played for real whereas this luxury is not available 
in the reality of risk management. Survival of the organization during a particular period 
depends on the final outcome of all risky events in a portfolio taken together. Portfolio risk 
117  In this paper a portfolio choice is defined as a choice between two different sets of lotteries. This definition 
differs from that employed by Charness and Gneezy (2009) who define portfolio choice as the decision on 
“how much to invest in a risky asset”. In their experimental framework this emanates to investing in indi-
vidual lotteries contrary to sets of lotteries.
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thus seems to be more concerned with final wealth, while stand-alone risk is concerned with 
the gains and losses associated with individual lotteries. 
The steady pace of making a large number of consecutive choices in experimental stud-
ies and the typical absence of calculative aids in the laboratory promotes the use of an intui-
tive, reactive, quick and holistic system of thinking. This system, referred to as System 1, 
relies on cognitive heuristics to arrive at judgments and is particularly helpful when immedi-
ate action is required (Evans 2003). Actual decisions in risk management can be based on 
System 1 thinking but can alternatively be based on System 2 thinking, which is the delib-
erative, reflective, computational and rule governed system of thinking. System 2 is helpful 
when one encounters unfamiliar situations and when there is no time pressure. While the 
experimental finding of risk seeking for losses is induced under conditions that promote 
System 1 thinking, these conditions can be very different from the circumstances under 
which decisions about organizational risk appetite are made. 
Decisions on organizational risk appetite are made by professional decision makers 
whose age profile and expertise differs considerably from that of the average participant 
in a laboratory experiment. It is an unresolved empirical question whether age has a sig-
nificant influence on risk preferences in the domain of losses. Evidence on age-differences 
in the domain of monetary losses is mixed, reporting for similar decision tasks either 
no significant effect of age (Rönnlund, Karlsson, Laggnäs, Larsson, & Lindström 2005, 
Mayhorn, Fisk, & Whittle 2002) or a significant age difference with only young adults 
exhibiting risk seeking behavior (Mikels & Reed 2009). Age-related differences are at-
tributed to an age-related decline in some aspects of attention, memory, learning, and 
cognitive control as well as motivational and affective changes (see for a meta-analysis 
Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig 2011). Older adults show less responsiveness to 
losses relative to younger adults (Samanez-Larkin, Gibbs, Khanna, Nielsen, Carstensen, 
& Knutson 2007) and while younger adults strive for gains, older adults appear more 
likely to work toward preventing losses (Ebner, Freund, & Baltes 2006). Experimental 
evidence suggests that professional experience has a significant effect on performance in 
complex decision problems (Abdolmohammadi & Wright 1987) and when the contextual 
setting of the experiment is familiar to the “expert” decision maker (Dyer, Kagel, & Levin 
1989, Cooper, Kagel, Lo, & Gu 1999). In addition it is argued that differences may oc-
cur when professional and social conventions and norms play a significant role in reality 
(Potters & Van Winden 2000, Carpenter, Burks, & Verhoogen 2005). From these empiri-
cal findings it is concluded that both age and expertise potentially have a profound influ-
ence on decisions with respect to risk appetite.
Decisions on organizational risk appetite are made in the context of portfolio risk, in 
an environment in which both intuitive and reflective thinking systems can be employed, 
and are made by experienced and older adult decision makers. On these three characteristics 
decisions on organizational risk appetite differ considerably from usual laboratory experi-
ments that typically assess risk preferences for stand-alone risk only, involving inexperienced, 
young adult decision makers under conditions that promote the use of intuitive thinking. 
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It is therefore unclear whether the finding of risk seeking in the domain of losses applies in 
the decision context of organizational risk appetite. 
7.4 Experimental design
This section contains an experimental design that enables us to directly observe the influence 
of compensation on the risk preference of the participant and assess whether the finding of 
risk seeking in the domain of losses applies in the context of organizational risk appetite. 
The design allows us to assess the effect of two very different financial incentive schemes 
on the risk appetite of the participants, their effectiveness in maintaining sufficiently large 
financial buffers to absorb losses, and their efficient use of risk management resources. First 
definitions for the effective and efficient use of risk management resources are provided. 
Then the experimental task is introduced which requires participants to simultaneously 
manage the risk of a portfolio of 25 mutually independent random loss events. Drawing 
on Monte Carlo simulation techniques we then identify a set of optimal choices along an 
efficient frontier. Next a fixed and variable incentive scheme is introduced and hypotheses 
for the influence of these conditions on the choices of the participants are formulated. At the 
end of the section details on the execution of the experiment are presented.
7.4.1 The experimental task
We design an experimental task in which participants face a portfolio of 25 mutually inde-
pendent lotteries with negative financial consequences only. The experimental task requires 
participants to decide between reducing and accepting the inherent risk of the lotteries in 
this portfolio and thus demands them to express their risk appetite, i.e. their willingness to 
accept potential losses in the pursuit of value. Contrary to conventions in decision theory 
participants do not face the 25 lotteries consecutively but instead evaluate them simultane-
ously. The task accommodates two different responses to risk.
Enterprise risk management identifies four risk responses –  avoiding, reducing, sharing, 
or accepting risk – that can be used in the management of risk (COSO 2004 p.3). Avoiding 
risk implies that the activity from which the risk originates is completely terminated. Risk 
is reduced when the entity takes action to reduce either the probability of occurrence or the 
impact of a risky event. Risk sharing, by means of insurance, outsourcing, and partnerships, 
allows the entity to share risk with other parties. Finally, accepting risk means that an entity 
does not take any further action to control risk and uses its financial buffers to absorb the 
consequences of risk. For the purpose of this chapter we refer to the entity’s expenditure on 
risk reduction efforts as the ex ante use of risk management resources. The expenses made 
from the entity’s financial buffers to absorb the losses that occur when the anticipated risky 
events become manifest, even after risk reduction efforts have been taken, are referred to as 
the ex post use of risk management resources. 
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For each lottery participants choose between two risk responses, to reduce or to accept risk, 
and they are therefore not allowed to share or avoid any lottery. Each participant receives 
a fixed budget that they divide between expenditures on risk reduction (ex ante use of risk 
management resources) and the maintenance of a financial buffer that can be used for the 
absorption of losses (ex post use of risk management resources). By making expenditures on 
risk reduction participants reduce the initial probability and negative impact levels of the 
lotteries in the portfolio to a level that they consider acceptable. These ex ante expenditures 
do, however, reduce the financial buffer that remains for the ex post absorption of losses. 
Participants are thus required to trade-off the ex ante use of risk management resources, 
which is a sure expenditure, with the ex post use of these resources, which is uncertain. Once 
the participant has determined the final probability and impact level for each lottery in the 
portfolio, which can also be its initial level, the participant accepts the final lottery composi-
tion of the portfolio. Once the portfolio is accepted a single draw is taken from each of its 25 
lotteries. The total negative financial impact that results from this simultaneous draw from 
all 25 lotteries determines the ex post use of risk management resources. When the amount 
of required ex post risk management resources exceeds the financial buffer of the participant, 
the participants loses. If the financial buffer is sufficient to cover the total impact of the lot-
tery draws, the participant wins. From the group of winning participants only one partici-
pant is randomly selected and paid out for real. The size of the financial reward depends on 
the incentive scheme that the participant has been randomly assigned to. 
The experimental task is programmed in VBA for MS Excel and is designed around the risk 
matrix, which is a tool commonly used in risk management to visualize the portfolio of risky 
events that an entity faces. The screenshot in figure 7.1 shows the two risk matrices that are used 
in the experiment to elicit choices from the participants. 
Both matrices show five probability levels (s) on the vertical axis and five levels of nega-
tive financial impact (i ) on the horizontal axis. In the left matrix the 25 lotteries, signified by 
the symbol “x”, are uniformly distributed over the 25 cells of the risk matrix. Each cell in this 
five-by-five matrix contains a binary lottery x = ( p
s
 : x
i
, 0) with .05 ≤ p
s
 ≤ .8 and -80 ≤ x
i
 ≤ 
-5.118 The complementary probability that there is no negative financial impact, (1 - p
s 
), is 
understood and is not explicitly mentioned in the risk matrix. By clicking on a cell in the left 
risk matrix participants select a lottery which initial probability or impact level they want to 
reduce and by consecutively clicking on a cell in the right matrix they select a final probabil-
ity and/or impact level for this lottery. When next the button “move the cross” is clicked on, 
the lottery moves in the left matrix from its original position to its new destination. Moving 
a lottery one cell leftward or downward halves the expected loss of this lottery. The cost of 
such a move is 5K. For each destination cell the right matrix displays the cost of moving the 
selected lottery to its new destination. The budget available for risk reduction (i.e. moving 
lotteries) and risk absorption in the experiment is in total 300K. Moving a selected lottery 
118 All monetary amounts are expressed in euro.
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upward or to the right is not possible. Depending on her risk appetite the participant can 
move any number of lotteries to any destination available, provided that her budget is still 
sufficient to accommodate these moves. While the cost of each move remains constant at 
5K, the benefits of risk reduction decrease incrementally. This implies that the risk matrix 
in figure 7.1 exhibits marginal diminishing returns with risk reduction effort, an assump-
tion used by several other authors in risk management (Cooper, Grey, Raymond, & Walker 
2005 fig. 6.4 p.81, Li, Pollard, Kendall, Soane, & Davies 2009 fig. 2 p.1731, Daníelsson, 
Jorgensen, & De Vries 2002 p.1411). 
Figure 7.1 displays an example in which the cell of the lottery that is to be moved, at 
the intersection of p
5
 = .8 and x
5
 = -80K, is highlighted in both risk matrices. In addi-
tion the right risk matrix highlights the destination cell for this lottery, at the intersection 
of p
3
 = .2 and x
4
 = -40K, together with the ex ante expenditure of 15K that effectuates 
the three-step lottery move from its original position (.8 : -80, 0) to its new destination 
(.2 : -40, 0). Participants were randomly assigned to either the matrix format presented 
in figure 7.1 or a format in which the axes for probability and impact were swapped. This 
alternation was introduced to exclude the possibility that a particular presentation of the 
axes would bias the experimental results.
Figure 7.1 Left side screenshot of the computer program used to elicit choices.
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The screenshot in figure 7.2 shows two bar-charts and a box with summary information, 
which are located on the right side of the risk matrices shown in figure 7.1. The box on the 
far right contains summary information on the budget that is still available, the cost of risk 
reduction, and the budget that remains after risk reduction. Both visually and in writing 
the bar-charts show the distribution of probability and impact of the selected lottery and its 
destination cell. In line with practices in risk management the cost of risk reduction is not 
integrated in the amounts of impact in the lower bar chart. Instead these costs are presented 
in the risk matrix on the right as well as the box with the summary information. 
7.4.2 Effective and efficient use of risk management resources
Prior to executing the experiment we explored which final lottery compositions of the port-
folio in the experimental task result in an effective and efficient use of risk management 
resources. For the purpose of this chapter the effective use of risk management resources is 
defined as attaining a desired level of assurance that losses do not exceed financial buffers. 
This desired level of assurance is specified by P (d > b) ≤ a in which P (d > b) represents the 
cumulative probability P that losses d exceed financial buffers b, with b, d > 0, and a rep-
resents the desired level of assurance, with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. We define efficiency as the minimum 
use of risk management resources, consisting of both ex ante and ex post expenditures, to 
obtain a specific level of assurance. We identify an efficient final lottery composition by the 
minimum sum of ex ante expenditure c and ex post expenditure d (i.e. losses that manifest 
themselves) that attains a desired level of assurance, i.e. inf {c + d | P (d > b) ≤ a}. In our 
experiment the size of the financial buffer is b = 300K - c.
We constructed 251 final lottery compositions and determined for each the ex ante 
expenditure c and three cumulative distribution functions for the ex post expenditure d 
Figure 7.2 Right side screenshot of the computer program used to elicit choices.
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based on Monte Carlo simulations of 10,000 independent lottery draws each. For each 
final lottery composition the three cumulative distribution functions were used to calcu-
late average values of the mean use of risk management resources µ(c + d ), the standard 
deviation of the use of risk management resources σ(c + d ), and the probability that 
losses exceed the financial buffer P (d > b). Figure 7.3 displays results of these 251 final 
lottery compositions with the probability of exceeding budget P (d > b) on the horizontal 
axis and the mean use of risk management resources µ(c + d ), presented in negative val-
ues, on the vertical axis.119 The starting position of participants in the experimental task, 
i.e. the status quo where no risk reduction expenditures have yet been made, is displayed 
by the horizontal dashed line expressing a level of ex post losses of 240.25K and a vertical 
dashed line expressing the corresponding probability of exceeding financial buffers of 
20.8%. An efficient frontier displays for each level of assurance the most efficient mean 
use of risk management resources. The most efficient and effective final lottery composi-
tions on the efficient frontier, which we refer to as efficiency 1st and effectiveness 1st, are 
respectively indicated by the symbols ∆ and . Table 7.1 presents the µ(c + d ), σ(c + d ), 
and P (d > b) values for the final lottery compositions of the status quo, “efficiency 1st” 
and “effectiveness 1st”.
Figure 7.3 Comparison of the mean use of risk management resources, µ(c + d ), and the proba-
bility that losses exceed the financial buffer, P (d > b), for 251 final lottery compositions (displayed 
are average values resulting from three Monte Carlo simulations with n = 10,000 performed 
in @Risk).
119   In figure 7.8 in appendix A an additional scatter diagram is presented for comparison of µ(c + d ) with 
σ(c + d ).
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Table 7.1  Mean use of risk management resources, µ(c + d ), the probability that losses exceed the 
financial buffer, P(d > b), and the standard deviation of the use of risk management re-
sources, σ(c + d ), of the status quo, “efficiency 1st” and “effectiveness 1st” final portfolio 
compositions (displayed are average values resulting from three Monte Carlo simulations 
with n = 10,000 performed in @Risk).
µ(c + d ) P(d > b) σ(c + d )
status quo -240K .208 77K
efficiency 1st -162K .016 59K
effectiveness 1st -182K .002 37K
On the criteria mentioned in table 7.1 the status quo is dominated by the “efficiency 1st” 
and “effectiveness 1st” final lottery compositions. A comparison of the marginal cost of risk 
reduction with its marginal benefit, expressed as changes in the risk’s expected value (EV), 
allows one to identify efficient levels of risk reduction (Vaughan 1997 p.67). “Efficiency 1st” 
consists of moving six lotteries in the top-right corner of figure 7.1, each characterized by 
an expected loss of 16K or higher, to the top-to-right diagonal in the risk matrix defined 
by an expected loss of 8K. In this composition the lowest mean use of risk management 
resources, i.e. 162K, is attained. Given this minimum expected loss, the smallest attainable 
probability that losses exceed the financial buffer is 1.6%, which is effected by moving all six 
lotteries to the left, which reduces their impact. While the selection of lotteries to transfer 
is under “efficiency 1st” consistent with risk neutrality, the choice to reduce the impact of 
these lotteries instead of their probability is consistent with risk aversion (see Appendix B for 
proof ). In “effectiveness 1st” the aforementioned six lotteries are all transferred to the -10K 
column. In addition the two lowest-probability lotteries in the –80K column are transferred 
to the -20K column. This lottery move is both in the selection of lotteries as well as the 
direction of their transfer consistent with a risk averse attitude. We expect that many par-
ticipants will not be able to attain the optima on the efficient frontier in figure 7.2 because 
µ(c + d ) and P(d > b) are not directly observable in the experiment which makes it hard for 
them to realize optimum choices.
The cumulative distribution functions of the final lottery compositions in table 7.1 
are presented in figure 7.4. The slopes of the curves indicate the degree of risk aversion of 
the three lottery compositions: the steeper the slope, the more risk averse. Inspection of the 
intersection of the curves with the vertical line at -300K reveals the large difference between 
the probability of exceeding budget in the status quo and “effectiveness 1st”.
7.4.3 Incentive conditions
To assess the influence of performance-based incentives on the performance of participants 
in the experimental task we elicit their risk appetite under two very different incentive con-
ditions, a fixed and a variable incentive scheme. Participants are randomly assigned to either 
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of these two conditions. When the amount of funds needed to absorb losses exceeds the 
financial buffer that remains after risk reduction, participants in both conditions lose their 
eligibility for payment of a personal financial reward. When the financial buffer is not ex-
ceeded then participants remain eligible for receiving a personal fixed fee of 2,067 in the 
fixed incentive condition. When in the variable incentive condition the financial buffer is 
not exceeded, the participants remain eligible for receiving a personal fee of .015 of the 
financial buffer that remains after absorption of losses, which implies a maximum fee of 
4,500.120 Eligible participants enter a random lottery that selects one participant who is paid 
out for real. 
The fixed fee is performance-contingent in the sense that the variability of this compen-
sation depends on the performance of the participant in assuring that losses do not exceed 
the financial buffer. Under this fixed incentive scheme the optimum risk management effort 
for the participant is one which would almost eliminate the probability of losses exceeding 
the financial buffer, regardless of its cost (Han 1996 p.382, Kim, Nam, & Thornton 2008 
p.230). Under the fixed incentive scheme a principal, deliberately or not, allows the agent 
to aim for an optimum in effectiveness in which efficiency is completely ignored (Van den 
Brink 2007 p.2, Daníelsson, Jorgensen, & De Vries 2002 p.1410). A fixed incentive scheme 
120  When the participant decides not to move any lottery and incurs no losses then the participant is eligible for 
receiving a financial reward of .015 300K = 4,500. Monte Carlo simulations in @Risk indicate that the lowest 
expected loss in the experimental task is -162.25K. Given our aim to provide a high incentive of around 2K, we 
decided for the fixed fee on the amount 2,067 derived from the calculation .015 × (300K - 162.25K).
Figure 7.4 Cumulative distribution functions of the status quo, “efficiency 1st” and “effectiveness 1st” 
lottery compositions.
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provides a disincentive for under spending this budget and creates an incentive for demand-
ing budget raises. Similar to up front high compensation, it on the other hand prevents the 
agent from seeking overly ambitious, difficult-to-implement strategies (Dow and Raposo’s 
2005 pp.2704, 2718, ex ante contracting). In figure 7.3 the optimum choice under the fixed 
incentive scheme is the “effectiveness 1st” lottery composition indicated by the symbol  on 
the efficient frontier. 
In both the fixed and variable incentive conditions participants, assuming self-interest, 
strive for effectiveness. Participants in the variable incentive condition are in addition inter-
ested to use risk management resources efficiently because more efficient use implies that a 
higher personal financial reward can be earned. Because risk reduction is costly, a variable 
incentive scheme curbs excessive risk aversion while excessive risk taking is curbed because 
the size of the allocated budget acts as a natural cap on rewards. In comparison with the fixed 
incentive scheme the risk manager in the variable scheme bears more risk and her incentives 
are to a much higher degree tied to her performance (Han 1996 p.382). Under the variable 
incentive scheme optimum lottery compositions are located somewhere on the efficient 
frontier depending on the trade-off that the participant makes between an efficient and an 
effective use of risk management resources.
Section 7.2 concluded that the influence of compensation on risk taking largely remains an 
open empirical question. The influence of performance-based incentives on the participants’ 
risk appetite and efficient and effective use of risk management resources is in this experiment 
tested on the basis of the following three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is derived from the 
prediction from the theory of incentives that a fixed fee relative to a variable fee induces more 
risk aversion in the agent. Both the recent thrust towards risk averse regulation and the call 
for behavioral instruments to curb excessive risk seeking behavior warrant further empirical 
investigation of this prediction in the context of organizational risk appetite. 
Hypothesis 1:  In the fixed incentive condition the agent’s risk appetite exhibits more risk 
aversion than in the variable incentive condition. 
The other two hypotheses are related to the efficient and effective use of risk management 
resources and state that comparatively a fixed fee promotes effectiveness and a variable fee 
promotes efficiency.
Hypothesis 2a:  In the variable incentive condition efficiency in the use of risk manage-
ment resources is attained to a higher degree than in the fixed incentive 
condition.
Hypothesis 2b:  In the fixed incentive condition effectiveness in the use of risk manage-
ment resources is attained to a higher degree than in the variable incentive 
condition.
Section 7.3 concluded that risk seeking behavior in the context of organizational risk 
appetite remains open empirical question as well. We therefore, in addition, address 
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in this experiment the question to what degree individual choices that are made in a 
portfolio context correspond with the empirical finding of risk seeking in the domain 
of losses.
7.4.4 Details of the experiment
The teaching staff of the Rotterdam University of Applied Sciences was invited by e-mail to 
participate in a study in which a game was to be played which offered the prospect of earning 
a substantial sum of money. This message informed participants that only one participant 
would be randomly selected for actual payment. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two incentive conditions and the two axis-presentations. Upon arrival participants 
watched individually a 20 minute video instruction on the game which was tailored to their 
incentive condition and axis-presentation. In an individual meeting with the experimenter 
they subsequently were allowed to ask questions and were interviewed in order to verify 
whether the instruction by video had been successful. Participants then played the game on 
an individual basis without any time-pressure and with the possibility to use calculative aids. 
The experiment took place on December 16, 2011. A pilot test with student participants 
was carried out two months before the experiment. 
A few days after the experiment took place a single lottery draw was taken for each 
participant from all of the 25 lotteries in their final destination to determine how much 
financial impact was sustained by each of the participants. Lottery draws were made 
using Monte Carlo simulation software @Risk and were recorded on video. Out of the 
participants whose remaining budget was sufficient to absorb the financial impact of the 
draws one participant was randomly selected for receiving payment. Participants were 
subsequently informed by e-mail about their results and were provided with a web link 
to the video recordings of the drawing.
In total 36 staff members from a variety of departments participated in the 
study.121 Nine participants who intended to participate failed to show up. Out of the 
36 who did participate one quit the study during participation while the results of a 
participant who skipped parts of the video instruction and ignored instructions were 
excluded from the study. This study reports the results of the remaining 34 participants, 
24 male and 10 female. With an average age of 42 years, the age-profile of the partici-
pants is clearly different from that of regular laboratory experiments. Participants spent 
121  At the moment that the study ran teaching staff at the university amounted to approximately 2,000 members. 
Potential reasons why the number of participants in the experiment was low relative to the population size 
(1.8%) are the unfamiliarity of the teaching staff with acting as participants in research projects, the heavy 
teaching load at the university of applied sciences, a fair amount of part-time employees that do not work 
on Fridays, large travelling distances between university buildings, and heavy rain at the time the experiment 
took place. The background of the 36 participants was Finance (20), International business (3), Technical (3), 
Management (2), Marketing (2), Health (1), Social (1), Arts (1), and Media (1).
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on average 26 minutes on playing the game and between their arrival and departure on 
average 63 minutes lapsed. 
After finishing the experimental task participants were requested to state to what degree 
they concur with the following ten statements on a scale between 1 (fully agree) and 7 (fully 
disagree). 
Table 7.2 Questionnaire with ten statements.
1 I consider the size of the financial rewards that can be won in the game attractive.
2 I found it difficult to make choices in this game.
3 The choices I made during the game have reduced my chances on losing.
4 I find that the study has been clearly explained to me.
5 The prospect of winning the price stimulated me to think and act carefully.
6 My objective in playing the game was to minimize my chances on losing.
7 I find that I made daring choices during the game.
8 In playing the game it was my objective to maximize the difference between the buffer and 
the total financial impact.
9 In playing the game I made prudent choices.
10 In general I like to calculate.
Additionally participants were requested to state their age, sex, fulltime equivalent and 
department.
7.5 Results
We first discuss some general findings and then analyze several qualitative judgments 
of the participants in relation to the game. The effect of the incentives on risk appe-
tite (hypothesis 1) is assessed by independent and paired samples tests. On the basis of 
the performance of participants in the game and simulation statistics derived from this 
the effect of the incentive conditions on efficiency and effectiveness is assessed (hypothesis 
2a and 2b).
7.5.1 General findings
Participants spent on average 95K on moving lotteries in the game, µ(c), the mean financial 
impact they sustained was 98K, µ(d ), and the amount of funds remaining after sustaining 
this impact was on average 106K, µ(b - d ). For 3 participants funds were not sufficient to 
absorb impact. The potential earnings made by the participants were on average 1,783. The 
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two axis-presentations that were used in the experiment did not have a significant impact on 
the results of this study.122
7.5.2 Analysis of qualitative judgments in relation to the game
After reaffirming their choices in the game participants stated to what degree they concur 
with ten qualitative statements.123 From their responses the following inferences are made.
More than half of the participants fully agree that the financial rewards offered in the 
study are attractive (question 1: mean 2.38, SD 1.907). Even though participants on average 
neither agree nor disagree whether the prospect of winning a prize had stimulated them to 
think and act carefully (question 5: mean 3.47, SD 1.862), there is a positive relationship 
between judgments of the reward’s attractiveness and its perceived positive effect on careful 
participation in the game (Spearman correlation test, ρ = .591, p = .000).
Participants did in general agree with the game’s objective being “the minimization 
of one’s chances on losing” (question 6: mean 2.53, SD 1.796) but also with its objec-
tive being “the maximization of the difference between buffer and total financial impact” 
(question 8: mean 2.59, SD 1.794). The median responses to both objectives were not 
significantly different (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = .849) and were positively related 
(Spearman correlation test, ρ = .355, p = .039). In the fixed incentive condition par-
ticipants judge their choices as significantly more prudent than daring (question 9 vs 7). 
In the variable reward condition the same relationship did not prove to be significant 
(Wilcoxon signed rank tests, respectively p = .028 and p = .068).
A large majority of the participants indicated that the study had been clearly explained 
to them (question 4: mean 1.56, SD .960). Participants in the variable reward condition 
122  Given n = 25 cells and a significance level α = .05 for testing one hypothesis then a significance level of 
α = .05 / 25 = .002 is required for testing the significance for each cell (Bonferroni correction). The p-value 
for the distribution of cell (.2 : -10K, 0) was higher than this significance level (Mann-Whitney U test, 
p = .038). It was therefore concluded that there is no significant difference between the two axis-presentation 
formats.
123 Mean responses and standard deviations are mentioned between brackets.
 Q1) I consider the size of the financial rewards that can be won in the game attractive. (2.38, 1.907).
 Q2) I found it difficult to make choices in this game. (4.06, 2.117).
 Q3) The choices I made during the game have reduced my chances on losing. (3.03, 1.660).
 Q4) I find that the study has been clearly explained to me. (1.56, .960).
 Q5) The prospect of winning the price stimulated me to think and act carefully. (3.47, 1.862).
 Q6) My objective in playing the game was to minimize my chances on losing. (2.53, 1.796).
 Q7) I find that I made daring choices during the game. (4.47, 1.846).
 Q8)  In playing the game it was my objective to maximize the difference between the buffer and the total 
financial impact. (2.59, 1.794).
 Q9) In playing the game I made prudent choices. (3.09, 1.545).
 Q10) In general I like to calculate. (2.82, 1.817).
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were even more positive about the clarity of explanations in the study than in the fixed 
reward condition (Mann-Whitney U test, p = .001). Participants’ opinions regarding the 
difficulty of making decisions in the game were greatly dispersed and on average neutral 
(question 2: mean 4.06, SD 2.117). The assessment of difficulty was negatively associated 
with one’s preference for making calculations (ρ = -.565, p = .000).
7.5.3  The effect of incentive conditions on the expression of risk appetite in the  
risk matrix
In this section we describe the choices made by the participants under the variable and fixed 
reward conditions and use independent and paired sample tests to test hypothesis 1.
7.5.3.1 Independent samples tests
The median number of lotteries that remain in the matrix after participants have cho-
sen which lotteries to move are presented in figure 7.5 under variable and fixed incentive 
conditions.
Figure 7.5 Median number of lotteries that remain in the matrix after participants have moved lot-
teries under (a) the variable incentive and (b) the fixed incentive condition.
(a) (b)
Under the variable incentive condition the area in figure 7.5a that does not contain lotteries 
is bounded by a top-to-right diagonal which contains cells with identical expected values. 
The triangular shape of this area, symmetrically spaced along the probability and impact 
axes, is in conformity with expected value theory. In figure 7.5b, under the fixed incen-
tive condition, the number of cells that do not contain lotteries is larger and in addition 
suggests an aversion to low probability – high impact lotteries. Where in figure 7.5a the 
cells (.2 : -40K, 0) and (.1 : -80K, 0) contain respectively 2 and 0.5 lotteries, these low 
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probability – high impact cells do not contain any lotteries in figure 7.5b. The medians and 
the distribution of lotteries in cell (.2 : -40K, 0) in the two conditions are significantly dif-
ferent (Median test, p = .012; Mann-Whitney U test, p = .019). 
Interestingly the distributions of lotteries in cell (.05 : -5K, 0), the cell in the bottom-
left corner of the matrix, are in the fixed incentive condition significantly different from 
those in the variable incentive condition (Mann Whitney test, p = .008).124 Apparently the 
fixed reward stimulus conditioned some participants to take risk aversion to the extreme by 
choosing the destination which enabled maximum risk reduction. 
These observations on figure 7.5 are consistent with the hypothesis that the fixed 
incentive condition induces more risk aversion than the variable incentive condition. 
This impression is corroborated by the median number of lottery moves which with 
11.5 moves in the variable incentive condition is significantly lower than the 21.5 moves 
in the fixed incentive condition (Median test, p = .039).125 Median expenditure in the 
fixed incentive condition exceeds that in the variable reward condition by 50K, which 
entails 1/6th of the available budget. In the variable incentive condition the median num-
ber of lottery moves is equally distributed between downward moves along the prob-
ability axis and leftward moves along the impact axis, with respectively 5.5 and 5 and 
in the fixed incentive condition these numbers were respectively 8 and 12. The medians 
of both the number of moves along the probability axis as well as the number of moves 
along the impact axis are in the variable and fixed incentive conditions not significantly 
different from each other (Median tests, respectively p = .311 and p = .169). The pre-
liminary result of our analysis is that our first hypothesis cannot be rejected on the basis 
of independent samples tests. 
7.5.3.2 Paired samples tests
Our next step is to use paired samples tests to assess whether the number of lotteries 
in cells with identical mathematical expectation, which are located on the top-to-right 
diagonals of the matrix, is significantly different between pairs of cells. Even though lot-
teries on any of the diagonals from the top to the right side of the matrix have the same 
mathematical expectation, the cells on these diagonals differ in the maximum number of 
lotteries that they can accommodate. The maximum number of lotteries that each cell po-
tentially can receive is determined by their relative position to the other cells in the matrix 
in combination with the restriction that lotteries in the experiment can only be moved to 
the left and downward. These maxima are the smallest at the end points of each diagonal 
124  Even though the medians of cell (.05 : -5K, 0) are identical in both conditions, observation of the two 
distributions shows that for 7 out of the 16 participants in the fixed incentive condition this cell contains 
more than one lottery while in the variable incentive condition this is only true for 1 out of 18 participants. 
125  The distributions from which these medians are derived are significantly different between these two condi-
tions as well (Mann Whitney test, p = .010).
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Figure 7.6 Distribution of the maximum number of lotteries that each cell of the matrix potentially 
can receive (cells on the top-to-right diagonals are identical in expected value and share the same 
shading).
and largest at its center. Crosswise along the diagonal from the top-right downwards to 
the bottom-left they furthermore increase exponentially from zero to a maximum of 24 
(see figure 7.6). 
Under expected value theory cells in figure 7.6 with identical maxima are equally qualified 
as recipients of lotteries originating from other cells. Given that under expected value theory 
a move leftward or downward is equally preferred we can expect that the observed distribu-
tion of lotteries within the risk matrix will under risk neutrality follow the distribution of 
the maxima in figure 7.6. Any significant difference which runs opposite to this direction is 
then attributed to the risk preference of the participants. 
For each pair of cells along the top-to-right diagonals we assessed whether the num-
ber of lotteries contained in these cells was significantly different. The cells (.8 : -5K, 0) 
and (.05 : -80K, 0), both having the same expected value and identical maxima, differed 
significantly from each other in terms of the number of lotteries they contain (Sign test, 
n = 34, p = .021). Given that both the expected values and the maxima of these cells are 
the same, the preference for cell (.8 : -5K, 0) as a lottery destination over (.05 : -80K, 0) 
is interpreted as a risk averse preference. To indicate that the median difference in the 
observed number of lotteries between cells is significantly positive, we use the notation 
(.8 : -5K, 0)  (.05 : -80K, 0). For 7 pairs significant differences were found that direc-
tionally correspond with differences in the maxima of these cells and thus conform with 
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predictions under expected value theory.126 For the remaining 22 pairs nonparametric 
paired sample tests did not reveal significant differences.
The variable incentive condition revealed (.05 : -20, 0)  (.1 : -10, 0), a preference 
that runs opposite to the difference in the maxima of these cells (Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
n = 18, p = .038). In combination with the fact that the expected values of these cells are the 
same, this preference is interpreted as an indication of risk seeking behavior in the domain of 
losses. Significant differences that directionally correspond with differences in cell maxima 
were found for 7 pairs and none for the remaining 22 pairs.127
Our prediction that the fixed incentive condition induces risk aversion was confirmed by 
two significant differences, in particular (.8 : -10K, 0)  (.2 : -40K, 0) (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, n = 16, p = .029, one-sided) and (.8 : -10K, 0)  (.1 : -80K, 0) (Sign test, p = .035, one-
sided). Both in the full sample and in the variable incentive condition significant differences 
were found that directionally correspond with differences in cell maxima. Such differences 
were, however, completely absent in the fixed incentive condition. This is another indication 
that the distributions of lotteries under the two incentive conditions are clearly different.
The results of both the paired and independent samples test suggest that in the fixed in-
centive condition the risk appetite as expressed in the risk matrix exhibits more risk aversion 
than in the variable incentive condition. We therefore conclude that hypothesis 1 cannot be 
rejected.
7.5.4  The effect of incentive conditions on risk management efficiency and  
effectiveness
In order to assess the effect of the participants’ choices on the risk management objectives 
of efficiency (hypothesis 2a) and effectiveness (hypothesis 2b) we analyze their performance 
within the experiment itself and use their choices to derive Monte Carlo simulation statistics 
for µ(c + d ), σ(c + d ), and P (d > b).
126  After each pair comparison significance levels are mentioned between brackets. Unless otherwise stated use of 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests is assumed. The following seven significant results correspond directionally with 
what is to be expected on the basis of the maximum number of lotteries that each of the cells can contain 
under expected value theory. 
 (.4 : -20K, 0)  (.1 : -80K, 0) [p = .011], (.2 : -40K, 0)  (.1 : -80K, 0) [p = .018], 
 (.2 : -20K, 0)  (.8 : -5K, 0) [Sign test, p = .035], (.2 : -20K, 0)  (.4 : -10K, 0) [p = .030], 
 (.4 : -10K, 0)  (.05 : -80K, 0) [Sign test, p = .008], (.2 : -20K, 0)  (.1 : -40K, 0) [p = .020], 
 (.2 : -20K, 0)  (.05 : -80K, 0) [p = .010].
127  The following seven significant results correspond directionally with what is to be expected on the basis of the 
maximum number of lotteries that each of the cells can contain under expected value theory. 
 (.4 : -20K, 0)  (.8 : -10K, 0) [p = .039], (.2 : -40K, 0)  (.8 : -10K, 0) [p = .023], 
 (.4 : -20K, 0)  (.1 : -80K, 0) [p = .036], (.2 : -40K, 0)  (.1 : -80K, 0) [p = .004], 
 (.2 : -20K, 0)  (.8 : -5K, 0) [p = .031], (.4 : -10K, 0)  (.05 : -80K, 0) [p = .025], 
 (.2 : -20K, 0)  (.05 : -80K, 0) [p = .008].
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7.5.4.1 Performance of participants in the experiment
Between the two incentive conditions no differences were observed in the amount of losses 
sustained, the financial buffer that remains ex post, the number of participants for which 
losses exceeded their financial buffer, and their earnings (Mann-Whitney tests, respectively 
p = .717, p = .104, p = .058, p = .337).128
As already reported in the previous section expenditures on risk reduction are signifi-
cantly higher in the fixed incentive condition than in the variable incentive condition. For 
the variable incentive group this result is corroborated by the distribution of the empty 
median cells in figure 7.5a which corresponds with the marginal benefit-marginal cost 
rule (Vaughan 1997), while the distribution of empty cells for the fixed incentive group in 
figure 7.5b does not. This suggests that the fixed incentive is not promoting efficient use of 
resources and thus seems to confirm our hypothesis 2a.
This line of argumentation is, however, far from satisfactory for two reasons. For one, risk 
aversion implies that a sure loss is preferred to a risky loss with the same mathematical expec-
tation and thus by definition implies inefficient expenditure of resources in risk reduction. 
Second, efficient use of risk management resources implies that the combination of ex-ante risk 
reduction expenses and the ex-post absorption of losses is minimized. This suggests that the size 
of post-loss resources should be used as a measure of efficiency. However, this can just as well be 
construed as a measure for effectiveness which then blurs the distinction between the two ob-
jectives. In line with the definition of efficiency and effectiveness in section 7.4.2 hypotheses 2a 
and 2b are therefore in the next paragraph tested using simulation statistics.
7.5.4.2 Performance of participants on the basis of simulation statistics
Table 7.3 presents descriptive statistics of the Monte Carlo simulations for the status quo and 
the final lottery compositions of participants in the variable and fixed incentive conditions.
Table 7.3  Comparison of simulation statistics in the status quo with the median (mean) simula-
tion statistics in the variable and fixed incentive conditions of mean use of risk man-
agement resources, µ(c + d ), the probability of losses exceeding the financial buffer, 
P(d > b), and the standard deviation for use of risk management resources, σ(c + d).
µ(c + d) P(d > b) σ(c + d)
status quo -240K .21 77K
variable incentive condition -173K (-180K) .06 (.09) 78K (77K)
fixed incentive condition -194K (-210K) .06 (.11) 63K (65K)
128  The null-hypothesis that the distribution of earnings, i.e. the monetary amount which a participant would ob-
tain in case random selection indicated her as winner, is the same in both conditions could not be rejected on the 
basis of a Mann-Whitney U test (p = .337) but was rejected in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = .029). A test for 
identical medians revealed significant differences as well (Median test, p = .001). In the variable incentive condi-
tion median earnings were 2,025 and for the alternative condition these had been fixed in advance at 2,067. 
Mean earnings were 1,875 in the variable incentive condition and 1,679 in the fixed incentive condition. 
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Compared to the status quo, participants in both conditions managed to significantly re-
duce the mean use of risk management resources, µ(c + d ), and thus improve efficiency. 
Compared with the status quo the simulated mean use of risk management resources of the 
variable incentive condition is less negative at a significance level of α = .001 (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, p = .000) while in the fixed incentive condition this decrease is only sig-
nificant at the α = .05 level (p = .049). These different levels of significance suggest that in 
the variable incentive condition the risk management objective of efficiency is attained to a 
higher degree than in the fixed incentive condition. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = .023) 
and a one-sided Mann-Whitney U test (p = .033) indeed confirm that average use of risk 
management resources in the fixed incentive condition is significantly higher than in the 
variable incentive condition. We therefore cannot reject hypothesis 2a and conclude, as 
predicted by the principal-agent theory of incentives, that variable incentives serve efficiency 
better than fixed incentives. However, in both conditions participants failed to minimize 
mean use of risk management resources to the optimum levels (see table 7.1) which were 
significantly lower than theirs (Wilcoxon signed rank test, in both conditions p = .000). 
Thus, even though participants were able to make significant improvements on efficiency 
they were not able to attain optimum levels. 
By reducing the probability of losses exceeding the financial buffer, P (d > b), participants 
were in comparison with the status quo in both the variable and fixed incentive conditions 
able to provide more assurance that post-loss resources are sufficient (Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests, respectively p = .000 and p = .030). Inspection of table 7.3 reveals that the median 
probability of exceeding is in both conditions approximately reduced by two-thirds. These 
medians do not differ significantly between conditions (Mann Whitney U test, p = .730). 
Contrary to our prediction we therefore reject hypothesis 2b and conclude that in both in-
centive conditions participants attained comparable levels of effectiveness. Again these levels 
fall significantly short of the optimum levels of effectiveness (see table 7.1) (Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests at significance level α = .01).
Because standard deviation is often used as a measure of risk in finance, it is relevant to 
analyze its low value in the fixed incentive condition compared with its higher value in the 
status quo and variable incentive condition (see table 7.3). While a Mann Whitney U test on 
the simulated standard deviations of the use of risk management resources, σ(c + d ), did not 
reveal a significant difference between the two conditions (p = .168), a one-sided Wilcoxon 
signed rank test comparison with the status quo did reveal a significant difference with the 
fixed incentive condition (p = .040).129 It is revealing that such a reduction in spread did not 
result, however, in a lower probability of exceeding budget in the fixed incentive condition. 
The scatter diagram in figure 7.7 presents the simulation results of the participants to-
gether with the efficient frontier and the status quo. The triangles, which designate results 
under the variable incentive condition, represent with one exception an improvement on 
129  A Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing the simulated standard deviation of the status quo with the variable 
incentive condition did not reveal significant different (p = .879).
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the status quo. While these triangles mostly populate the upper half of the top-left quadrant, 
the squares, which represent results under the fixed incentive condition, are in comparison 
much more dispersed. Triangles and squares do not appear to differ in dispersion in terms 
of the probability that losses exceed the financial buffer.130 These observations corroborate 
the conclusions derived from the statistical analysis that both conditions do not significantly 
differ in terms of effectiveness but do significantly differ in terms of efficiency.
7.5.5  Assessment of utility under expected utility using Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Under the assumptions of expected utility (EU) theory the choices made by the participants 
are used to estimate a utility function using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Each 
of these choices implies that a destination cell together with its associated cost is preferred to 
all other alternative destinations and associated costs in the matrix. For a lottery that origi-
nates from a cell from the ith column and the sth row its new destination is preferred to i × s - 1 
alternative destinations in the risk matrix, including the cell of origin. When for example the 
lottery (.8 : -80K, 0) is moved to another destination, then this destination is preferred to all 
other 24 destinations, including the cell of departure itself. For this specific lottery one move 
in the matrix thus implies 24 discrete preferences. For lotteries which originate from other 
cells in the risk matrix the number of discrete preferences is lower because the game only 
130  A scatter diagram comparing the simulated mean and standard deviation of the use of risk management 
resources is presented in appendix A.
Figure 7.7 Scatter diagram of the simulated mean use of risk management resources (in € 1.000) 
and the probability of losses exceeding the financial buffer in the variable (n = 18) and fixed incentive 
condition (n = 16).
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accommodates leftward and downward moves. Because expected utility theory and portfolio 
choice share a focus on final wealth, we performed a MLE assuming linearity in probability 
and nonlinearity in utility. As MLE requires large samples this analysis is undertaken at the 
group level.131
The discrete preferences resulting from the experiment were fitted to an expected util-
ity (EU) model using MLE assuming a power utility function (CRRA, Pratt 1964).132 The 
best fit for the utility function u(x) = -((-x)b), with x representing monetary outcomes, is 
b = 0.86 which under expected utility theory suggests a convex utility function in the do-
main of losses (n = 3,956, log pseudo likelihood = -2376). Under expected utility theory 
a convex utility function in the domain of losses implies risk seeking behavior. A test of 
conformity of these results with expected value theory indicates that the hypothesis of risk 
neutrality, implying b = 1, could not be rejected (Chi-square, p = .0826). In a second 
model specification the incentive conditions, the axis-formats and their interaction did not 
prove to be a significant influence on the b-parameter (p-values were respectively p = .550, 
p = .852, p = 843, log pseudo likelihood = -2306).133 
These results are in conformity with the tendency of participants in the variable reward 
condition to behave according to expected value theory with a slight inclination to risk 
seeking behavior. They do, however, contradict the results of the nonparametric statistical 
tests in section 7.5.3 for the fixed incentive condition which suggest risk averse behavior. 
Furthermore, in contrast with these statistical tests the two incentive conditions do not 
appear as significant variables in the EU choice model. 
7.6 Discussion
In a laboratory experiment we assess the effect of a fixed and variable incentive scheme 
on choices regarding risk appetite. The results suggest that fixed incentives induce risk 
aversion, by making participants spend more on risk reduction, in particular for the low 
probability – high impact risks. In comparison with variable incentives these efforts re-
sult in a lower standard deviation of the use of risk management resources but do not 
result in a significantly smaller probability of exceeding one’s risk management budget. 
One reason for this result is that it is possible to reduce this probability of default by in-
creasing the skewness of the distribution of outcomes, which has a negative relationship 
131  It should be noted that our experimental design does not accommodate the incentivization of individual 
discrete choices such as in the random-lottery incentive scheme (Bardsley, Cubitt, Loomes, Moffatt, Starmer, 
& Sugden 2010 p.266).
132  See appendix C for the specification of these MLE-models and data fittings. The model employs a Fechner 
error specification and its code was derived from Harrison (2008).
133 In addition the b-parameter in this specification was not significant as well (p = .297). 
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with standard deviation.134 Contrary to our predictions fixed incentives, in comparison 
with variable incentives, fail to deliver more assurance regarding the effective use of risk 
management resources. In line with our predictions the fixed incentive scheme proves to 
be comparatively less efficient, as measured by the significantly higher mean use of risk 
management resources. Indicative for the efficiency induced by variable incentives is the 
correspondence of its median responses with expected value theory and the marginal ben-
efit – marginal cost rule (Vaughan 1997). 
In neither the fixed nor the variable incentive conditions participants are able to attain 
optimum levels of efficiency and effectiveness. Under both the fixed and variable incentive 
conditions participants could have reduced the probability of exceeding their budget much 
further by reducing the risk of lotteries in the risk matrix along the impact-axis instead of 
the probability axis. Participants do not seem to notice that by being indifferent between the 
direction of risk reduction they were “stuffing risk into the tails” (Nocera 2009). In the man-
agement of risk the choice which event to select for risk reduction can be based one kind of 
risk preference while the decision which direction this risk reduction should take can be based 
on another preference. A preference for impact reduction over probability reduction, given 
equal lottery means, is evidence of a risk averse preference to risk (see appendix B). By reduc-
ing the impact of lotteries participants under the variable and fixed incentive schemes would, 
compared to the status quo, have been able to reduce the probability of exceeding budget by 
a factor 10 and 100 respectively.
The risk matrix offers several advantages to conventional elicitation techniques 
that are used in decision theory. The large number of individual lotteries that can be 
evaluated simultaneously, makes it a useful instrument for analyzing portfolio risk. The 
risk matrix allows the participant a wider spectrum of choices, requiring the partici-
pant to choose which lottery needs to be moved and choose its destination in addition. 
Moving a lottery ( p
s
 : x
i
, 0) to another destination in the risk matrix yields si – 1 discrete 
preferences, which makes it quite an efficient elicitation method. These discrete choices 
can then be used to estimate model parameters, such as in our case the utility of the 
participants at the group level using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. However, our 
attempt to estimate the utility function parameter under expected utility theory did not 
substantiate findings that resulted from the independent and paired samples tests in our 
study, which revealed risk neutrality and risk aversion under respectively the variable 
and fixed incentive condition. Under MLE the null-hypotheses of a neutral risk attitude 
of the participants and of the absence of any effect of incentives on their choices could 
not be rejected. Given that the dominant choice of participants was a leftward, risk 
averse move of lotteries in the risk matrix, this is a surprising result that demands further 
investigation.
134  The Pearson mode skewness coefficient is defined by the formula (mean - mode) / standard deviation (Kenney 
& Keeping 1962 p.101).
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While our experimental design serves the purpose of assessing the influence of incentives on 
risk taking behavior, it does so using a rather abstract experimental task. Even though the 
task centers around a very popular tool in risk management, the risk matrix, it is not fully 
representative of a company-context. All lotteries in the experiment have known probabili-
ties and outcomes and the cost and effects of risk reduction are precisely known, which are 
luxuries that are available in the laboratory but usually absent in practice. While participants 
in the experiment lose their eligibility for financial rewards when losses exceed the financial 
buffer, golden handshakes and other contractual obligations prevent organizations from 
withholding financial rewards in practice. An important limitation of our study is further-
more that participants in the experiment are neither active as executives and lack experience 
in risk management. Finally, it cannot be ruled out that events at the time at which the 
experiment took place, a period of renewed financial turmoil, have influenced the responses 
of the participants. 
In future studies we aim to replicate the findings of this study with representatives 
from the business community. When these studies replicate the finding that efficient use 
of risk management resources is identical in both the variable and fixed incentive condi-
tion then this calls for a theoretical explanation, which is currently lacking. In addition we 
intend to vary the size of the financial buffer to assess whether extremely difficult and easy 
circumstances stimulate excessive risk taking or exacerbate risk aversion (Carpenter 2000, 
Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt 2008, Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, 
& Welbourne 2007). 
The implication of this experimental study is that it suggests that performance-based 
incentive schemes, despite their bad publicity since the 2007–2009 financial crisis, need 
not result in excessive risk taking but instead may promote the efficient and effective use 
of risk management resources. These findings result from an experimental design in which 
risk management resources can be construed as revenues, expenditures on risk reduction and 
sustained losses can be considered costs, and ex post risk management resources can be seen as 
profits. This experimental set-up corresponds with organizing the risk management process 
as a profit-generating business (Culp 2001 p.209), which contrasts conventional corporate 
risk cultures in which risk management is usually organized as a cost center (Daníelsson, 
Jorgensen, & De Vries 2002 p.1410, Culp 2001 p.ix). The results of our experiment suggest 
that when the financial compensation of the executive who is responsible for this risk man-
agement profit center is based on a variable performance-based incentive both the efficiency 
and effectiveness of risk management are promoted. A difficulty of organizing risk manage-
ment as a profit center in practice is, however, that ex ante expenditures on risk reduction 
are known, while the ex post benefits of risk reduction and the time at which losses manifest 
themselves are unknown. In such a context, organizing risk management as a business re-
quires safeguards that prevent opportunistic behavior and gambling (Culp 2001 p.209). In 
this light it is noteworthy that in our experiment both incentive schemes did not seem to 
stimulate risk seeking behavior, which is predicted under prospect theory, but instead pro-
moted either risk neutrality or risk aversion. In this exploratory study we find that, at least 
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in the laboratory, it is possible to curb risk appetite using performance-based incentives and 
that the default risk attitude of decision makers under portfolio risk need not be risk seeking 
in the domain of losses. However, careful experimentation with incentives in the practice of 
risk management and collection of more evidence on the aforementioned relationships are 
still required to prevent that incentives become a poison in risk management rather than 
a cure. 
7.7 Appendices
7.7.1 Appendix A: Additional scatter diagrams of simulation results
Figure 7.8 Comparison of mean use of risk management resources, µ(c + d ), with the standard de-
viation for use of risk management resources, σ(c + d ), for 251 final lottery compositions.
Figure 7.9 Scatter diagram of the simulated mean and standard deviation for the use of risk manage-
ment resources (in € 1.000) in the variable (n = 18) and fixed incentive condition (n = 16).
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7.7.2 Appendix B: Proof
Proof that under risk aversion reducing the risk of a lottery by impact reduction is preferred 
to probability reduction, when it is given that the means of the lotteries after risk reduction 
are identical.
Proof:
Define the lottery X = ( p : x, 1 - p : 0) with x < 0, 0 < p ≤ 1. Let c be the cost of reducing 
either the outcome x to x + b/p (impact reduction) or the probability p to p + b/x (probabil-
ity reduction) with b, c > 0. Define lottery Y = ( p : x + b/p - c, 1 - p : -c) as the lottery that 
results from impact reduction and lottery Z = ( p + b/x : x - c, 1 - p - b/x : -c) as the lottery 
resulting from probability reduction. It can be verified that the expected values of lotteries 
Y and Z are both px + b - c. 
We are now ready to prove that under risk aversion Y  Z. Given that aversion to mean-
preserving spreads implies risk aversion (Wakker 2010 p.75) this requires us to proof that Z is 
a reduction of a compound lottery in which one of the outcomes of single lottery Y has been 
exchanged for a mean preserving spread (Wakker 2010 p.60 footnote 4, reduction of compound 
prospects assumption). Define lottery S = (1 + b/px : x - c, -b/px : -c) with expected value 
x + b/p - c. Lottery S is a mean-preserving spread of outcome x + b/p - c. Replace outcome 
x + b/p - c in lottery Y by lottery S, its mean-preserving spread, defining the compound lottery 
Y *= ( p : S, 1 - p : - c). We next reduce this compound lottery to a single lottery by imputation 
of lottery S in lottery Y *. 
Y * = ( p : (1 + b/px : x - c, -b/px : -c), 1 - p : -c) 
Y * = ( p + b/x : x - c, -b/x : -c, 1 - p : -c)
Y * = ( p + b/x : x - c, 1 - p - b/x : -c) = Z. 
7.7.3  Appendix C: Maximum Likelihood Estimation model and data fittings  
in STATA
STATA-code for fitting an EU-model to all discrete preferences.
*  create a log file 
log using ml_mainv1_eu.log, text replace
*  load a text-file and assign names to the columns 
insheet id prob0l prob1l prob0r prob1r m0l m1l m0r m1r choice reward axes interact using 
mainv1.txt, clear
*  describe content of data in the file 
describe
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*  list the values of the variables in the file   
list
*  save the file to stata-format (.dta-file) 
save mainv1, replace
*  use the .dta file 
use mainv1, clear
*  eliminate program from memory 
program drop ML_eut0
*  define EUT with CRRA and Fechner error, and replace earlier versions of this program 
program define ML_eut0
*  specify the arguments of this program 
args lnf r LNmu
*  declare the temporary variables to be used 
tempvar prob0l prob1l prob0r prob1r m0l m1l m0r m1r y0l y1l y0r y1r euL euR euDiff mu
*  please do not display all these steps on the screen, for every ML iteration! 
quietly {
*  define the noise parameter 
generate double ‘mu’ = exp(‘LNmu’)
*  initialize the data 
generate double ‘prob0l’ = $ML_y1 
generate double ‘prob1l’ = $ML_y2 
generate double ‘prob0r’ = $ML_y3 
generate double ‘prob1r’ = $ML_y4
  generate double ‘m0l’ = $ML_y5 
  generate double ‘m1l’ = $ML_y6 
  generate double ‘m0r’ = $ML_y7 
  generate double ‘m1r’ = $ML_y8
*  evaluate the utility function 
generate double ‘y0l’ = -((-‘m0l’)^ ‘r’) 
generate double ‘y1l’ = -((-‘m1l’)^ ‘r’) 
generate double ‘y0r’ = -((-‘m0r’)^ ‘r’) 
generate double ‘y1r’ = -((-‘m1r’)^ ‘r’)
*  calculate EU of each lottery 
generate double ‘euL’ = (‘prob0l’*‘y0l’) + (‘prob1l’*‘y1l’) 
generate double ‘euR’ = (‘prob0r’*‘y0r’) + (‘prob1r’*‘y1r’)
*  get the Fechner index 
generate double ‘euDiff ’ = (‘euR’ - ‘euL’)/‘mu’
*  evaluate the likelihood 
replace ‘lnf ’ = ln($cdf(‘euDiff ’)) 
} 
end
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*  to check for syntax errors  
ml model lf ML_eut0 (r: prob0l prob1l prob0r prob1r m0l m1l m0r m1r = $version) (LNmu:)
  ml check
  ml search
*  the actual command to run the MLE model 
ml model lf ML_eut0 (r: prob0l prob1l prob0r prob1r m0l m1l m0r m1r = $version) (LNmu:), 
cluster (id)  
technique (nr) maximize
*  create output 
ml display
*  recover the core parameter mu 
nlcom (mu: exp ([LNmu]_b[_cons]))
*  for testing whether a variable is significantly different from a particular value (such as 0 or 1) 
test [r]_cons = 1
*  global programme for adding controls  
global version “reward axes interact”
*  global programme for choosing error theory, change for example to “invlogit”  
global cdf “normal”
*  close the log 
log close
STATA-output for the EU-model.
*  create output 
ml display
Log pseudolikelihood = -2376.3459
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(0) 
Prob > chi2
= 
= 
=
3956 
. 
.
(Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id)
| Robust
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
r |
_cons | .8551918 .08342 10.25 0.000 .6916915 1.018692
LNmu |
_cons | -1.89187 .3663621 -5.16 0.000 -2.609927 -1.173814
*  recover the core parameter mu 
nlcom (mu: exp([LNmu]_b[_cons])) 
mu: exp([LNmu]_b[_cons])
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
mu | .1507895 .0552436 2.73 0.006 .0425141 .2590649
*  for testing whether a variable is significantly different from a particular value (such as 0 or 1) 
test [r]_cons = 1 
(1) [r]_cons = 1 
chi2(1) = 3.01 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0826
185
STATA-output for the EU-model with the binary control variables “reward” (the two incen-
tive conditions), “axes” (the two axis-formats), and “interact” (“reward” × “axes”). 
*  create output 
ml display 
Log pseudolikelihood = -2306.3213
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(3) 
Prob > chi2
= 
= 
=
3956 
1.31 
0.7277
(Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id)
| Robust
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>| z | [95% Conf. Interval]
r |
reward | -.9814279 1.640714 -0.60 0.550 -4.197168 2.234312
axes | -.328002 1.758144 -0.19 0.852 -3.7739 3.117896
interact | .3484799 1.761938 0.20 0.843 -3.104854 3.801814
_cons | 1.71738 1.645471 1.04 0.297 -1.507684 4.942443
LNmu |
_cons | -2.165276 .2645722 -8.18 0.000 -2.683828 -1.646724
*  recover the core parameter mu 
nlcom (mu: exp([LNmu]_b[_cons])) 
mu: exp([LNmu]_b[_cons])
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>| z | [95% Conf. Interval]
mu | .1147182 .0303513 3.78 0.000 .0552309 .1742056
*  for testing whether a variable is significantly different from a particular value (such as 0 or 1)  
test [r]_cons =1 
(1) [r]_cons = 1 
chi2(1) = 0.19 
Prob > chi2 = 0.6629
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8 Conclusion
This final chapter provides a discussion of the main conclusions drawn in this thesis along 
the lines of the five questions formulated in the introduction and identifies areas for future 
research.
8.1 Decision theory, measure theory and organizational risk appetite
Chapter 2 discussed models in decision theory and methods from measure theory that en-
sure that organizational risk appetite both complies with the risk attitude of senior manage-
ment and a rational model of decision-making. It provided definitions for organizational 
risk appetite (Definition 2.2), an unbiased utility function (Definition 2.4), unbiased 
risk attitudes (Definition 2.6) and the zero equivalent risk measure (Definition 2.7). 
It furthermore derived two decision rules for enterprise risk management from this risk 
measure.
While the concept of unbiased expected utility theory, as defined in this thesis, is not 
new in decision theory (see Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker 2001), it is not generally applied 
in decision analysis. In applications, utility is usually elicited under the assumptions of ex-
pected utility theory (the classical elicitation assumption), despite empirical evidence that 
refutes the descriptive validity of this theory. At the other extreme, some applications that 
do assume a descriptively accurate theory of choice under risk, such as prospect theory or 
rank-dependent utility theory, consider probability weighting to be normative. In both these 
approaches, descriptive findings are by default assumed to have a normative status. A theory, 
in which descriptive reality and normative prescription by definition coincide and in which, 
as a consequence, natural behavior equals desired behavior, offers no added value for deci-
sion making (Howard 1988). Unbiased expected utility theory offers the best of both the 
descriptive and normative spectrum of decision theory. It adopts a descriptively valid theory 
of choice under risk, elicits a utility function that is free from well known empirical biases 
and applies this unbiased utility function in analyses within the classical expected utility 
framework. Unfamiliarity with this unbiased utility concept may be one cause for the lack 
of its application. Another cause may be that it requires the decision analyst to assume that 
the true risk preferences of a decision maker are represented by an unbiased utility function 
(Assumption 2.5). Future research should investigate the reasonableness of this assumption, 
which, in fact, was accepted a priori by the case company in chapter 5. The variety of mod-
els, conventions, tools and techniques in decision theory and decision analysis results in an 
ambiguity that broadens rather than tightens the gap between the practice and promise of 
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these disciplines. Decision theorists and analysts are therefore urged to define a set of gener-
ally agreed and accepted principles and conventions for the application of decision theory 
and analysis to practice. 
The relationship between decision theory and measure theory has been investigated 
before by researchers from both these disciplines (Goovaerts, Kaas, & Laeven 2010). This 
thesis contributes to this literature by introducing the zero equivalent risk measure, a mea-
sure for risk that is derived from the willingness-to-accept valuation method from decision 
theory and the concept of unbiased expected utility. The zero equivalent risk measure be-
longs to the family of utility based shortfall risk measures (UBSR). While utility, a concept 
from economics, has found adoption in measure theory through UBSR, its literature treats 
the specification of this utility function as an exogenous variable. While the literature on 
measure theory leaves the source of the utility function unspecified, we propose eliciting this 
function under prospect theory and applying this function to utility based risk measures 
under unbiased expected utility theory. Based upon the zero equivalent risk measure, we 
derived a limited number of decision rules for enterprise risk management. Future research 
is needed to extend this set with additional decision rules for organizational risk appetite and 
to increase their applicability by reducing the number of restrictive assumptions that were 
presented in chapter 2.
The definition of organizational risk appetite in terms of risk measures (Definition 2.2) 
is a response to the call in the risk management practitioner literature to identify 
appropriate measures for organizational risk appetite (Anderson 2011 p.8). Risk measures 
offer a unified framework for addressing the measurement of organizational risk appetite in 
both financial risk management, where risk measures are already applied, and operational 
risk management, where their application is still lacking. A refinement of Definition 2.2, 
in which the current, restrictive assumption of the independence of lotteries is avoided, is 
left for future research. Under expected utility theory, the utility function expresses both a 
decision maker’s sensitivity to outcomes and her risk attitude. In the same vein, both the 
need for the measurement of organizational risk appetite and the incorporation of the risk 
attitude of senior management are, under unbiased expected utility theory, facilitated by the 
application of the unbiased utility function to risk measures.
Chapter 3 discussed what effect risk attitudes have on the expression of organizational 
risk appetite in the risk matrix, one of the most popular tools for risk evaluation in enter-
prise risk management. While traditionally formal expressions of organizational risk appe-
tite have been based on a neutral attitude to risk, several authors in risk management agree 
that small probability – large impact risks should be ranked high in the risk prioritization, 
which implies risk aversion. While this already provides some guidance for decisions on the 
acceptability of risks, practitioners find it hard to decide on the exact location and shape 
of the boundary for organizational risk appetite in the risk matrix. To elucidate this we 
applied a marginal cost-benefit analysis to the risk matrix, based on unbiased expected util-
ity theory (chapter 3), and provided diagrams that illustrate how probability weighting and 
utility functions translate to the zoning in the risk matrix (chapter 5). We illustrate that a 
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risk averse attitude, in comparison with a neutral attitude to risk, designates a larger area in 
the risk matrix as unacceptable, in particular the area with a small probability of occurrence 
and a large impact. 
Apart from specifying the risk appetite boundary in the risk matrix, decision theory is 
also able to specify which risk reduction strategy is compatible with the risk attitude of a 
decision maker. A decrease in the expected loss of a risk can be attained either by reducing 
its probability of occurrence or its negative impact. Ceteris paribus this decrease in expected 
loss is preferably attained under expected utility theory and risk aversion by means of an im-
pact reduction strategy (proposition 3.4, preference for mean-preserving outcome reduction). 
Both by categorizing small probability – large impact as unacceptable and reverting risks to 
lower impact levels, decision makers are prevented from concentrating risk in the tail of the 
loss distribution. An illustration of this was the optimum default probability that could be 
attained in the laboratory experiment in chapter 7. Many participants in this experiment 
were, however, indifferent between a probability and an impact reduction strategy and, as 
a result, did not attain the optimum levels along the efficient frontier in this study. Future 
research is required to test whether practitioners in risk management and management show 
the same indifference to these two risk reduction strategies. By broadening the scope of deci-
sions from preferences over lotteries to preference relationships over risk reduction strategies, 
the value added of decision theory to risk management is enhanced. The study of a decision 
maker’s consistency in relation to these two types of preferences is also of interest to deci-
sion theory itself. A decision maker may, for instance, be risk neutral in her preference over 
lotteries while, on the other hand, favoring an averse risk reduction strategy. Future research 
should investigate to what degree decision makers exert these inconsistencies. 
8.2 Utility elicitation and organizational risk appetite
Chapter 4 investigated which utility elicitation method is compatible with the elicitation 
of utility in the context of organizational risk appetite. This resulted in the design of a new 
nonparametric utility elicitation method, which is an extension of the trade-off method 
(Wakker & Deneffe 1996). The novelty of our elicitation method is that utility in the 
domain of losses is not elicited independently from, but is instead derived from the utility 
of gains. The method is capable of eliciting utility over the whole domain of outcomes with-
out requiring the elicitation of a loss aversion parameter.
Based on reviews of the risk management literature in chapters 1 and 7, it is concluded 
that in the context of organizational risk appetite there is an increased call for prudence, 
which precludes risk seeking for losses and the use of unbiased convex utility functions in 
risk management. In decision theory, convex utility in the domain of losses is, however, 
reported in a small majority of studies (Wakker 2010 p.264). Our median results for the case 
company in chapter 5 indicate a concave utility function for financial damages, while those 
for the case company in chapter 6 showed a convex utility function for claims. Both these 
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studies elicited utility under prospect theory and predominantly compared risky losses with 
certainty equivalents. This reflects the mainstream convention in decision theory to elicit 
the utility of losses using gain-free lotteries, which measures the decision maker’s willing-
ness-to-pay to avoid risk and which usually induces a risk seeking response from a decision 
maker. While choices between two gain-free alternatives occur in practice, they are not the 
focal point of decisions in organizational risk appetite and should therefore be avoided in 
this particular context.135 The elicitation method in chapter 4 allowed decision makers to 
express their willingness to accept risk mainly by means of mixed lotteries. This enhances the 
realism of utility elicitation in the context of organizational risk appetite where probability 
distributions that resemble mixed lotteries are common. 
Our utility elicitation method should be able to assess the loss aversion phenomenon 
for large stakes where losses really hurt. As such it has the potential to enhance the empirical 
meaningfulness of loss aversion studies. The number of trial sessions carried out in chapter 4, 
however, was too small to draw any preliminary conclusions. Nevertheless it is quite 
remarkable that the distinctive kink around zero is mostly absent in our method and that 
for several entrepreneurs concavity of the utility of losses was found near ruin. With the 
aid of our elicitation method, future research should investigate the nature of both loss 
aversion and concavity near ruin, phenomena that were both hypothesized by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). 
It is not uncommon to find academics and practitioners in risk management who have 
serious concerns about elicitations of utility and the application of these to organizational 
risk appetite. At the same time, it is common practice in risk management to employ in-
trospective ratings of probability and impact which are grounded in pragmatism and lack 
any theoretical foundation. An example of this is the rating scales of Fine (1971), presented 
in the appendix to chapter 2. In the light of the aforementioned controversy surrounding 
utility elicitation, future research should, however, investigate the possibility of testing the 
validity of our elicitation method and those of others by triangulating its results with other 
measurement techniques. 
8.3 Describing organizational risk appetite using decision theory
Chapter 5 assessed whether expected value theory, unbiased expected utility theory or pros-
pect theory performed best in describing the organizational risk appetite expressed by the 
senior management of a large Dutch privatized government service. Being a non-profit orga-
nization, this case company lacked a focus on financial gains. For this reason, the elicitation 
135  A vivid example of a choice between two gain-free “lotteries” was presented in the BBC One television series 
Sherlock, where its lead character in the episode A Study in Pink is faced with a choice between certain death 
and a lottery with an even chance between life and certain death. 
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method that was introduced in chapter 4 could not be used in measuring utility. Instead the 
nonparametric utility elicitation method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) 
was employed.
In this study, the introspective judgment of the participants, which measured their profes-
sional opinion with respect to organizational risk appetite, neither corresponded with their 
elicited nor their unbiased risk attitudes. To the decision theorist it may come as a surprise 
that the introspective judgments in this study were best described by expected value theory, 
which is not considered to be a very accurate decision theory for descriptive purposes. Given 
that introspective judgments of the acceptability of lotteries imply that more acceptable lot-
teries are preferred to less acceptable lotteries, the preference relationships in the first part of 
the study should in theory have corresponded with the acceptability judgments in its second 
part. A possible explanation for the inability of prospect theory to describe organizational risk 
appetite relates to the difference in cognitive load of both tasks. The high cognitive load of the 
choice task, consisting of many iterative sessions between pairs of lotteries, may have acted 
as a stimulus for cognitive biases, such as nonlinear probability weighting. Under prospect 
theory this bias does not interfere with utility, but is completely captured by the probability 
weighting function. The low cognitive load of the judgment task, requiring one judgment to 
be made for single lotteries, may have stimulated trade-off like decision processes with results 
that correspond with expected value theory (Cokely & Kelley 2009). In our study, unbiased 
expected utility theory did not drive organizational risk appetite, but was instead accepted by 
the case company as a prescriptive foundation for setting organizational risk appetite. If the 
prescriptive, professional unbiased risk attitude and introspective judgment of organizational 
risk appetite of the participants had been the same, then the elicitation of an unbiased utility 
function under prospect theory would have lost its added value. 
8.4 The utility and probability weight of verbal expressions
Chapter 6 investigated whether the value of numerical translations of verbal probability 
and outcome expressions differ from those that can be inferred from choices under prospect 
theory. The main academic contribution of this study is that it bridges findings of choice-
studies involving verbal probability and outcome expressions with those that elicit prob-
ability weights and utility values. In a field study involving consultants of a large, global 
advisory firm the utility for verbal outcome expressions and the weight of verbal probability 
expressions were elicited. This study employed the semi-parametric method of Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon (2008) to elicit the utility of financial claims and introduced an 
estimation procedure for the probability weighting function that is compatible with this 
method. 
This field study replicated results from laboratory studies that demonstrated a large de-
gree of similarity between the verbal and numerical probability response mode. In our study, 
the weight of single point percentage translations of verbal probability expressions did not 
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differ significantly from the weight of verbal probability expressions inferred from choices 
under prospect theory (Hypothesis 1). This suggests that the consultants were indifferent 
between the two representation modes. As in previous studies, the context of the decision 
appeared to have a profound influence on word-to-percentage scaling. Both the judged and 
inferred percentages were lower than was expected, suggesting that participants anchored 
their interpretations and choices on the low base rate of financial claim occurrence.
The utility of single point monetary translations of verbal outcome expressions was 
significantly less negative than the utility of verbal outcome expressions inferred from the 
consultants’ choices under prospect theory (Hypothesis 2). This result suggests a disprefer-
ence for the verbal mode, which corresponds with findings from previous studies that report 
vagueness aversion in the domain of losses. Inferred outcomes were significantly more nega-
tive than judged outcomes. Both judged and inferred outcomes varied exponentially with 
the rank order of the verbal outcome expressions.
On the basis of these results, the study hypothesized that in the probability dimen-
sion source dominance over representation holds. In a context in which objective probabili-
ties are employed, such as in many laboratory experiments, all decision makers are able 
to understand that the source of uncertainty is precise and that vague or precise modes of 
representation are merely expressions of precise probability. In a business context, objective 
probabilities rarely exist, and decision makers understand that the source of uncertainty 
must be vague, regardless of the mode of representation that is used. In these examples, the 
nature of uncertainty in the probability dimension is unambiguous, while the numerical 
and verbal probability modes are ambiguous, portraying alternative meanings depending 
on the nature of uncertainty. In the outcome dimension, on the other hand, such a source 
dominance over representation may not hold because the nature of uncertainty itself is am-
biguous. In a business context, the nature of outcome estimates can be either precise, based 
on meticulous calculation of the effects of an event, or vague, based on a best guess. When 
it is unknown a priori to the decision maker whether what the nature of outcome estimates 
is vague or precise, then the mode of representation provides a signal to the decision maker 
of the nature of its underlying uncertainty. Given that the source itself is ambiguous, it is 
unable to dominate the representation mode. By manipulating the ambiguity of sources of 
uncertainty, future research should assess whether this hypothesized source dominance over 
representation holds. 
It has already been mentioned that the utility elicitation method presented in chapter 4 
is capable of accommodating verbal probability expressions. It is, however, important to 
assess whether the pair of verbal probability expressions that are used in this method com-
plement each other such that their numerical translations by the decision maker sum up 
to 100%. 
The scales of risk matrices presented in chapters 3 and 5 are often composed of a set of 
verbal probability and outcome expressions. The techniques presented in chapter 6 can be 
used to infer for each verbal probability expression its numerical counterpart and for each 
verbal outcome expression its utility value. By calculation of the product of this numerical 
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probability and utility value we derive for each cell its unbiased expected utility value, which 
can be used to articulate organizational risk appetite. 
The rating scales of Fine (1971), presented in chapter 2, can be considered as prototypes 
of the weights and utility values of verbal probability and outcome expressions introduced in 
chapter 6. In risk management, rating scales are derived from introspective judgments. Our 
application of prospect theory to verbal expressions allows us to derive rating scales entirely 
from a decision-maker’s revealed choices. It allows us to distinguish between a verbal prob-
ability (outcome) expression’s weight (utility) and its inferred probability (outcome). This 
provides a link between qualitative and quantitative risk analysis that has a solid decision 
theoretic foundation. 
8.5 Performance-based incentives and organizational risk appetite
Chapter 7 assessed experimentally what the influence of performance-based incentives is 
on expressions of risk appetite in the risk matrix. This laboratory study contributes to the 
ongoing debate about the role of performance-based incentives in risk management by high-
lighting their capacity to curb excessive risk taking as well as excessive expenditure on risk 
management.
Participants who were exposed to the variable incentive scheme in this study were 
significantly more efficient in their use of risk management resources than those under the 
fixed incentive condition. In addition, participants under the variable incentive scheme mini-
mized the probability of default equally well as those exposed to the fixed incentive scheme. 
The variable incentive condition thus performed equally well in curbing excessive risk tak-
ing and outperformed the fixed incentive scheme in curbing excessive expenditure of risk 
management resources. 
The fixed incentive scheme induced a risk averse response in the participants, mak-
ing them spend more on risk reduction, in particular for the low probability – high im-
pact risks. Such a risk averse articulation of risk appetite in the risk matrix was given a 
normative status in chapter 2 and 3. However, in chapter 7, in comparison with a more 
risk neutral risk reduction strategy, risk aversion did not result in a significantly lower 
probability of default. Such a lower probability of default would have been attained if the 
aforementioned risk averse response had been accompanied by a preference for outcome 
reduction over probability reduction (see proposition 3.4). This finding emphasizes the 
need to educate decision makers in choosing appropriate risk reduction strategies.
Principal-agent theory assumes that agents are risk averse, while decision theory pro-
vides empirical evidence of risk seeking in the domain of losses. The introspective judg-
ments of the acceptability of lotteries in chapter 5 and movements of lotteries in the risk 
matrix in chapter 7 provide evidence for risk aversion and risk neutrality. The results of the 
choice-based elicitation tasks in chapters 5 and 6 correspond with risk seeking behavior. 
These findings suggest that judgments of risk appetite need not correspond with the elicited 
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risk attitudes and are partially in agreement with the assumptions of agency theory. Future 
research should investigate these relationships with a larger sample of organizations in field 
studies and participants in laboratory studies. 
An unsolved puzzle is that the expression of risk appetite in the risk matrices in 
chapter 7 suggested risk neutral and risk averse behavior while using Maximum Likeli-
hood Estimation under expected utility theory suggested risk seeking behavior. Future 
research is necessary to assess whether the risk matrix format that was used in chapter 7 is 
a useful tool for decision theorists to elicit risk preferences.
8.6 Epilogue
The inspiration for this thesis arose from a question posed by a bachelor’s student of the 
Rotterdam University of Applied Sciences in one of my risk management courses. The 
question was whether there is a normatively preferred way to articulate risk appetite in 
the risk matrix. The aim of this thesis has been to formulate provisional answers to this 
question. While there are many unresolved issues remaining, decision theory has enabled 
me to unravel some of the questions related to organizational risk appetite. I hope that 
this thesis will inspire risk practitioners to consciously apply the concepts of decision 
theory in their measurement of organizational risk appetite and that it will attract 
researchers from decision theory to explore this new applied field of research.
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Samenvatting
Het ontrafelen van risicoacceptatiegraad
Toepassingen van besliskunde in de evaluatie van de  
risicoacceptatiegraad van organisaties
1 Inleiding 
In deze tijd van mondiale uitdagingen en wereldwijde crises zijn organisaties continu op 
zoek naar oplossingen voor het fundamentele economische probleem van het vaststellen 
welke doelen moeten worden nagestreefd en de manier waarop schaarse middelen moeten 
worden verdeeld. In hun streven om de nadelige effecten van risico te minimaliseren tegen 
zo gering mogelijke kosten, balanceren organisaties tussen de ex ante allocatie van middelen 
om risico’s te reduceren en de ex post beschikbaarheid van middelen om de gevolgen van ri-
sico’s te absorberen. De keuzes die een organisatie hierin maakt, weerspiegelen de bereidheid 
van de organisatie om risico’s te accepteren, ofwel de risicoacceptatiegraad van de organi-
satie. Schaarsheid van middelen impliceert dat niet alle risico’s kunnen worden weggenomen 
of verkleind, met als gevolg dat er een rangorde in de risico’s dient te worden vastgesteld. 
Het besliskundige begrip risicohouding bepaalt de rangorde van de geïdentificeerde risico’s. 
De risicoacceptatiegraad bepaalt vervolgens voor welk deel van deze geordende verzameling 
risico’s beheersingsmaatregelen worden genomen en voor welk deel niet. 
De risicoacceptatiegraad van een organisatie is niet onbeperkt. In dit proefschrift wordt 
daarom onderzocht hoe een gemeten risicohouding een zinvolle bijdrage kan leveren aan de 
oplossing van het economische probleem van de schaarsheid van middelen binnen risico-
management. De uitkomst van dit onderzoek is een belangrijke schakel, tussen enerzijds de 
op de risicohouding gebaseerde risicoacceptatiegraad van de leiding van een organisatie, en 
anderzijds het eenduidig vertalen van deze risicoacceptatiegraad naar methoden en techniek-
en die door medewerkers van de organisatie dienen te worden gehanteerd bij het bewaken 
van die risicoacceptatiegraad. 
In het COSO (2004a) raamwerk voor ondernemingsrisicomanagement is risico-
acceptatiegraad gedefinieerd als ‘de hoeveelheid risico in brede zin die een onderneming 
of entiteit bereid is te accepteren in het nastreven van haar missie’ (p.110). De algemene 
opinie binnen risicomanagement is dat de risicoacceptatiegraad formeel dient te worden 
vastgesteld en vastgelegd en dat zij de risicohouding van de leiding van de organisatie 
moet weerspiegelen. Recente publicaties van beoefenaars van risicomanagement benoemen 
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expliciet de behoefte aan het inbedden van de risicohouding van de leiding in de 
risicoacceptatiegraad van de organisatie (Semple 2007, Van den Brink 2007, PwC 2006, 
Barfield 2005, Zurich 2004). Voor de validatie van de risicoacceptatiegraad van organi-
saties kunnen gedragseconomische modellen en methoden worden gebruikt, waarmee 
de risicohouding van een beslisser gemeten en geanalyseerd wordt. 
Besliskunde is de discipline waarin gedragseconomen en cognitieve psychologen samen-
werken om individueel beslissingsgedrag onder risico en onzekerheid te onderzoeken. In 
de besliskunde bestaan beschrijvende modellen om de professionele risicohouding van be-
langrijke beslissers in een organisatie te meten, en normatieve modellen om de strategische 
besluitvorming over de risicoacceptatiegraad te verbeteren. Eén model uit de besliskunde 
dat in ondernemingsrisicomanagement gebruikt wordt, is de verwachte-waardetheorie 
(Huygens 1657). Dit beslismodel veronderstelt een risiconeutrale beslisser, die de prioriteit 
van de risico’s bepaalt aan de hand van de verwachtingswaarde. Een ander model voor bes-
lissen onder risico is de verwachte-nuttheorie (Cramer 1728/1954, Bernoulli 1738/1954). 
De verwachte-nuttheorie is bekend in de economie, maar wordt nog bijna niet toegepast 
in ondernemingsrisicomanagement. Deze theorie veronderstelt dat een beslisser risicoavers 
is. De verwachte-nuttheorie geeft deze risicoaverse houding van een beslisser weer met een 
concave nutscurve, waarbij het nut de subjectieve waardering van een beslisser is voor de uit-
komsten van een risico. Deze theorie kent prioriteit toe aan risico’s op basis van de wiskundige 
verwachting over de uitkomsten van een risico, die door middel van de nutscurve naar nut 
zijn getransformeerd. Zowel de verwachte-waardetheorie als de verwachte-nuttheorie heeft 
een normatieve status als rationeel model voor beslissen onder risico. De rationaliteit van de 
verwachte-waardetheorie is verbonden aan de wet van de grote aantallen. De rationaliteit van 
de verwachte-nuttheorie is vastgesteld door Von Neumann en Morgenstern (1944), die vier 
axiomata voor rationele besluitvorming hebben geformuleerd en hebben aangetoond dat deze 
equivalent zijn met de verwachte-nuttheorie. De verwachte-waardetheorie en de verwachte-
nuttheorie zijn vanuit een normatief oogpunt aantrekkelijk, maar empirisch onderzoek toont 
aan dat beide theorieën beslissingsbedrag onder risico niet accuraat beschrijven.
Een accurate, beschrijvende theorie voor beslissen onder risico die in staat is om de ratio-
nele componenten en de irrationele componenten van beslissingsgedrag te onderscheiden, is 
prospecttheorie (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992). Prospecttheorie 
beschrijft door middel van nuts- en kanswegingsfuncties voor winsten en verliezen diverse 
afwijkingen van de verwachte-nuttheorie die al eerder in de literatuur zijn beschreven. Eén 
van deze afwijkingen is het fenomeen van risicozoekend gedrag in het domein van verliezen. 
Empirisch onderzoek suggereert vervolgens dat beslissers niet alleen de uitkomsten van een 
risico transformeren maar ook de kans op het optreden van een risico. Een andere afwijking 
van de verwachte-nuttheorie betreft verliesaversie, het fenomeen dat verliezen zwaarder we-
gen dan winsten (Tversky & Kahneman 1991).
Bewijs voor deze afwijkingen biedt meer inzicht in beslissingsgedrag onder risico. Ech-
ter, dit vergrote inzicht beperkt de vrijheid van de besliskundig analist om nutscurves aan 
de hand van de verwachte-nuttheorie te meten. De gangbare toepassing van besliskunde 
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op besluitvorming door ondernemingen (e.g. Spetzler 1968, Walls & Dyer 1996, Stanford 
University Strategic Decisions Group 2010) houdt echter vast aan nutsmeting onder de 
veronderstellingen van de verwachte-nuttheorie. Een alternatief is de nutscurve te meten 
onder de veronderstellingen van prospecttheorie en deze normatief te gebruiken in analyses 
met de verwachte-nuttheorie (Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker 2001). Diverse nutsmeetmeth-
oden zijn in staat om een dergelijke ‘zuivere’ nutscurve onder de veronderstellingen van 
prospecttheorie te meten (Wakker & Deneffe 1996, Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv 
2007). Deze nutscurves worden verondersteld de werkelijke preferenties van beslissers in or-
ganisaties te vertegenwoordigen en kunnen onder de rationele verwachte-nuttheorie worden 
toegepast om de risicoacceptatiegraad van een organisatie te formuleren. 
2 Onderzoeksvragen 
Eén van de grootste struikelblokken bij het toepassen van besliskunde binnen onderneming-
srisicomanagement, is de empirische bevinding van risicozoekend gedrag ten aanzien van ver-
liezen. Als de risicoacceptatiegraad van een organisatie gebaseerd is op een convexe, ‘zuivere’ 
nutsfunctie voor verliezen, die de werkelijke preferenties van haar leiding weerspiegelt, dan 
stimuleert het toepassen van deze functie binnen de verwachte-nuttheorie de organisatie om te 
gokken. Traditioneel wordt in risicomanagement een risiconeutrale en niet een risicozoekende 
houding verondersteld. Daarnaast stellen diverse auteurs binnen het risicomanagement, in 
reactie op recente financiële schandalen en verscheidene crises, een risicoaverse houding voor. 
Impliciet toegeven aan gokken binnen risicomanagement is ook vanuit de economische wet 
van afnemend marginaal nut onacceptabel.
In operationeel risicomanagement is het gangbaar risico’s te prioriteren aan de hand 
van een risicomatrix, een assenstelsel met een schaal voor de kans van optreden en een 
schaal voor de negatieve gevolgen van een risico. De risicomatrix geeft uitdrukking aan 
de risicoacceptatiegraad door aan te geven welke risico’s acceptabel zijn, en welke ri-
sico’s onacceptabel zijn en dienen te worden beheerst. Beoefenaars van risicomanagement 
vinden het moeilijk om te bepalen waar de grens tussen acceptabele en onacceptabele 
risico’s ligt. Een ‘zuivere’ nutsfunctie van de leiding van een organisatie zou gebruikt 
kunnen worden om deze grens te bepalen, maar het is onduidelijk hoe dit moet worden 
gedaan.
In organisaties zijn er veel situaties die lijken op gemengde loterijen, dat wil zeggen 
loterijen die zowel winsten als verliezen bevatten. In de context van de risicoacceptatiegraad 
zijn vooral gemengde loterijen met grote financiële gevolgen relevant. In de besliskunde 
worden gemengde loterijen voornamelijk gebruikt voor het meten van de verliesaversiepa-
rameter. De meettechniek voor deze parameter noodzaakt de besliskundig analist om juist 
kleine bedragen te gebruiken. Gemengde loterijen met uitkomsten rond de nul zijn binnen 
de besliskunde volledig geaccepteerd, maar passen niet bij de werkelijke omstandigheden 
waaraan de leiding van een organisatie in de praktijk is blootgesteld. 
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Organisaties maken hun formeel vastgestelde risicoacceptatiegraad over het algemeen niet 
publiek. Het is daarom onbekend welke risicohouding wordt weerspiegeld in beleidsdocu-
menten die de risicoacceptatiegraad van de organisatie vastleggen. Het is onduidelijk of een 
risicozoekende tendens verwacht kan worden, zoals voor verliezen wordt voorspeld door 
prospecttheorie, een risicoaverse houding, zoals wordt verondersteld in economische model-
len, of een risiconeutrale redenering conform de verwachte-waardetheorie.
Terwijl besliskunde erg kwantitatief is, is ondernemingsrisicomanagement vaak erg 
kwalitatief van karakter. Kwantificering van risico is prominent aanwezig in financieel 
risicomanagement. In operationeel risicomanagement is het echter gebruikelijk om in 
risicoanalyses verbale uitdrukkingen van kansen en uitkomsten te gebruiken, zoals ‘on-
waarschijnlijk’ en ‘bijna zeker’ voor kansen, en ‘marginaal’ en ‘catastrofaal’ voor uitkom-
sten. Het gevolg hiervan is dat het begrip risicoacceptatiegraad vaak wordt gezien als iets 
vaags en kwalitatiefs. De vraag is dan wat de relevantie is voor operationeel risicoman-
agement van een kwantitatieve aanpak zoals wordt gehanteerd binnen de besliskunde. 
De toegevoegde waarde van besliskunde kan liggen in het met elkaar verbinden van 
kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve risicoanalyses door het bepalen van een nutswaarde voor 
verbale uitdrukkingen van uitkomsten en een kansweging voor verbale uitdrukkingen 
van kansen.
Het uitgangspunt van de principaal-agenttheorie (Laffont & Martimort 2002) is dat 
de economische agent risicoavers is. Voor het op één lijn brengen van de doelstellingen 
van de agent en de doelstellingen van de principaal kunnen financiële prikkels worden ge-
bruikt. De empirische bevinding van risicozoekend gedrag in het domein van verliezen, is 
in tegenspraak met de veronderstelling van een risicoaverse agent. Terwijl binnen de princi-
paal-agenttheorie het doel is om de agent meer risico te laten nemen, is er in reactie op de 
financiële crisis van 2008 een toenemende behoefte aan resultaatgerelateerde prikkels die 
roekeloos gedrag van economische agenten tegengaan. Het is onduidelijk wat voor prikkels 
ontworpen kunnen worden om binnen organisaties een risicoaverse risicohouding en risi-
coacceptatiegraad te bevorderen. 
Aan de hand van het bovenstaande kunnen vijf centrale vragen worden geformuleerd:
Welke modellen uit de besliskunde en welke methoden uit meettheorie zorgen ervoor 1. 
dat de risicoac ceptatiegraad van een organisatie overeenkomt met zowel de risicohoud-
ing van de leiding van de organisatie als een rationeel beslismodel? Welk effect heeft een 
risicohouding op de uitdrukking van de risicoacceptatiegraad van een organisatie in de 
risicomatrix? 
Welke nutsmeetmethode sluit aan op de context van de risicoacceptatiegraad van 2. 
organisaties? 
Als het doel het beschrijven van de risicoacceptatiegraad van beoefenaars van 3. 
risicomanagement is, welke theorie uit de besliskunde (verwachte-waardetheorie, 
‘zuivere’ verwachte-nuttheorie of prospecttheorie) kan dan het beste gebruikt 
worden? 
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Als verbale uitdrukkingen van kansen en uitkomsten worden gebruikt in de risico-eval-4. 
uatie, verschillen de introspectieve schattingen van hun waarde dan van de waarden 
die vanuit het keuzegedrag kunnen worden afgeleid onder de veronderstellingen van 
prospecttheorie? 
Wat is de invloed van resultaatgerelateerde financiële prikkels op uitdrukkingen van de 5. 
risicoacceptatiegraad in de risicomatrix? 
Om deze vijf vragen te beantwoorden is allereerst een studie gemaakt van de relevante lit-
eratuur uit de vakgebieden risicomanagement, besliskunde, meettheorie en linguïstiek, 
en van de principaal-agenttheorie. Bij gebrek aan databases op het gebied van de risi-
coacceptatiegraad van organisaties, leende de verkennende aard van de onderzoeksvragen 
zich bij uitstek voor een analyse met surveys en experimenten. Voor het testen van de meet-
methode die voortkwam uit de tweede onderzoeksvraag, is met de surveymethode de ri-
sicohouding van verschillende jonge ondernemers gemeten. De derde onderzoeksvraag is 
beantwoord door de surveymethode in te zetten bij het meten van zowel de risicohouding 
als de risicoacceptatiegraad van de beslissers van één grote onderneming. De vierde en vijfde 
onderzoeksvraag zijn beantwoord aan de hand van de experimentele dataverzamelingsmeth-
ode. In het eerste experiment is bij één grote onderneming de houding van managers ten 
aanzien van verbale uitdrukkingen van kansen en uitkomsten met betrekking tot projec-
trisico’s gemeten bij kleine en grote projecten. Het tweede experiment is uitgevoerd onder 
docenten van de Hogeschool Rotterdam om het effect van verschillende financiële prikkels 
op de risicoacceptatiegraad van de deelnemers te meten. 
3 Resultaten 
3.1 Besliskunde, meettheorie en risicoacceptatiegraad 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 2 is om duidelijk te krijgen welke modellen uit de besliskunde 
en welke methoden uit de meettheorie ervoor zorgen dat de risicoacceptatiegraad van een 
organisatie overeenkomt met zowel de risicohouding van haar leiding als een rationeel 
beslismodel. De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is dat het tegemoetkomt aan de 
behoefte van beoefenaars van risicomanagement aan een heldere maatstaf voor de risi-
coacceptatiegraad van organisaties en het inbedden van de risicohouding van de leiding 
daarin. Aan beide behoeften, het vaststellen van risicoacceptatiegraad en het inbedden van 
de risicohouding, kan worden voldaan met de verwachte-nuttheorie. In deze theorie wordt 
de risicohouding van een beslisser uitgedrukt met een nutsfunctie. Deze functie kan ver-
volgens worden gebruikt om een risicomaatstaf te bepalen, door het berekenen van het 
minimumbedrag aan kapitaal dat een organisatie verlangt om risico te kunnen accepteren 
(Föllmer & Schied 2004).
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Dit proefschrift introduceert de nul-equivalentrisicomaatstaf, een maatstaf voor risico die 
is afgeleid van de ‘willingness-to-accept’ waarderingsmethode uit de besliskunde in combi-
natie met het concept van ‘zuiver’ verwacht nut. De nul-equivalentrisicomaatstaf behoort 
tot de categorie ‘utility based shortfall risk measures’ (UBSR). Terwijl nut, een concept 
uit de economie, binnen meettheorie met UBSR al wordt toegepast, behandelt UBSR de 
nutsfunctie zelf als een exogene variabele. Waar meettheorie de bron van de nutsfunctie niet 
definieert, stelt dit hoofdstuk voor om de nutsfunctie te meten onder de veronderstellin-
gen van prospecttheorie en deze functie toe te passen op de op nut gebaseerde risicomaat-
staven onder de veronderstellingen van de ‘zuivere’ verwachte-nuttheorie. Dit hoofdstuk 
definieert aan de hand van risicomaatstaven het begrip risicoacceptatiegraad en leidt een 
beperkt aantal beslissingsregels af voor ondernemingsrisicomanagement. Toekomstig onder-
zoek is noodzakelijk om deze beslissingsregels uit te breiden met aanvullende regels en de 
toepasbaarheid hiervan te verhogen door het verminderen van het aantal in het hoofdstuk 
genoemde restrictieve veronderstellingen. 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 3 is te onderzoeken welk effect verschillende risicohoudingen 
hebben op de uitdrukking van de risicoacceptatiegraad van een organisatie in de risicoma-
trix, één van de meest populaire hulpmiddelen binnen risicomanagement. Op basis van 
methoden uit de besliskunde wordt in dit hoofdstuk onder de veronderstellingen van de 
verwachte-nuttheorie de grootte van iedere zone in de risicomatrix bepaald alsook de vorm 
van de grenslijn. Traditioneel adviseren risicomanagementtekstboeken om een risiconeu-
trale houding aan te nemen bij het bepalen van de risicoacceptatiegraad. Diverse auteurs 
binnen het risicomanagement propageren echter dat aan risico’s met een kleine kans van 
optreden en een grote impact, een grote prioriteit dient te worden toegekend, wat een 
risicoaverse houding impliceert. De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is dat het verk-
laart op welke manier methoden uit de besliskunde bijdragen aan het vastleggen van deze 
risicoaverse houding in de risicomatrix. Er wordt onderzocht hoe de ‘zuivere’ risicohouding 
van een beslisser kan worden uitgedrukt in de risicomatrix aan de hand van de nul-equiv-
alentrisicomaatstaf. Met isocontouren worden de vorm en de locatie van de onacceptabele 
risicozone in de risicomatrix afgeleid op basis van een analyse van de marginale opbreng-
sten en marginale kosten. Deze toont aan dat met een risicoaverse houding, in vergelijking 
met een risiconeutrale houding, een groter gebied binnen de risicomatrix als onacceptabel 
wordt bestempeld, in het bijzonder het gebied met een kleine kans van optreden en grote 
gevolgen. Deze analyse impliceert dat een concave nutsfunctie, die onder de verwachte-
nuttheorie een risicoaverse houding weerspiegelt, consistent is met een voorkeur voor het 
verminderen van de negatieve uitkomsten van een risico ten opzichte van een strategie van 
het verminderen van de kans van optreden van een risico. Toekomstig onderzoek is nodig 
om vast te stellen wat de voorkeur van beoefenaars van risicomanagement en managers is 
ten aanzien van deze twee risicoreducerende strategieën. Voor besliskunde is het interessant 
om de consistentie te bestuderen tussen de risicohouding die blijkt uit de selectie van onac-
ceptabele risico’s in de risicomatrix en de keuze voor gevolg- dan wel kansreductie binnen 
de risicomatrix. 
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3.2 Nutmeting en risicoacceptatiegraad 
Hoofdstuk 4 stelt vast dat bepaalde conventies binnen de besliskunde niet aansluiten op de 
context waarin de risicoacceptatiegraad van organisaties wordt bepaald. De conventie om 
het nut van verliezen te meten aan de hand van winstloze loterijen, meet de bereidheid van 
de beslisser om te betalen voor het vermijden van risico’s, wat gewoonlijk resulteert in een 
risicozoekende reactie van de beslisser. Hoewel keuzes tussen twee winstloze alternatieven in 
de praktijk voorkomen, bepalen deze niet de kern van beslissingen die betrekking hebben 
op de risicoacceptatiegraad van een organisatie en moeten deze in deze specifieke context 
worden vermeden. Het meten van de bereidheid om risico’s te accepteren door middel van 
gemengde loterijen, verhoogt het realisme van een nutmeting binnen de context van de 
risicoacceptatiegraad, waar kansverdelingen die lijken op gemengde loterijen, gemeengoed 
zijn. De conventie binnen de besliskunde is echter om deze gemengde loterijen alleen te 
gebruiken voor het meten van de verliesaversieparameter voor uitkomsten dicht bij nul. 
Hoofdstuk 4 introduceert een nieuwe meetmethode, die in staat is nut te meten onder 
de veronderstellingen van prospecttheorie over het volledige domein van uitkomsten, zonder 
dat daarbij een verliesaversieparameter dient te worden bepaald. Deze methode sluit aan op 
de context waarin organisaties hun risicoacceptatiegraad bepalen en maakt gebruik van de 
‘trade-off ’ methode (Wakker & Deneffe 1996) om nut in het domein van winst te meten. 
Deze methode is non-parametrisch en behoeft daarom geen specificatie van wiskundige 
functies of gebruik van statistische analyses om een nutsfunctie te bepalen. Het vernieu-
wende van deze meetmethode is dat nut in het domein van de verliezen niet onafhankelijk 
wordt gemeten, maar dat dit wordt afgeleid van het nut van winsten. Deze meetmethode 
beantwoordt aan de oproep in de besliskundeliteratuur om een nutsfunctie te specificeren 
voor het gehele domein van uitkomsten, in het bijzonder voor grote uitkomsten ver van het 
nulpunt (Wakker 2010). Met behulp van deze meetmethode dient toekomstig onderzoek 
het karakter vast te stellen van de fenomenen verliesaversie en concaviteit rond catastro-
fale uitkomsten. In het hoofdstuk worden de resultaten van proefsessies met ondernem-
ers getoond, samen met een aantal daaruit volgende beperkingen van de meetmethode. 
Toekomstige studies dienen de validiteit van deze meetmethode te bepalen door middel van 
het vergelijken van de resultaten met andere meetmethoden.
3.3 Het beschrijven van de risicoacceptatiegraad met besliskunde 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de relatie tussen de risicoacceptatiegraad en de risicohouding van de 
leiding van een grote Nederlandse onderneming. In dit onderzoek wordt het introspectieve 
oordeel van leidinggevenden over de risicoacceptatiegraad van de onderneming vergeleken 
met hun professionele risicohouding, die is gebaseerd op voorspellingen vanuit prospect-
theorie, de ‘zuivere’ verwachte-nuttheorie en de verwachte-waardetheorie. De nutsfuncties 
en kanswegingsfuncties van 43 leidinggevenden van de onderneming worden gemeten aan 
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de hand van de meetmethode van Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt en Paraschiv (2007). Vervolgens 
worden de leidinggevenden verzocht om aan te geven wat de risicoacceptatiegraad van de 
onderneming zou moeten zijn. Ten slotte wordt vastgesteld welke theorie uit de besliskunde 
de meest accurate voorspelling geeft voor het introspectieve oordeel van de leiding over 
de risicoacceptatiegraad.
De bevindingen van de studie zijn dat in het domein van de verliezen de nutsfunctie 
van de mediaan deelnemer licht concaaf is, wat een afnemend grensnut impliceert. De 
kanswegingsfunctie is zeer convex, wat een optimistische houding ten aanzien van de 
kans op het optreden van verliezen weerspiegelt. Gezamenlijk voorspellen deze resultaten 
een risicozoekende houding onder prospecttheorie en een risicoaverse houding onder de 
‘zuivere’ verwachte-nuttheorie. Het introspectieve oordeel van de mediaan deelnemer 
over de risicoacceptatiegraad geeft duidelijk uitdrukking aan risiconeutraliteit en risicoa-
versie en wordt significant meer accuraat beschreven door de verwachte-waardetheorie 
dan door prospecttheorie. Dit laatste is een verassing, aangezien de verwachte-waar-
detheorie binnen de besliskunde niet gezien wordt als een erg accurate, beschrijvende 
beslissingstheorie. 
3.4 Het nut en de kansweging van verbale uitdrukkingen
Hoofdstuk 6 maakt gebruik van prospecttheorie om het nut en de kansweging te meten 
die 143 consultants van een groot, wereldwijd opererend adviesbureau toekennen aan een 
verzameling verbale kans- en gevolguitdrukkingen die binnen deze organisatie worden ge-
hanteerd om projectrisico’s te managen. Naast de waarde van deze verbale uitdrukkingen die 
uit de keuzes van de consultants kan worden afgeleid, meet deze studie tevens het introspec-
tieve oordeel van de consultants over de waarde van deze verbale uitdrukkingen. Om het 
nut van financiële claims te meten, gebruikt deze studie de semi-parametrische methode van 
Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt en l’Haridon (2008). Tevens wordt een schattingsmethode voor de 
kanswegingsfunctie geïntroduceerd die aansluit op deze nutsmeetmethode.
In deze veldstudie worden resultaten uit laboratoriumstudies bevestigd, die een grote 
overeenkomst aantonen tussen keuzes aan de hand van verbale kansuitdrukkingen en keuzes 
aan de hand van numerieke kansuitdrukkingen. Het kansgewicht van een direct naar een 
kanspercentage vertaalde verbale kansuitdrukking verschilt niet significant van het kansge-
wicht van deze verbale kansuitdrukking dat onder de veronderstellingen van prospecttheorie 
kan worden afgeleid uit de keuzes van de consultants (hypothese 1). Dit suggereert dat de 
consultants onverschillig staan tegenover de twee manieren waarop de kans van optreden 
wordt uitgedrukt. Net als in eerdere studies blijkt de context waarin de beslissing plaats-
vindt, aantoonbare invloed te hebben op de relatie tussen de verbale kansuitdrukking en 
het kanspercentage. Zowel de kanspercentages gebaseerd op het introspectieve oordeel van 
de consultants als de kanspercentages die uit de keuzes van de consultants kunnen worden 
afgeleid, zijn lager dan verwacht. Dit suggereert dat de consultants hun interpretaties en 
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keuzes verankeren op het lage onderliggende kanspercentage voor het optreden van een 
financiële claim. 
Het nut van een direct naar een bedrag vertaalde verbale gevolguitdrukking is signifi-
cant meer negatief dan het nut van deze verbale gevolguitdrukking dat kan worden afgeleid 
uit de keuzes van de consultants onder de veronderstellingen van prospecttheorie (hypothese 
2). Dit resultaat suggereert een afkeer van de vage uitdrukkingsvorm voor gevolgen, wat 
overeenkomt met bevindingen uit eerdere studies die een aversie voor vaagheid aantonen in 
het domein van verliezen. Bedragen die uit de keuzes van de consultants kunnen worden af-
geleid, zijn significant meer negatief dan de bedragen die gebaseerd zijn op het introspectieve 
oordeel van de consultants. Beide bedragen worden exponentieel positiever met de rangorde 
van de verbale gevolguitdrukkingen. 
Deze resultaten suggereren dat wanneer de aard van de onzekerheid ondubbelzinnig du-
idelijk is, zij de uitdrukkingsvorm domineert. Wanneer de beslisser a priori echter niet weet 
of de aard van informatie over kansen of gevolgen vaag is of precies, dan geeft de uitdruk-
kingsvorm hiervan een signaal over de aard van de onderliggende onzekerheid aan de beslis-
ser. Toekomstig onderzoek moet door de dubbelzinnigheid van de aard van onzekerheid te 
manipuleren, vaststellen of deze veronderstelde dominantie van de aard van de onzekerheid 
over de uitdrukkingsvorm standhoudt. 
De academische bijdrage van deze studie is dat zij de bevindingen van keuzestudies met 
betrekking tot verbale kans- en gevolguitdrukkingen en de bevindingen van keuzestudies die 
nut en kansweging meten, met elkaar verbindt. De relevantie van de studie voor beoefenaars 
van risicomanagement is dat de studie aangeeft hoe een semi-kwantitatieve risicoanalyse 
kan worden vormgegeven met kanspercentages en gevolgbedragen die onder de veronder-
stellingen van prospecttheorie kunnen worden afgeleid uit de keuzes met verbale kans- en 
gevolguitdrukkingen. 
3.5 Resultaatgerelateerde prikkels en risicoacceptatiegraad 
Hoofdstuk 7 toont de keuzes van 34 docenten van de Hogeschool Rotterdam die deelnemen 
aan een laboratoriumexperiment dat is ontworpen om het effect van resultaatgerelateerde 
financiële prikkels op de risicoacceptatiegraad te bepalen. De resultaten laten zien dat een 
vaste vergoeding een risicoaverse risicoacceptatiegraad tot gevolg heeft, wat resulteert in 
meer bestedingen aan risicoreductie, in het bijzonder voor de risico’s met een lage kans en 
groot gevolg. Een variabele vergoeding resulteert in een risiconeutrale risicoacceptatiegraad. 
Deelnemers met de variabele vergoeding zijn significant meer efficiënt in hun gebruik van 
risicomanagementmiddelen dan diegenen met een vaste vergoeding. Deelnemers met de 
variabele vergoeding zijn net zo goed in staat om de kans op verlies te verkleinen als de 
deelnemers met een vaste vergoeding. Deelnemers met een variabele vergoeding zijn dus net 
zo effectief in het verkleinen van de kans op verlies als de deelnemers met een vaste vergoed-
ing, maar kunnen dit resultaat op een efficiëntere manier bereiken. De deelnemers zouden 
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een kleinere kans op verlies hebben gehad wanneer zij gekozen hadden voor het reduceren 
van de gevolgen van een risico in plaats van het reduceren van de kans op het optreden van 
een risico. Deze bevinding onderstreept het belang van het onderwijzen van beslissers in het 
hanteren van de juiste strategieën voor risicoreductie. 
Deze studie draagt bij aan het ontwerpen van effectieve en efficiënte prikkels voor 
economische agenten, een centraal thema in de economie. Het draagt tevens bij aan 
het voortgaande debat over de rol van resultaatgerelateerde prikkels bij het aan banden 
leggen van het nemen van excessieve risico’s en het beperken van excessieve uitgaven aan 
risicomanagement. 
4 Tot slot
De aanleiding voor dit proefschrift was een vraag van een bachelor-student van de Hoge-
school Rotterdam in één van mijn lessen risicomanagement. De vraag was wat normatief de 
beste manier was om de risicoacceptatiegraad in de risicomatrix weer te geven. De doelstell-
ing van dit proefschrift was om een voorlopig antwoord op deze vraag te formuleren. De 
verschillende studies in dit proefschrift beantwoorden vanuit verschillende invalshoeken 
de vraag hoe besliskunde een bijdrage kan leveren aan de koppeling tussen enerzijds de 
op de risicohouding gebaseerde risicoacceptatiegraad van de leiding van een organisatie, 
en anderzijds de vertaling van deze risicoacceptatiegraad naar methoden en technieken 
die door medewerkers van de organisatie worden gebruikt bij het implementeren van de 
risicoacceptatiegraad binnen de organisatie. Hoewel er nog vele onbeantwoorde vragen 
overblijven, heeft de besliskunde mij in staat gesteld om een deel van de problematiek 
rondom de risicoacceptatiegraad te ontrafelen. Ik hoop dat dit proefschrift beoefenaars van 
risicomanagement zal inspireren om de concepten van de besliskunde toe te passen bij het 
meten van de risicoacceptatiegraad in hun organisaties en dat het onderzoekers vanuit de 
besliskunde zal aantrekken om dit nieuwe gebied van toegepast besliskundig onderzoek 
verder te ontginnen.
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